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This thesis deals with Britain’s attitude towards European security under the 
Callaghan government from 1976 to 1979. That period saw Cold War tensions grow 
and détente lose its momentum as Britain struggled with economic weakness while 
trying to maintain its international influence. Concentrating on Cold War Europe, this 
thesis asks two questions: what policy did the Callaghan government adopt towards 
European security, and what role did Britain play in the Atlantic Alliance? 
 
It draws three conclusions. First, under Callaghan, Britain sought to maintain a 
traditionally influential role in Europe. To achieve that goal, it attempted to sustain a 
major military contribution to NATO and to foster good US-UK relations. 
Nevertheless, this policy was complicated by acute economic crisis and defence 
expenditure cuts. Britain’s credibility in the Alliance was seriously diminished and 
policymakers had to offset reductions in British hardware contributions with 
diplomatic contributions. 
 
Secondly, Britain’s role as a mediator in the Alliance contributed to its stability 
during the presidency of Jimmy Carter. Carter’s inconsistent foreign policy and lack 
of consultation with allies caused confusion and tensions soon after his inauguration. 
This gave the British room to work for the maintenance of Alliance unity and, as a 
result, the US-UK special relationship was strengthened. 
 
Thirdly, regardless of Britain’s response to its economic trails, and its collaboration 
with the US, Callaghan’s preference for status quo, and his lack of strategy towards 
European security other than the maintenance of the stability of the Alliance under 
American leadership, hampered Britain’s attempts to retain influence. As Britain’s 
power waned, West Germany’s rose as German leaders gained status in the defence 
policy making process of the Alliance by arguing for a new response to the changing 
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In the first half of the 1970s, Cold War tensions were reduced as détente seemed at 
last to be having historic effect. A momentous agreement came in May 1972 when 
the US President, Richard Nixon, and General Secretary of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, met in Moscow and 
finalised the Strategic Arms Control Talks (SALT) I. As a result, the Americans and 
the Russians agreed to limit their strategic ballistic nuclear weapon armouries. Two 
and half years later, in November 1974, Nixon’s successor Gerald Ford and Brezhnev 
met in Vladivostok and concluded a ‘base agreement’ on SALT II negotiations. At 
the same time, both countries agreed to set an ‘equal ceiling’ of strategic missiles and 
bombers and began further negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons systems. Along 
with these major developments in superpower détente, there was remarkable progress 
in the easing of tensions in Europe. The historic Helsinki conference of 31 July–1 
August 1975 saw 32 European leaders, together with those from Canada, the US and 
the Soviet Union, sign a ‘Final Act’ which committed each side to maintain the 
other’s territory and influence. Détente had reached a highpoint.
1
  
For Britain, the problem of Europe appeared to have been settled in the first half 
of the seventies. Britain’s entry into the European Community (EC) in January 1973 
was a decisive step towards a new post-East of Suez European-based policy.
2
 True, 
                                                 
1
 Robert D. Schulzinger, ‘Détente in the Nixon-Ford Years’, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne 
Westad (eds.), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume II: Crises and Détente (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp.373–94. On European détente, see Poul Villaume and Odd 
Arne Westad (eds.), Perforating the Iron Curtain: European Détente, Transatlantic Relations, and the 
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(Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2009). 
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 John W. Young, Britain and European Unity 1945–1999 (2nd edn., Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 
pp.100–11; Stephen George, An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), pp.46–70; John W. Young, ‘The Heath Government and British Entry 
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membership was still fragile and divided public opinion, but the referendum held in 
June 1975 showed that more than two thirds of voters supported Britain’s 
membership.
3
 This result formally defeated the so called ‘anti-marketeers’ and the 
government was able to quieten the long dispute over the EC, for now at least. 
Similarly, it meant the end of the harsh inner-party dispute in the Labour party and 
the government which had absorbed so much Prime Ministerial and ministerial time.
4
 
It also meant that policymakers could concentrate on dealing with other key issues 
such as European security under the new circumstances created by détente in and 
outside Europe. For the British, 1970 to 1976 can be seen as a final transitional phase 
from Empire to Europe, a process which had begun earlier in the twentieth century 
but had picked up pace in the 1960s.
5
 In 1948 Winston Churchill proclaimed that 
Britain sat uniquely at the centre of three interlocking circles; the Commonwealth 
and Empire, the transatlantic English-speaking world, and continental Europe.
6
 This 
idea was popularised in the later period, but the end of the Empire marked the end of 
one circle and British policymakers had to establish a new British foreign policy 
based on the remaining two circles, the US and western Europe. After the 1975 
referendum, the second half of the seventies was to be a period in which Britain fully 
dedicated itself to the stabilisation of détente on the basis of a new-found stability, 
ostensibly at least, of Britain's place in Europe, and the world.
7
 
                                                                                                                                          
into the European Community’, in Stuart Ball and Anthony Seldon (eds.), The Heath Government, 
1970–1974: A Reappraisal (London: Longman, 1996), pp.259–84. 
3
 David Butler and Uwe W. Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum (London: Macmillan, 1976); George, An 
Awkward Partner, pp.76–95. 
4
 Roger Broad, Labour’s European Dilemmas: From Bevin to Blair (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 
pp.104–19. 
5
 Saki Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice between Europe and the World? 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and 
World Power in the Twentieth Century (2nd edn., Harlow: Longman, 2000); David Sanders, Losing an 
Empire, Finding a Role: British Foreign Policy since 1945 (Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 
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Britain joined the EC when the integration experienced stagnation over the 
decade which continued until the early 1980s. Economic difficulties which had 
affected most European countries prevented progress in integration although French 
president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt 
had energetically led member states towards the European Monetary System (EMS). 
Nevertheless, overall, the Community lacked the dynamism of politico-economic 
integration that it had witnessed since its creation.
8
 While the EC suffered from 
so-called ‘Eurosclerosis’, Cold War détente was a major pre-occupation of European 
international and transatlantic relations. The euphoria of reduced East-West tensions 
did not last long. Détente soon lost its momentum, especially outside of Europe, 
which diminished hopes for further reduction in East-West tensions.
9
 As the same 
time, the US–Soviet SALT II negotiations did not go as smoothly as expected.
10
 
Naturally, the decline in superpower relations inevitably impacted upon Europe and 
brought transatlantic relations into conflict over the Atlantic Alliance’s response to 
increases in Soviet military strength.  
Recent declassification of primary sources from the countries concerned has 
enabled historians to begin to scrutinise this period and the events which defined it. 
This new wave of Cold War history research has shed more light on the multipolarity 
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Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004), pp.399–454. 
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1950–1991 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), pp.128–34; Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and 
Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Rev. ed., Washington D.C: 
Brookings Institution, 1994), pp.594–617. 
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of the Atlantic Alliance.
11
 It is becoming clear that there was much cooperation but 
also conflict among the Alliance over European defence in the face of deteriorating 
East-West relations. Ford’s handling of East-West relations has been subject to 
criticism, but the latest analyses argue that East-West relations soured further after 
the advent of the Carter administration and then worsened gradually during his 
presidency.
12
 Facing declining East-West relations and Soviet military build-up (in 
both the conventional and nuclear fields), the central concern for the Europeans was 
of course the defence of Europe, but their particular interest was in the modernisation 
of nuclear forces in Europe. The perception gap on this matter between the 
Americans and the Europeans most clearly emerged in the process of intra-Alliance 
discussions on nuclear balance. These occurred in the so-called ‘grey area’ – the 
medium-range nuclear weapon systems which were not included in the SALT II 
negotiations – and over NATO’s theatre nuclear forces (TNF). It has been largely 
believed that this intra-Alliance perception gap led Carter to propose the four power 
summit meeting in Guadeloupe in January 1979 which resolved the problem after 
agreement principally with the British and the Germans. However, recent works 
draw attention to the influence of European allies on US strategic considerations and 
suggest that they had greater effect on the 1979 agreement than previously thought.
13
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Cambridge University Press, 2010); Haftendorn, Helga, Georges-Henri Soutou, Stephen E. Szabo, and 
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Hopkins University Press, 2006). 
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Superpower Detente, 1975–1980’, in Leffler and Westad (eds.), The Cambridge History of the Cold 
War, Volume III, pp.135–54; and Olav Njølstad, ‘Keys of Keys? SALT II and the Breakdown of 
Détente’, in Westad (ed.), The Fall of Détente: Soviet–American Relations during the Carter Years 
(Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997), pp.34–71. 
13
 Kristina Spohr Readman, ‘Conflict and Cooperation in Intra-Alliance Nuclear Politics: Western 
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The role that the West Germans played in altering the direction of the Carter 
administration’s foreign policy has received specific attention. Spohr Readman’s 
research is noteworthy in how it has emphasised Schmidt’s influential role in the 
Alliance’s considerations on the grey area and how it has argued that Schmidt was 
the engine of change who facilitated the Guadeloupe summit in January 1979, and 
then NATO’s double track decision in December 1979.
14
   
In terms of Britain’s role in European security during the second half of the 
1970s, the general impression has been that Britain’s status was in decline, and that 
the nation was preoccupied domestically with economic problems and political strife, 
and in Europe with the Community. Britain’s policy towards European integration, 
particularly its commitment to the EMS, has attracted historians’ interest and there 
are a number of works which have explained the Callaghan government’s policy on 
monetary integration, direct elections, and the EMS.
15
 Yet to date there has been no 
real analysis of the British role in European security under Callaghan. Britain does 
appear in research on Cold War détente.
16
 But when it comes to European defence, 
                                                                                                                                          
Alliance, the United States, and the Genesis of NATO’s Dual-Track Decision, 1977–79’, Journal of 
Cold War Studies, vol.13, no.2 (Spring 2011), pp.39–89; Kristina Spohr Readman, ‘Germany and the 
Politics of the Neutron Bomb, 1975–1979’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol.21, no.2 (2010), pp.259–85; 
Joachim Scholtyseck, ’The United States, Europe, and the Dual Track Decision’, in Schulz and 
Schwartz (eds.), The Strained Alliance, pp.101–23; Leopoldo Nuti, ‘The Origins of the 1979 Dual 
Track Decision—A Survey’, in Nuti (ed.), The Crisis, pp.57–70; Helga Haftendorn, Coming of Age: 
German Foreign Policy since 1945 (Lanham, MD: Bowman & Littlefield, 2006), pp.240–57. 
14
 See Spohr Readman’s works, ‘Conflict and Cooperation’ and ‘Germany and the Politics of the 
Neutron Bomb’. 
15
 Daisuke Ikemoto, European Monetary Integration, 1970–79: British and French Experiences 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp.115–91; John W. Young, ‘Europe’, in Anthony Seldon 
and Kevin Hickson (eds.), New Labour, Old Labour: The Wilson and Callaghan governments, 1974–
79 (London: Routledge, 2004), pp.139–53; Young, Britain, pp.120–5; George, An Awkward Partner, 
pp.107–36; Sean Greenwood, Britain and European Cooperation since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1992), pp.104–8. 
16
 On Britain’s commitment to CSCE, particularly on the pre-1975 period, there are a number of 
contributions For example, Martin D. Brown, ‘A Very British Vision of Détente: The United 
Kingdom’s Foreign Policy during the Helsinki Process, 1969–1975’, in Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre 
Rey, N. Piers Ludlow, and Bernd Rother (eds.), Visions of the End of the Cold War in Europe, 1945–
1990 (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2012), pp.139–56; Robert Gerald Hughes, ‘Britain, East-West 
Détente and the CSCE’, in Vladimir Bilandžić, Dittmar Dahlmann, Milan Kosanović (eds.), From 
Helsinki to Belgrade: The First CSCE Follow-up Meeting and the Crisis of Detente (Göttingen: V&R 
Unipress, 2012), pp.119–42; Keith Hamilton, ‘Cold War by Other Means: British Diplomacy and the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1972–1975’, in Wilfried Loth and Georges-Henri 
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Britain’s role, even if it is mentioned, is supplanted by the superpower perspective or 
just touched on briefly as a supplement to the broader story of difficult transatlantic 
relations of this period.
17
 The main reason for this lack of interest is partly because 
of Britain’s supposed inactivity in this field. In a classic study, Michael Dockrill 
described the ‘relative stagnation’ of the seventies in the history of British defence 
policy and how defence issues ‘tended to be neglected’ under the Labour 
government.
18
 True, British defence policy under the Labour governments is a 
history of consecutive reductions of defence expenditures as a result of economic 
difficulties.
19
 Nevertheless, as this thesis will show, even if Britain’s defence 
contribution was substantially reduced in relative terms (i.e. the percentage of GNP 
expenditure on defence declined), among the four major NATO allies the figure 
remained second to that of the US and well above West Germany and France.
20
 In 
addition, Britain still kept its nuclear power status. Thus, despite the axes that fell on 
the defence budgets, Britain was still a major player in European security and, as we 
will see, sought to use its diplomacy to affect the course of Allied relations in the 
changing Cold War. Consequently, the questions of the evolution of Britain’s policy 
towards European defence, and its response to the increasing Soviet threat, are 
significant not only to our understanding of Britain’s history, but also of the Atlantic 
Alliance, Europe and the Cold War in the late seventies. 
One element of transatlantic relations has been generally seen as positive in this 
                                                                                                                                          
Soutou (eds.), The Making of Détente: Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965–75 
(London Routledge, 2008), pp.276–300; Luca Ratti, Britain, Ost- and Deutschlandpolitik, and the 
CSCE (1955–1975) (Bern: Peter Lang, 2008). 
17
 Early exceptions are Christoph Bluth, Britain, Germany and NATO’s Nuclear Strategy (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.214–37; Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Politics of 
Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 1969–1987: The Problem of the SS-20 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), 
pp.58–105. 
18
 Michael Dockrill, British Defence since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), p.110.   
19
 For example, see Michael Carver, Tightrope Walking: British Defence Policy since 1945 (London: 
Hutchinson, 1992), pp.105–17.  
20
 Robert Self, British Foreign and Defence Policy since 1945: Challenges and Dilemmas in a 
Changing World (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p.167; John Baylis, British Defence 
Policy: Striking the Right Balance (London: Macmillan, 1989), p.143.  
14 
 
era. Callaghan’s prime ministership is known for an improvement in the special 
relationship between the UK and the US. Whereas the bilateral relationship between 
the Heath government and the Nixon administration was problematic and turbulent, 
it is broadly recognised that their successors established cordial relations, including 
good personal ties.
21
 In the light of Britain’s scaled down defence spending, the 
Carter–Callaghan relationship was particularly important. In their private personal 
meeting during the four power summit meeting at Guadeloupe in January 1979, 
Carter agreed to transfer the Trident submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) 
technology to Britain as the replacement for the Polaris force. This story is recounted 
as a success which symbolised the specialness in Anglo-American relations at that 
time.
22
 But even this success story should be scrutinised from the context of 
European security. Britain’s nuclear deterrent could not be free from nuclear arms 
control discussions between the superpowers and within the Alliance. For this reason, 
it is necessary to consider the impact of Anglo-American relations on Britain’s 
defence policy not only in the light of the UK-US bilateral relationship but also in the 
context of transatlantic relations and European defence as a whole. 
With these considerations in mind, this thesis deals with British foreign policy 
towards European security under the Callaghan government from April 1976 to May 
                                                 
21
 John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq (2nd 
edn., Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp.101–5; Alan P. Dobson, Anglo-American Relations 
in the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 1995), p.146; Ann Lane, ‘Foreign and Defence Policy’, 
in Seldon and Hickson (eds.), New Labour, p.162. On Anglo-American relations during the 
Nixon-Heath years, see Alex Spelling, ‘Edward Heath and Anglo American Relations 1970–1974: A 
Reappraisal’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol.20, ver.4 (2009), pp.638–58. On detailed study of the 
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Political Unity (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009); Niklas H. Rossbach, Heath, Nixon and the Rebirth of the 
Special Relationship: Britain, the US and the EC, 1969–74 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); 
Catherine Hynes, The Year that Never Was: Heath, the Nixon Administration and the Year of Europe 
(Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2009).  
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 Dumbrell, A Special Relationship, pp181–2; Lane, ‘Foreign and Defence Policy’, p.161; Dobson, 
Anglo-American Relations, p.146. On Labour Governments’ attitude towards nuclear deterrent, see 
Kristan Stoddart, ‘The British Labour Government and the Development of Chevaline, 1974–79’, 
Cold War History, vol.10, no.3 (August 2010), pp.287–314.   
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1979. It aims to answer two questions: first, what kind of vision did the Callaghan 
government envisage for Britain’s policy towards European security while facing 
weakening economic conditions and deteriorating East-West relations, and secondly, 
what kind of role did Britain play in transatlantic relations? To answer these 
questions, this thesis concentrates specifically on British policy making in London 
and on intra-Alliance discussions in NATO on European security. Faced with Soviet 
military build-up, the central issue for the European allies was the military imbalance 
in Europe. Their concerns emerged more clearly in the consultations on TNF and 
grey area, two issues which this thesis concentrates upon. Consequently, other 
aspects of European security, such as Britain’s policy towards the CSCE Follow-up 
Meeting in Belgrade which began in October 1977, and its commitment to the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which the Carter administration 
energetically initiated, are considered to be separate issues and are not included as a 
major part of this research.
23
  
Detailed examination of Britain’s policy is now possible through the analysis of 
recently declassified archival sources. Since official documents from the Callaghan 
government are now open under the 30-year rule, the major part of research for this 
thesis has been undertaken at the National Archives, Kew, in the files of the Prime 
Minister’s Office, the Cabinet Office, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), 
and Ministry of Defence (MOD). This thesis also rests on numerous memoirs and 
private papers, including those of Callaghan and David Owen, his second Foreign 
Secretary from February 1977. In addition, it has also made use of primary sources 
from the NATO files in the NATO Archives in Brussels and from NATO’s e-Library. 
Likewise this research has accessed American archives available online, and 
                                                 
23
 On Belgrade CSCE Follow-up Meeting, see Vladimir Bilandžić, Dittmar Dahlmann, Milan 
Kosanović (eds.), From Helsinki to Belgrade: The First CSCE Follow-up Meeting and the Crisis of 
Detente (Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2012). 
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published West German documents. Furthermore, witness testimony has been 
employed from oral histories, correspondences and interviews with key figures. 
This thesis is the first project of its kind in the broader field of British foreign 
affairs and European security and will encourage the further development of the 
subject. It contributes to two historiographical themes. First, this research provides a 
new interpretation in the field of Britain’s diplomatic history. Britain’s struggle with 
its weakening economy culminating in the IMF crisis in 1976 was naturally a serious 
event and has drawn much comment from historians.
24
 In contrast with the 
sensational impact of this crisis on Britain’s finances and economy, its effect on other 
areas of the state’s policies and activities are lesser known. Britain’s policy towards 
European security is one such topic for research. This thesis analyses how Britain’s 
attitude towards European security was formed and modified under the economic 
predicaments, particularly in relation to the IMF crisis.
25
 Moreover, it aims to reveal 
how policymakers sought to come to terms with the nation’s declining influence. As 
mentioned earlier, Britain’s defence policy during the Callaghan government is often 
recounted in the context of the replacement of the Polaris force. While the current 
work touches on that issue, it pays more attention to the development of defence 
policy in a wider setting – the Atlantic Alliance and Europe in the Cold War – and the 
meaning of the independent nuclear deterrent in the intra-Alliance consultations on 
European defence.  
Secondly, in addition to its new perspectives on British diplomatic history, this 
thesis also makes a contribution to Cold War history. Kenneth O. Morgan’s 
authorised biography of Callaghan suggested that Callaghan envisaged his role as an 
                                                 
24
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 On the impact of defence expenditure cutbacks on the Anglo-American relationship, see Thomas 
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1976’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol.22, no.2 (2011), pp.321–37. 
17 
 
‘experienced international honest broker’.
26
 In the same vein, while pointing out 
Callaghan’s preference for ‘Atlanticism’ and his strong tie with Carter, Dumbrell has 
also suggested that Callaghan intended that Britain played the role of ‘Atlantic 
intermediary’.
27
 Lane’s research has similarly described Callaghan as an interlocutor 
in transatlantic relations, particularly between the US and West Germany.
28
 
However, while Britain’s diplomacy, and especially that of its Prime Minister, was 
closely related to intra-Alliance policymaking, there has been no detailed analysis of 
this aspect of Cold War history which examines how Callaghan himself and his 
government intended to function as intermediaries in allied relations or to what 
extent this western Cold War diplomacy worked. These are the issues which drive 
this thesis. While it builds on existing interpretations about the Callaghan 
government, and British policies towards European security more generally, it 
extends our understanding by investigating how Britain functioned in the post-IMF 
era as a nation which had to rely more on diplomacy and Cold War know-how than 
on a growing military contribution to NATO in a fast-changing East-West world. It 
seeks to examine Britain’s contribution as an aspect of Cold War history, and in 
particular how the Anglo-American relationship of the Callaghan-Carter era played 
its part too. While we have a sketchy understanding of UK-US ties from 1976 to 
1979 from memoirs and survey histories, there has until now been no research on 
how this bilateral relationship worked in the formation of Alliance policy making and 
how personal relations eased the conduct of British and American foreign policy. 
This thesis investigates how influential this bilateral relationship was in the 
intra-Alliance consultations and how it helped the British, and the Americans to a 
lesser extent, in their pursuit of their political objectives in Alliance politics. By 
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doing so, it offers thoughts about how UK-US diplomatic relations affected 
transatlantic relations and, as a consequence, East-West relations. It should be stated 
here that this is a work of British diplomatic history, resting for the most part on 
sources from the UK government and those who worked for it. Any discussion of, or 
judgements upon, the foreign policies of other nations – primarily the United States 
and West Germany – relies on the research of other specialists. 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter One investigates the 
development of British defence policy under the Callaghan government. It begins 
with an examination of Callaghan’s visions for British foreign and defence policy 
from 1974 until taking over the premiership from Harold Wilson in April 1976. It 
then shows how the Callaghan government’s defence policy was affected by the 
continuing economic crisis while détente was about to lose its momentum in and 
outside Europe. This chapter reveals that the decline in Britain’s status increased 
West Germany’s presence in the Alliance by investigating the relations between 
defence expenditure cutbacks and the Anglo-German offset negotiations. It concludes 
with an exploration of the change of British policymakers’ minds on Britain’s 
contribution to European security from physical military strength to diplomatic skills 
and knowledge in the management of transatlantic relations.   
Chapter Two tracks the Callaghan government's initial reaction to the new Carter 
administration’s policy towards European security. The Carter administration’s new 
approach to European security caused concern among the European allies about 
whether the new administration wanted a close consultation with the Alliance 
members for their pursuit of foreign policy. The Callaghan government thought that 
the establishment of a good relationship with the new administration was important 
not only to retain Britain’s influence as a principal player in European international 
relations but also to modify the administration’s radical foreign policy for the 
19 
 
maintenance of the unity of the Alliance. It illustrates how the Callaghan government 
and the Carter administration built a new Anglo-American special relationship 
through the preparations for the NATO ministerial meeting in London in May 1977. 
Chapter Three starts with an analysis of the Callaghan government’s review of 
the Carter administration’s foreign and defence policy. The success of the London 
NATO summit stabilised transatlantic relations, but European allies’ worries 
remained as the increasing Soviet military build-up in Europe and the slow 
development of the SALT II negotiations heightened anxieties. The main cause of 
concern was the lack of US initiative in intra-Alliance consultations. This chapter 
then illustrates the cacophony in the Alliance by focusing on the discussion over the 
Enhanced Radiation Warheads (ERW). It reveals the Carter administration’s 
reluctance to assume political leadership on this issue when it was dealing with the 
Soviet Union in the SALT II negotiations. While Callaghan adopted a wait-and-see 
attitude towards this issue, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt warned of the 
‘Eurostrategic’ imbalance in medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe caused by the 
SALT II negotiations which was to be known as the ‘grey area’. 
Chapter Four illustrates the close Anglo-American cooperation towards an 
Alliance consensus for the production and deployment of the ERW under US 
leadership from January 1978. The chapter then shows how that Anglo-American 
special relationship worked for the re-stabilisation of the Alliance, which was 
severely shaken by Carter’s sudden decision of the deferment of the plan at the 
beginning of April. While Schmidt lost his trust in Carter’s foreign policy towards 
European security, Callaghan consistently supported the President and his efforts 
played a decisive role in the restoration of the Carter administration’s credibility as 
the leader of the Alliance. It then considers Britain’s further contribution to the 
success of the Washington NATO summit in June 1978.  
20 
 
Chapter Five deals with intra-Alliance discussions on the modernisation of 
theatre nuclear forces (TNF) and on the grey area issue. It starts with an examination 
of the Callaghan government’s consideration on the nuclear balance in Europe. 
Given the lack of a NATO TNF equivalent to the Soviet Union’s medium-range 
nuclear systems, the Callaghan government thought that the grey area, which 
included both NATO’s TNF and Russian medium-range nuclear weapons, should be 
excluded from arms control negotiations unless the TNF were modernised, otherwise 
the Russians would take advantage of their superiority in this field in the negotiations. 
This chapter illustrates why the Callaghan government decided to accept the Carter 
administration’s ‘integrated strategy’ in which the TNF modernisation and grey area 
negotiation took place in parallel. It then elucidates Callaghan’s role in the important 
four-power summit meeting at Guadeloupe in January 1979. This chapter finally 
analyses policymakers’ thoughts in the last months of the Callaghan government on 
the decline of Britain’s presence in the Alliance and the rise of West Germany as the 









The Callaghan Government, Economic Crisis  
and British Defence Policy 
 






The first year of James Callaghan’s government was dominated by disastrous economic 
crisis and cuts in public expenditure. Recently, historians have investigated this period 
by using newly declassified British primary documents. Much attention has been paid to 
economics and finance and the impact of 1976 on the British economy. Until now, there 
has been no thorough consideration of the effects on Britain’s defence policy.
1
 This 
chapter assesses the development of British foreign and defence policy under the 
Callaghan government from April to December 1976. It focuses on two questions; first, 
on coming to power, what kind of vision Callaghan himself, and his government, 
envisaged for Britain’s policies; and secondly, how foreign policy was obliged to 
change as the result of the never-ending economic crisis which eventually led to the 
British application to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a £2.3 billion rescue 
package? 
Our analysis begins by revealing the Callaghan government’s thinking on 
transatlantic relations and European security. Then it analyses how the economic crisis 
and subsequent defence expenditure cuts eroded Britain’s influence and credibility as a 
                                                 
1




principal member of the Atlantic Alliance. As the chapter goes on to show, since the 
Labour Party returned to power in March 1974, the Wilson and Callaghan governments 
intended to target Britain’s defence contribution on Europe and adjust the size of the 
armed forces due to reduced resources in the Exchequer. Nevertheless, the economic 
crisis had greater ramifications than the British policymakers had thought. Inevitably 
the Callaghan government was obliged to reduce public expenditures and defence 
expenditure. This chapter finally investigates the process of transition in British 
policymakers’ thinking on defence expenditure cuts and the dilemma which would 
dominate the mid to late 1970s: how to maintain Britain’s presence in the Alliance as its 
military strength, and influence, declined after a seismic economic shift? 
 
 
1. The Callaghan Government’s Foreign Policy Vision 
  
When Callaghan entered No.10 Downing Street on 5 April 1976, Britain’s long-term 
diplomatic problems in Europe seemed to have reached a stage of relative stability: 
Britain’s EC membership was assured and tensions in East-West relations had 
ostensibly quietened. Therefore, the task of the new Prime Minister was to adapt 
Britain’s recently European-based foreign policy to this new phase in European 
international relations. 
Callaghan had been directing British foreign policy as Foreign and Commonwealth 
Secretary since the Labour Party came back to power in March 1974. The aging Prime 





 The Prime Minister and his Foreign Secretary shared belief in the 
concept of ‘Atlanticism’. Their Atlanticist outlook emerged soon after Wilson came 
back to office in March 1974. Callaghan told at the House of Commons on 19 March: 
 
I must emphasise that we repudiate the view that Europe will emerge only out of a process 
of struggle against America. We do not agree that a Europe which excludes the fullest and 




This clearly meant that Britain’s relations with Europe should not be developed at the 
expense of the Anglo-American relationship. Besides, Wilson affirmed the importance 
of Anglo-American relations to the US Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger at a 
meeting in the same month saying that he and Callaghan were ‘Atlanticist’.
4
 Their 
‘Atlanticism’ was based on the preference for a global rather than a European approach 
to international affairs, even though Britain was not materially much more of a 
European power.
5
 This view was reinforced by Callaghan’s observations on 
international affairs and his experiences in government convinced him that the 
Americans would help the British when their nation was in crisis.
6
  
As Prime Minister, Callaghan chose Anthony Crosland as the new Foreign Secretary 
which in part reflected inner party politics. Callaghan himself recalled later that Roy 
Jenkins was the person he was thinking of at first.
7
 However, with the vivid memory of 
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deep party disputes over Britain’s relations with Europe in the first half of seventies, his 
appointment was rejected because of his ardent pro-European attitude and active role 
during the referendum campaign in 1975.
8
 For these reasons, the idea of Jenkins as 
Foreign Secretary would have raised serious suspicions among the party’s left wing 
‘anti-marketeers’. Actually, Michael Foot, the leader of the left wing, insisted that the 
post of Foreign Secretary should not go to Jenkins because Foot’s supporters would not 
accept him.
9
 Given Foot’s influence in the left wing of the party as shown by the 
number of votes he obtained in the March leadership contest, Callaghan could not 
refuse his demand. Taking this concern into consideration, his choice of the moderate 
European Crosland was the second best alternative to avoid the confusion over the 
European affairs in the party.
10
 In the end, Jenkins was appointed to President of the 
European Commission in autumn of that year and left British politics.  
Nevertheless, Crosland had little experience in foreign affairs even though he was 
instinctively interested in the foreign secretaryship.
11
 According to one of his advisers, 
Crosland was ‘dropped from the skies into the FO’ by Callaghan.
12
 The new Foreign 
Secretary was soon preoccupied with the Cod War, the disputes between Britain and 
Iceland over fishing rights in the North Atlantic, and the problems in Rhodesia. 
Crosland said Callaghan deprecatingly that ‘when I pop off and they cut open my heart, 
on it will be engraved “fish” and “Rhodesia”’.
13
 Given these priorities, Callaghan 
himself had some room for his own influence in the management of transatlantic 
relations, a subject which engaged him. Similarly, Healey enabled Callaghan to 
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concentrate on issues outside of the Treasury; Callaghan regarded Healey as a highly 
capable Chancellor and did not want himself to be over-involved in economic matters.
14
 
These factors provided continuity between the Atlanticist outlook of the Wilson 
government and its successor. Callaghan wished to guide the development of Britain’s 
place in the world without making any major changes in its fundamentals as Britain 
began its steady adjustment, post-EC entry, to its new European and North 
Atlantic-based foreign policy. 
While the new Prime Minister prepared for the conduct of foreign policy under his 
own premiership, officials examined the future of British foreign policy in the late 
seventies on the basis of changing international affairs. On 5 April, the day Callaghan 
became Prime Minister, the FCO Planning Staff submitted a paper for the new incoming 
Foreign Secretary. The paper, titled ‘British Foreign Policy for the Late Seventies’, 
shows the FCO’s recognition of Britain’s altered status. On the one hand, it argued that 
the confirmation of Britain’s membership to the EC in June 1975 was particularly 
significant in Britain’s future foreign policy making and after the referendum the British 
had ‘thrown in our lot with our partners in the European Community’. But, while 
pointing out the importance of Britain’s relations with Europe as a confirmed member 
of the Community, the paper shared Callaghan’s policy of the maintenance of balanced 
British relations with the US and Europe. It stated that ‘(i)t is important that our 
decision to add weight to our views by voicing them through the Community should not 
be at the expense of what remains our and our partner’s most important other 
relationship, that with the US’. The paper also stressed that it was an essential European 
interest in all fields to ‘keep the Americans engaged in partnership with Europe’.
15
 On 
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this point, it is significant that the paper showed confidence in the future of the 
Anglo-American special relationship: 
 
(T)he Americans now listen to some of our European allies on some subjects as much as 
they listen to us. […] Closer German and French ties with the US are desirable, especially 
now that we are together in the European Community, but if their views are not to receive 
priority with the Americans over ours, we must be careful about preserving the assets for 
which the Americans value us. Our advice, experience and influence in international 




This indicates Britain’s two-fold objectives in its foreign policy in the Atlantic Alliance: 
sustained influence in Europe through EC membership, and preservation of the 
Anglo-American special relationship to strengthen its presence in Europe and to keep 
the US committed to European affairs.  
On the Anglo-American relationship, the paper argued that Britain’s defence 
contribution was the key. It pointed out that ‘(t)he size and nature of the British defence 
effort will be a decisive influence on Britain’s relationship with the US. This is a factor 
which needs to be weighed against the economic burdens of the defence effort’.
17
 
However, Britain’s contribution was decisive not only for relations with the US but also 
European defence as a whole. For officials, who were not necessarily optimistic about 
the future of détente, Britain’s contribution to European security was also a critical 
problem. On the basis of this concern about détente, the paper highlighted that while 
détente needed to be pursued, it should be parallel with the maintenance of Western 







defence. In addition, it continued that ‘(i)f we cannot afford to spend more, it is urgent 
from the security viewpoint that we make the best use of the resources allocated to 
defence through rationalisation and joint arms procurement’.
18
 Accordingly, good 
transatlantic relations were essential for either Britain’s political status or the unity of 
the Alliance in Europe under the Cold War. With this premise, the paper concluded that: 
 
What they [the Alliance member countries] most want from us is a restoration of our 
economy as well as a return of political and psychological self-confidence so that we can 
play a full part with them in seeking to shape events to our common advantage. The 
Americans want a strong Europe, even though they would not always be enthusiastic about 
its manifestations. The French do not want the Germans to dominate Europe. The Germans 




Therefore, it can be summarised that foreign policy under the Callaghan government 
was rooted in traditions born after 1945 and now adapted to Britain’s post-imperial, 
European-based outlook: first, to take a lead in the creation of a unified Europe which 
was amicable with the US, and secondly, to maintain Britain’s traditional relations with 
the US, all against the backdrop of maximising British influence through cooperation. It 
is important that on this fundamental strategy for British foreign policy under the new 
government, there was a consensus between the Prime Minister and the FCO officials. 
However, Britain’s presence in the Alliance was at risk. The turbulence caused by 
continued economic crisis in 1976 eroded Britain’s credibility in the Alliance and it 
prevented policymakers from pursuing these original diplomatic purposes. This 







predicament emerged particularly in the defence field. Whilst it became more necessary 
to maintain defence spending for the preservation of Britain’s presence in the Alliance, 
defence expenditure was not free from the massive spending cuts throughout the year.  
 
 
2. Defence Spending Cuts and Britain’s Contribution to European Security 
 
Given the continuing severity of the economic situation, the Labour government began 
to pursue reduction in public expenditure after they came back to power in March 1974. 
Wilson soon requested a review of Britain’s defence commitments. As early as 21 
March, the new Defence Secretary Roy Mason told the House of Commons that the 
government had ‘initiated a review of current defence commitments and capabilities 
against the resources that, given the economic prospects of the country, we can afford to 
devote to defence’.
20
 The Labour Party’s victory in the second general election in 
October secured the Party’s, and Wilson’s, position. Nevertheless, the Wilson 
government faced the problem of defence expenditure with enhanced seriousness.
21
 
The government’s review was published as chapter one of the Statement on the 
Defence Estimates 1975. It explained that ‘a new balance between commitments and 
capabilities and between manpower and equipment expenditure will be achieved to 
meet the Government’s strategic priorities’ and that ‘Britain’s defence force had to be 
concentrated on those areas in which a British contribution to collective defence would 
be most effective in ensuring Britain’s security and that of her Allies’.
22
 Based on this 
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premise, it said, NATO was a ‘linch-pin of British security’, and continued that ‘NATO 
should remain the first and overriding charge on the resources available for defence’ and 
British ‘commitments outside the Alliance should be reduced as far as possible to avoid 
overstretching our forces’.
23
 Given the pressure on resources caused by economic 
weakness, the Labour government terminated Britain’s military commitment outside the 
Atlantic Alliance and decided to concentrate its defence contribution on the NATO area. 
As the result of this decision, Britain’s role in European security became the mainstay of 
its defence policy, and as a logical consequence, it reflected more directly Britain’s real 
defence contribution under the Cold War. 
By this decision, defence expenditure was reduced by £136 million for the financial 
year 1976/77.
24
 Mason recalled later that the review was ‘the best possible outcome’ 
and could ‘preserve our core defensive interests in Europe and fully maintained the 
integrity of NATO’.
25
 On the contrary, Kissinger and the US Defense Secretary James 
R. Schlesinger were critical about Britain’s decision to downsize, particularly from the 
Mediterranean. Furthermore, they were concerned about the negative impact on NATO 
which could lead to other allies making defence reductions.
26
 In September, 
Schlesinger told Mason that the Defence Review should be regarded as a ‘one-time 
process’ and further cuts would be ‘very adverse’ for the Ford administration. He 
continued that it might lead to an intensified pressure for the withdrawals of the US 
troops in Europe, an old argument often used by Washington. In response, Mason 
confirmed that there would be no further reductions and even if they were forced, they 
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would be made in ‘tail area’, which would not affect the troops in the front line.
27
 
Schlesinger repeated his anxiety and warning in his meeting with Wilson. Wilson 
responded by emphasising that his government was pro-NATO and ‘very 
transatlantic-minded’. Nevertheless, his denial of the possibility of further expenditure 
cuts was somewhat vague.
28
  
Wilson’s vagueness came from the gloomy state of British economy. The weakened 
British economy could not afford to maintain even the re-defined defence policy. Given 
the worsened economic situation, public spending cuts were still all-important, and 
defence expenditure could not be free from the axe. As early as the autumn 1975, 
further spending cuts for the financial year 1977/78 and subsequent years were 
discussed in the Cabinet, and on 13 November the Cabinet decided after a long 
discussion a public expenditure reduction of £3,750 million. Healy persuaded Cabinet 
by warning that: 
 
(U)nless we were seen to be moving towards the possibility of external balance, it might 
well prove impossible in the interim to borrow overseas in order to finance the current 
account deficit, and the Government would then be forced to borrow from international 
institutions on conditions which would almost certainly include public expenditure cuts 




Once the total amount was settled, the next step was how to allocate this reduction 
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to the departments. Detailed discussion on defence spending cuts was held in the 
Cabinet on 9 December. Nevertheless, by then only a £2,600 million reduction had 
already been achieved and £1,150 million remained to be saved. Defence expenditure 
was an obvious target. The discussion focused on the international politico-military 
impact of defence expenditure cuts on Britain’s presence in the Alliance. It was argued 
that ‘cuts in defence expenditure implied a change in our historic position in the world 
which was irreversible.’ As this quotation shows, there was anxiety about Britain’s 
international standing caused by further defence expenditure cutbacks. In terms of 
European security, a reduced British commitment would lead the Americans to doubt 
Britain as their most reliable partner; consequently, West Germany’s status would rise. 
Yet Cabinet was also reminded that even after reductions in defence expenditure, 
Britain still spent 5% of its GNP on defence while the NATO average was 3.9%. For 
this reason, it was thought that ‘[t]his could hardly be represented as a betrayal of the 
Alliance’.
30
 Given that Britain’s tight financial conditions, a drastic spending cut was 
unavoidable and should be granted. Nonetheless, reduction of defence spending at this 
point would not only jeopardise Britain’s influence in the Alliance but also lead 
potentially to Germany’s strength. More seriously, it was recognised that the cut would 
weaken the Alliance and could change the equilibrium of power in Europe 
accomplished by détente. After a long discussion, Wilson concluded that a total of £275 
million should be cut in defence expenditure for 1978/79. He emphasised that these 
savings should be found mainly in support services and should not jeopardise Britain’s 
contribution in the Alliance.
31
 
However, Mason could not achieve this figure. What he could offer was only a total 
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saving of £175-180 million. It was obviously far shorter than the target figure.
32
 
Nevertheless, Mason wrote that it was £157 million which he could offer without 
causing distrust about Britain’s contribution to the Alliance. He warned that any 
belt-tightening greater than £157 million would harm Britain’s reputation in the 
Alliance:  
 
We have told our Allies and the public truthfully that the Defence Review was a 
fundamental re-examination of all our commitments and capabilities, with the aim of 
reducing our essential commitments […]. If we now cut further into our planned provision 
for the years 1977/78 to 1979/80 our Allies are bound to question our continuing 





Defence expenditure was discussed again in the Cabinet on 15 January 1976. Healey 
refuted the Defence Secretary’s argument by sharply pointing out that even if the figure 
of £275 million was not achievable, cutbacks of at least £200 million should be made 
and he personally thought a further saving of £225 million was still possible. Callaghan 
then found for Mason; he pointed out that the Soviet Union was growing in strength and 
that conventional force was becoming more important while nuclear strength was less 
reliable. Based on this assumption, he argued that while he understood that defence 
expenditure should have to contribute to the expenditure saving, he believed that a 
reduction of more than £200 million ‘could have a disproportionate symbolic effect 
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upon our allies’. Moreover, it was pointed out in discussion that if Britain’s defence 
expenditure was below that of France and Germany, there was a danger of ‘ceasing to 
be even a second class NATO power’. At the end of long debate, Wilson again 
proposed a compromise. While agreeing the necessity of keeping the reductions below 
£200 million, he concluded the discussion saying that savings of £193 million should be 
found. This was the figure which Healey proposed as a minimum contribution from 
defence savings to show global reductions.
34
  
The Cabinet debates about expenditure savings and defence epitomised Britain’s 
foreign policy predicament. On the one hand, Healey argued strongly that Britain’s 
economic stability had critical importance and for that purpose drastic expenditure 
saving was inevitable. On the other hand, Callaghan, Mason, and Wilson insisted that 
the preservation of defence expenditure was essential to maintain not only Britain’s 
status as a major player in the Alliance but also European security as a whole. Yet, it 
seems that the key issue for the ministers was how Britain could maintain its place in 
the Alliance facing economic decline and the rise of West Germany’s presence in 
European international politics, and how it could keep America’s attention as a special 
ally in Europe. In fact Wilson’s decision was a compromise, but it clearly backed 
Mason/Callaghan’s side. Wilson had sought a way to maintain Britain’s place in the 
Alliance by capping the cuts at the minimum level. Such was the power of the traditions 
in British foreign policy established after 1945. 
Once the defence expenditure cuts had been settled, the next tasks were to manage 
their effect on overall defence policy and to inform Britain’s allies of them. As to the 
latter point, the possibility of Britain’s defence expenditure cuts was already widely 
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known. After the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels in December, the British 
ambassador to NATO Sir John Killick reported that ‘everybody was waiting with bated 
breath for decisions to emerge from a series of British Cabinet meetings which were 
known to be going on’.
35
 He warned that if Britain curtailed its defence spending in 
research and development and depended more on the US assistance, it would harm 
Britain’s position in Europe.  
The British government decided to explain matters to the allies before the reduction 
was announced publicly in the Public Expenditure White Paper which was due to be 
published in mid-February. But the details of the reductions were already sent two days 
in advance to the US, West Germany, and NATO to convince them that this reduction 
would not affect the Britain’s contribution to NATO.
36
 The choice of the US and West 
Germany was a reflection of anxiety about a closer US-West German relationship. 
Mason wrote to Wilson of his concern about the impact of the expenditure savings on 
Britain’s status in the Alliance. He pointed out that the increasing closeness of the US 
and West Germany and the growing flexibility and influence of French policy made 
Britain’s relations with the US and West Germany weaker and its position more isolated 
in the defence field. He continued that defence expenditure reductions would accelerate 
this tendency and there was ‘more than a hint that they now regard us with a greater 
degree of wariness, even suspicion, as a weak and possibly unreliable ally to be 
increasingly discounted as a major force for cohesion and strength in the Alliance’. For 
this reason, he argued that Britain should make a maximum effort to turn their 
impression around and convince their major allies of Britain’s determination to maintain 
their contribution to NATO by emphasising that the reduction would be done in the ‘tail’ 
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area, not the ‘teeth’ area.
37
 
Possibly because of this British government’s efforts, most of the allies responded 
positively to the Public Expenditure White Paper.
38
 For example, the Germans were 
even sympathetic about the defence cuts because the main reduction was performed in 
the ‘tail’ area.
39
 However, the Americans were more exercised than other member 
states about the impact of defence cuts to the Alliance as a whole. For the Ford 
administration, any defence expenditure reduction made by their allies had potentially 
harmful effects on their effort to maintain defence spending in the face of considerable 
Congressional pressure. As soon as the Cabinet decided the defence expenditure cut in 
December, Kissinger sent a message of deep concern to Callaghan: ‘any further defense 
reductions would weaken Britain’s influence as a NATO ally, with important 
implications for future European stability’.
40
 The new US Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld repeated the same fear to British ambassador to the US, Sir Peter 
Ramsbotham.
41
 Britain’s reputation with its allies would not easily survive any further 
cuts. Even though Mason justified their decision by arguing that it would only affect in 
the ‘tail’ area, there was no tail left; any additional defence cuts would inevitably 
influence the ‘teeth’ area and, inevitably, Britain’s standing. 
On the issue of how to manage the effect of the reduction on defence policy, the 
Wilson government intended to include it in the Statement of the Defence Estimates, 
due for publication on 17 March. The Statement, first of all, defined Britain’s perception 
of the relation between defence and détente: ‘The Government is committed to the 
search for real and enduring peace in Europe, and supports NATO as an instrument of 
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détente, no less than of defence’.
42
 The Statement then re-affirmed that defence and 
détente were the two main pillars of British defence policy. However, whilst describing 
the development of détente in several areas, such as CSCE, MBFR and SALT II, it drew 
attention to the expansion of conventional forces either in quality or quantity in the 
Eastern block on ground, sea, and air. It analysed that there was no likelihood of 
aggression from the Eastern bloc, but the Soviets would take advantage of the economic 
problems which the Western countries were facing ‘to wean them away from their 




Yet, East-West détente was fading after the period of euphoria. In America, the 
critics of détente warned of the risks caused by further relaxation of tensions. As the 
presidential election of November 1976 was approaching, Ford was forced to defend his 
foreign policy from right-wing criticisms in and outside of his own party. It was 
important for him to defend the attack from Ronald Reagan, a powerful competitor to be 
the Presidential candidate.
44
 On 1 March, in a television interview, Ford did not use the 
word of ‘détente’ and described his foreign policy as ‘a policy of peace through 
strength’. Did this disappearance of the word of détente imply a visible shift in US 
foreign policy from détente to confrontation? A month later, Ramsbotham explained that 
the omission of the term was due to enhanced criticism in America of Kissinger’s 
détente policy. The Ford-Kissinger’s foreign policy faced stark attacks on SALT, the 
expansion of Soviet conventional forces, Kissinger’s negligence of human rights, and its 
commitment to the conflicts in southern Africa, particularly Angola. But what is 
                                                 
42








important in this despatch is that Ramsbotham pointed out that the Americans had not 
found the answer to the question of how to respond to the emergence of the Soviet 
Union as a ‘superpower’, and thus they were uncertain about Kissinger’s policy. 
Nevertheless, he reported that a majority of the Americans still supported the substance 
of détente. While the Ford administration’s handling of the US-Soviet relations would 
become more cautious by the end of the year, not least because of the presidential 




FCO officials agreed with this Ramsbotham’s analysis.
46
 However, there remained 
the issue of how the debate in America over its policy direction would play among 
European countries where confusion was growing. The gap between the Americans and 
the European allies became evident at the NATO ministerial meeting at Oslo in May. In 
the communiqué preparations, the Americans proposed the omission of the word of 
détente from the draft. The FCO Defence Department pointed out that NATO was an 
alliance for détente as well as defence, thus both were ‘essential to HMG’s own policy 
towards the Alliance’. In that situation the omission of the word détente would be 
‘picked up and misinterpreted […] by readers of the communiqué’.
47
 It was clear that 
the Americans wanted to delete the term because of their domestic political situation, 
and it was likely that the other allies would react more strongly against the idea than the 
British. Officials pointed out that given the difficulties the Americans were facing, ‘we 
would not want to die in the last ditch for the word détente’.
48
 This reflected the view 
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of the North American Department whose head, Derek Thomas, wrote that ‘if we expect 
the Americans to take our domestic political constraints into account from time to time, 
I would prefer us not to take the lead on this issue’.
49
 This passive attitude show 
Britain’s declining position in transatlantic relations. In fact the officials were worried 
about the American stance towards détente. But the quid pro quo in their minds was 
obvious: a dispute with the Americans might lead to a loss of sympathy for Britain’s 
politico-military predicament. In a sense, what this diplomatic dilemma indicates is the 
reality of Anglo-American relations in the latter half of seventies which will be 
described in detail in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
Objections from the other allies – especially France – ensured that ‘détente’ was 
included in the communiqué.
50
 But for the British, apprehension about the future of 
détente remained. At the ministerial meeting, Kissinger eloquently reassured allies on 
the continuation of US commitment to détente and emphasised the importance of NATO 
co-operation for its development.
51
 However, despite his assurances, Killick remained 
doubtful and asked ‘whither America?’
52
 This pessimism was criticised in the FCO. E. 
J. Hughes of the Atlantic Region Research Department argued that the Americans had 
recovered from the ‘traumas of Vietnam and Watergate’, and were still committed to an 
active foreign policy.
53
 This indicates that in the FCO there was no clear image of the 
future of US foreign and defence policy and the US presidential election campaign 
made any forecast more difficult. 
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3. The Offset Negotiation: A Thorn in the side of Anglo-German Relations 
 
While the major part of the £193 million savings in defence expenditure would be found 
in British budgets, the government now more than ever needed to recoup money from 
West Germany through offset payments for British troops stationed there. A successful 
outcome to the latest stage in the Anglo-West German offset negotiations was of crucial 
importance for Britain’s future defence policy, not simply because the total involved – 
some £50 million – would mean more than a quarter of the total required defence 
spending savings. There was a further concern: if the offset negotiations failed and the 
target figure was not reached, whatever amount that the German government would not 
pay Britain would shift to the defence budget.
54
 Since the present agreement would 
expire on 31 March 1976, a rapid and positive negotiation was critical to Britain.  
It was not the Labour government’s first experience of offset. Successive offset 
negotiations through the 1950s and 1960s had been complicated and difficult and thus 
this question had been a thorn in the side of post-war Anglo-German relations. Yet the 
question needed to be resolved. The stark fact was that the British Army of the Rhine 
(BAOR) continued to be the biggest cost for Britain’s balance of payments overseas. 
The first Wilson government faced this problem in 1966. Given severe economic 
conditions, the Labour government warned that it would be forced to reduce the number 
of British armed forces in West Germany. After six-month trilateral talks started in 
October 1966 between the UK, US and German officials, it was agreed that the 
Germans would pay for the stationing cost of the US and the UK forces in West 
Germany. In addition, the then Johnson administration offered an additional $35 million 
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(£12.5 million) in defence procurement orders with Britain.
55
  
As the Labour Party came back to power in 1974, the Anglo-German offset problem 
was an active politico-military issue. It was suggested at the Defence and Oversea 
Policy Committee (OPD) on 1 August that the British government should seek an 
arrangement in which Britain’s economic burden would be more equitably shared 
among the Alliance, and that the Germans be asked to make a much greater contribution 
to the budgetary cost of the BAOR.
56
 The matter was discussed again in detail in the 
OPD on 9 September 1975. There, it was formally decided to seek a new offset 
agreement which would commit the Germans to provide a higher cash contribution to 
maintain British troops in West Germany. It was also agreed that the British government 
should seek, at least as an opening bid, a direct budgetary payment of DM 500 million 
(just under £100 million) a year and it should not be less than DM 300 million a year.
57
  
However, the prospect of the negotiation did not seem bright from the outset. The 
British Ambassador to West Germany, Sir Oliver Wright, pointed out as early as 
mid-October that the Anglo-German offset agreement faced numerous difficulties. He 
indicated that the West German government was also engaging in cuts in public 
expenditure before the election scheduled the following year. Wright then added that for 
the Germans, the UK‘s economic problems seemed ‘self-induced’ and its European 
policy towards European unity did not attract their sympathy. Furthermore, he thought 
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that Chancellor Schmidt felt that Britain should do something in return for his support 
for the renegotiation of the terms of the Britain’s membership to the EC. Wright’s 
conclusion was bleak: fundamentally the Germans, particularly Chancellor Schmidt, did 
not wish to conclude a new offset agreement.
58
  
Nonetheless, with no option, the Labour government soon approached the Germans 
about a new offset agreement as it was critical to the future of Britain's defence 
commitment to European security as well as its status in the Alliance. As early as 
November, the then Foreign Secretary Callaghan sent a message to West German 
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher to remind him of the urgency that Britain 
attached to a new offset agreement. In his message, Callaghan stressed the significance 
of the contribution of the British troops in West Germany to the Alliance and the fact 
that Britain spent more money on defence than other European NATO countries. 
Moreover, he wrote that Anglo-German cooperation in the rescue of Britain from 
financial and economic difficulties was a ‘joint interest of both our countries’ and 
‘everything possible should be done to avoid any impairment of the burden of the 
British capacity to contribute to our common defence effort’.
59
 In this logic, a new 
offset agreement was justified in the name of European security. 
From January 1976, the British became active. Clearly the final arrangement of 
defence expenditure and the expiry of the current offset agreement led them to swift 
negotiations with the Germans. Wilson touched off the negotiation when he visited 
Copenhagen to attend a meeting of European Socialist leaders. In a brief conversation 
with Schmidt, Wilson warned the Chancellor that if Britain’s requirements on offset 
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should not be achieved, additional cuts would have to be made in ‘teeth’ area.
60
 
Schmidt gave nothing of his views away in this brief discussion, but his attitude became 
clear during his visit to Chequers in early February. According to the brief prepared for 
the meeting with Schmidt, the stationing of British forces in Germany was ‘an 
enormous burden’ to the Exchequer. It cost more than £450 million in the 1974/75 




It was not clear if Britain’s sustained pressure on the Germans affected Schmidt, but 
his reply at the Chequers meeting was both sympathetic and reluctant. Schmidt told 
Wilson in their tête-à-tête that he understood the difficulties that the British government 
was facing, but he did not regard them as serious as the British government did. At the 
same time, while he did not wish to give a ‘flat negative’ to the new offset agreement, 
he considered that it was not opportune to give the West German people any impression 
of additional credit in the election year. For Schmidt, it was ‘most important that 
nothing should be made public before October’.
62
 For the British government, however, 
the period until October would be a difficult time, but all they could do was wait; the 
Germans were dictating the timetable and any further approach to them might harden 
their attitude. 
The difference over offset occurred while Anglo-German relations were otherwise 
good. However, there were sources of concern for the British. Sir Michael Palliser, the 
Permanent Under Secretary of the FCO, noted in his minute to Callaghan of 28 January 
1976 that the West German ambassador to Britain, Karl-Günther von Hase, had said that 
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there was disappointment in Germany over Britain’s attitude towards Europe. Von Hase 
told Palliser that if Britain could not afford to contribute further finances to the EC, the 
British should show more political commitment. The same could be said in defence. 
Palliser wrote that there was disquiet at the prospect of reductions in Britain’s defence 
commitment to Germany, adding that ‘(t)he combination of anxieties about our attitude 
towards the Community and our tendency to reduce our defence effort had had a 
daunting effect on German opinion’.
63
 For the success of the offset agreement, good 
Anglo-German relations were essential and the only card left that the British could play 
– to threaten to reduce the BAOR given the lack of offset payments – might worsen 
them. The Callaghan government was hamstrung by finances at home, by the lack of 
them from Germany, and by the inability to do much about it. 
It was recognised in February that any real negotiation would not commence before 
October, when the federal election was to be held. Nevertheless, the impatient British 
government tried to persuade the Germans to sit at the negotiating table as soon as 
possible when Callaghan visited Bonn as the new Prime Minister in June. But he had no 
success as Schmidt repeated his earlier position on offset. Moreover, Schmidt added that 
West Germany would handle the US-German negotiations separately from the 
UK-German ones and that talks with the Americans had received priority and would be 
concluded soon.
64
 This separation indicated that the Germans saw negotiations with the 
Americans differently. Indeed, as Schmidt told Callaghan, the US-German offset 
agreement was secured during Schmidt’s visit to the US on 17 July. Schmidt and Ford 
issued a joint statement which announced the end of traditional US-German offset 
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agreements and a German contribution of $68 million to the cost of relocating an 
American combat brigade.
65
 The improved American balance of payments ensured that 
the Ford administration gave up on continuation of a traditional offset agreement and 
this made the surprisingly rapid conclusion possible.  
More importantly, that agreement implied two things: an improved US-German 
relationship and the arrival of a more powerful Germany in European security. J. O. 
Moreton, Minister of the British embassy in the US, reported in his despatch that the 
rapid recovery of the West German economy and further growth of its economic and 
defence power expanded the range of West German foreign policy, and made Bonn a 
major partner of Washington. Moreover, the despatch stated that good US-West German 
relations would help sustain America’s commitment to Europe and maintain Germany in 
the Western camp. Yet, to allay fears in London, it added that while US-West German 
relations would develop, Anglo-American relations could maintain their significance. Its 
conclusion was still optimistic for the British; the Germans ‘are not a nuclear power, 
they lack our understanding of the strategic nuclear problems faced by the US, which 
we have been sharing for over 30 years’. It continued that ‘despite our defence cuts we 
can still talk to the Americans across the whole range of their military preoccupations’.
66
 
In short, it came to the conclusion that the US would continue to regard the 
Anglo-American relationship as equal with US-German relations.  
The interaction between Anglo-West German and Anglo-American relations was an 
open question in the FCO. On the other hand, the British Embassy in Bonn had a 
different view. It challenged the Washington embassy’s despatch, pointing out that ‘a 
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situation in which the German voice carried more weight in Washington than our own 
would be a new one, and could in the long run have implications’.
67
 The offset 
negotiation revealed the changing power-balance among the Alliance. West Germany 
was clearly increased its presence while Britain was struggling with its financial 
difficulties to maintain its physical contribution to European security. It was important 
that this became clearer exactly when the Soviet Union’s military build-up emerged a 
more pressing threat to the Alliance.      
The successful termination of a traditional US-German offset agreement reflected 
improved US-West German relations which in turn increased Germany’s presence in the 
Alliance even if it might not decrease the strength of Anglo-American relationship. In 
contrast, the end of the traditional US-German offset agreement had a damaging impact 
on Britain’s effort to maintain its influence upon European security. Under severe 
economic woes, the British had little financial resource available for the maintenance of 
its military contribution to European security. The Anglo-German offset could 
effectively compensate for that lack. However, the fundamental problem which the 
Anglo-German offset negotiations entailed was the irony that Britain asked West 
Germany for financial support to deter the rise of its presence in the Alliance. This 
self-contradiction was increased by the devastating situation of the British economy 
throughout the rest of the year. The more the British economy deteriorated, the more 
urgent the success of Anglo-German offset negotiations became. The amount of £50 
million was crucial not only for defence expenditure but also the future of Britain’s 
presence in the Alliance. Unfortunately for British policymakers, their concerns over 
Britain’s contribution to the European defence were only set to deepen. 
                                                 
67






4. The IMF Crisis and Britain’s Presence in the Alliance 
 
In September and October 1976, Britain’s Ambassador to NATO, Sir John Killick, sent 
two despatches to the FCO titled ‘Medium and Long-term problems for NATO’. In his 
first despatch, Killick argued that NATO was ‘being taken too much for granted’, but 
the Alliance might be necessary ‘urgently and acutely’ because of increasing Soviet 
military power and its capability for military intervention outside of the NATO area as 
well as military imbalance on land in Europe.
68
 In his analysis, even if the possibility of 
Soviet military attack was not feasible, there was the real danger in Europe of Soviet 
political pressure taking advantage of their military superiority. For this reason, Killick 
proposed that NATO be used more as a forum for political consultations. He pointed out 
that there was a widespread impression that Britain’s contribution to NATO was ‘less 
genuine and wholehearted than it might be’ and ‘the pendulum has swung too far in the 
direction of the Community’. Yet, as the Defence Review stated, NATO was now the 
‘linch pin’ of Britain’s security, and Britain should play a major role in political 
consultations by encouraging the habit of ‘thinking NATO’ in the Alliance.
69
 His 
despatch suggested a way for the UK to maintain its political influence in the Alliance 
even after the defence expenditure cuts had weakened its physical contribution to 
European defence. More precisely, Killick’s despatch implied that a British initiative on 
more active Alliance consultations to resist Soviet political pressure could be an 
alternative to its declining military commitment in Europe. In his second despatch, 
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Killick referred to West Germany’s increasing influence in the Alliance. Sharing the 
view of the Embassy in Washington, he did not think the US-West German relations 
would develop at the expense of Anglo-American relations. The issue was how the 
Alliance would adjust to enable the Germans to play a greater politico-military role in 




Ramsbotham agreed with Killick’s view, reporting Americans’ concern about 
Britain’s poor performance in NATO and ‘an increasing tendency, particularly marked 
in the Pentagon, to lean towards the Germans at our expense over defence matters’. To 
counter this tendency, Ramsbotham suggested that: 
 
(I)f we cannot help to revitalise the Alliance by making a greater military contribution (as 
we obviously cannot), then we should do everything possible in other areas. Political 
consultation is one field where we can perhaps hope to inject some life at relatively small 
cost. Activity on this front should help to reassure the Americans that we take NATO as 





These analyses by senior diplomats suggested a new role for Britain in the Alliance in 
the late seventies. They argued that Britain could defend its status by taking the 
initiative in political consultation in the Alliance, and at the same time it should consider 
how to utilise Germany’s increasing presence, not by deterring it, but assisting it as 
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Soviet military strength grew. In other words, weakened economically, Britain could 
contribute to the stability of Europe and secure its influence by leading coordination in 
the Alliance, particularly with the Americans and the Germans, to adapt West Germany 
into a new situation. 
However, the Callaghan government had little time to consider Britain’s new role in 
the Alliance. Ministers were completely preoccupied with a devastating economic crisis 
from the summer of 1976. The value of sterling fell sporadically and the exchange rate 
became desperate in early June. Callaghan was still reluctant to ask the IMF for 
financial assistance, but the government decided to seek an international loan in that 
month.
72
 As a result of negotiations with major developed countries and international 
organisations, a £5.3 billion stand-by loan was arranged. Yet, it was a conditional loan. 
By the insistence of the US Treasury, the stand-by loan was available for three months 
and renewable for another three months, and that if the British government should not 
be able to return the money they would go to the IMF.
73
 
The stand-by loan gave Britain some breathing space. Still, it was necessary for the 
government to satisfy its creditors about the viability of the country's economic strategy. 
Thus a massive reduction of the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) was 
inescapable. Callaghan chaired three Cabinet meetings on 6, 15, and 19 July to decide 
the details of further public expenditure cuts. In the first meeting, on 6 July, Healey 
argued that it was essential to reduce the PSBR next year by a further £1,000 million.
74
 
Detailed discussion on defence spending was held on 15 July. Mason said that a total of 
£140 million cuts should be possible in the 1977/78 financial year by deferring capital 
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programmes and purchases of equipment, but the maximum amount which would not 
affect Britain’s responsibility for security would be £85 million by a programme of 
deferments and a temporary moratorium on all new building starts. Apart from the 
discussion on the amount to be reduced itself, further reduction was refuted by the 
argument that this cut was the fourth within the past 19 months. Besides, it was argued 
that those allies who were pressing the view that the government had allowed social 
expenditure to outrun productive capacity would not be impressed by a package which 
included a disproportionate element of defence cuts. At the end of discussion, Callaghan 
argued that the reduction of £140 million was probably ‘too high’, and concluded that of 
a total public expenditure cut of £1,000 million, another £100 million of defence 
expenditure could be reduced.
75
 It was a tough task for the ministers to have the best of 
both worlds. The expenditure had to be cut as much as possible lest the country should 
face bankruptcy, but defence spending cutbacks had to be kept in a minimum level to 
prevent further detrimental erosion of Britain’s presence and credibility in the Alliance.  
This additional defence spending cut inevitably affected Western defence and 
troubled Western allies. Immediately after the decision was taken, the US Secretary of 
Defense Rumsfeld sent a letter to Mason to express the US government’s concern by 
emphasising the increasing Soviet threat and warning that ‘(a)ny reductions that would 
weaken or appear to weaken your defense would impinge adversely and directly on the 
collective security of every ally’.
76
 Similarly in September, NATO Secretary General 
Joseph Luns expressed his anxiety to Mason not only about the military balance 
between East and West but also about the political fallout which would spread to other 
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 In response, Mason’s successor Fred Mulley told Luns on 22 
September that the impact of the cuts was not so serious saying that it was a ‘miracle’ 
that the defence expenditure cuts were relatively small compared with other cuts and the 
quality of the British forces was maintained even under such difficulties.
78
 Yet, no 
matter how the British tried to ease concerns among allies, Britain’s further unilateral 
decision was not negligible in the light of its negative impact on Alliance defence policy 
as well as on Britain’s credibility itself. Rumsfeld’s and Luns’ concerns showed that 
they were anxious that Britain’s repetitious defence expenditure reduction would cause 
a domino effect and change the posture of the Alliance which had kept the 
politico-military equilibrium. When the Soviet military threat was becoming ever 
clearer, they could be a dangerous blow to European defence. 
As the year drew on, the stand-by loan did not help the declining British economy 
and the weakness of sterling persisted over the summer. £1.1 billion was already drawn 
in June and a further £515 million at the beginning of September, but these funds did 
not bring relief to the decline in the value of sterling and it put the British economy in a 
more serious situation throughout the month. On 29 September, the British government 
finally announced that it had applied to the IMF for financial support of £3,900 
million.
79
 Along with this urgent short-term financial support from the IMF, the British 
government envisaged a huge amount of safety net for sterling repayable over six years 
mainly financed by America and West Germany.
80
 Under these circumstances, an 
Anglo-German offset agreement was yet more critical for the future of Britain’s 
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contribution to European security. In addition, an early conclusion to the negotiations 
was essential to the formulation of Defence Budgets for the financial years from 
1977/78 to 1980/81.
81
 At the same time, relations with Germany were of yet greater 
importance. A helpful German attitude was essential for the construction of the safety 
net for sterling balances as Germany was a major creditor for borrowing. 
The Federal German election ended with success for Schmidt’s SPD/FDP coalition 
on 3 October. This victory finally opened the door to the offset negotiation which the 
British government had waited for impatiently. Their hope was that the Chancellor 
intended to settle this problem at a high political level. They expected that the personal 
rapport between Callaghan and Schmidt would contribute to an early settlement.
82
 
Immediately after the election, the British made a prudent step towards the Germans. 
Callaghan called Schmidt on 6 October to congratulate him on his success and got the 
Chancellor’s agreement to a Chequers meeting on 10 October to talk about general 
political matters as well as economic problems. In that telephone conversation, 
Callaghan did not directly raise the offset problem. He just said the Chequers meeting 
would be ‘a political talk to exchange ideas and views as to what you would advise, 
what you think we can do and so on’.
83
 The British saw German help as vital, but the 
prospect of negotiation was not bright. In his telegram to Bonn, Crosland explained that 
while Schmidt’s ‘help will be of particular importance for our effort to maintain the 
value of sterling’, and as a result of the weakened position of the SPD/FDP coalition, it 
seemed ‘more unlikely than ever that this problem will be resolved except at the highest 
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level; i.e. in a deal between the Federal Chancellor and the Prime Minister’.
84
 
Nevertheless, in fact the offset problem was urgent matter, but it was also critically 
important to gain Schmidt’s support in Britain’s negotiations with the IMF. Cabinet 
Secretary Sir John Hunt wrote to Callaghan before the Chequers meeting that ‘you have 
a bigger fish to catch’. He advised that the Prime Minister ‘should take things just as far 
as the atmosphere and your political judgement dictates’ to bring a sympathetic attitude 
from Schmidt to the safety net.
85
 While Callaghan was eager to push Schmidt to 
conclude the new offset agreement, excessive demands would harm good personal 
relations and potentially lose the Chancellor’s support for Britain’s negotiation with the 
IMF. Here the power-balance in Anglo-German bilateral relations was clearly in West 
Germany’s favour.     
The Germans also began to move after the federal German election. The 
Auswärtiges Amt (the Federal German Foreign Ministry) notified Wright that the 
German side was ready to meet Britain’s request for offset talks. However, it is 
important that the Germans regarded this meeting as purely ‘fact finding’.
86
 Thus, it 
was clear from the beginning that any drastic change could not happen prior to it. In the 
following negotiations between British and German officials at the end of October, it 
was decided that the fact finding meeting was to be held on 11 November.
87
 
In the meeting between Callaghan and Schmidt on 10 October at Chequers, the main 
subject was Britain’s economic crisis. It was Schmidt who raised the offset problem, not 
Callaghan. He pointed out that the offset agreement ‘was and would be very unpopular’ 
in Germany and instead of the conclusion of a new agreement he proposed to smother 
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the offset payment in the safety net for sterling balances due to the unpopularity of the 
offset agreement in Germany. Naturally Callaghan did not give a clear answer to 
Schmidt’s proposal.
88
 But Britain’s defensive position was strengthened by this 
Schmidt’s pre-emptive remarks. 
On the other hand, Callaghan publicly implied the linkage between the economic 
crisis and the British defence contribution. In a BBC Panorama programme on 25 
October, Callaghan emphasised the role of sterling as a reserve currency and connected 
the sterling crisis with Britain’s responsibility and burdens as an Alliance member.
89
 
Furthermore, he referred to the heavy cost of the BAOR saying that:  
 
(I)f we are to be pushed into a position where we would have to make a choice between 
whether we carry on with these responsibilities or we have to say sorry our economic 
situation demands that we put our own position first, this would be a very serious matter 
for Europe. I don’t want us to make that choice and I am very clear on this. I believe very 
strongly in NATO. I believe very strongly that Britain has a great contribution to make to 




The Germans reacted quickly. The West German press gave a lot of space to the 
Prime Minister’s remark and suggested that Callaghan had threatened the withdrawal of 
the British troops stationed in Germany.
91
 German Foreign Minister Genscher was 
‘rather jumpy’ with this news but the British denied any possibility of this kind of 
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 The Panorama statement can be regarded as a ballon d’essai as an answer to 
Schmidt’s comment in Chequers on 10 October. Actually Callaghan’s linkage had been 
discussed in the government as a tactic for the offset negotiation with the Germans. 
However, the British were afraid that if Britain really withdrew its troops in Germany, 
the nation’s presence in the Alliance would suffer further decline. With this risk in mind, 
this linkage could not be more than a ballon d’essai, even if Callaghan and other British 
policymakers felt differently. 
The Germans were not only reluctant to meet British offset demands but also 
concerned about the direction of British defence policy. When Defence Secretary 
Mulley visited Bonn at the beginning of November, German Defence Minister Georg 
Leber indicated that the British could be assured of his country’s help with the 
economic crisis. However, he told Mulley that as the result of the termination of the 
US-German offset agreement it was not possible to continue with the Anglo-German 
agreement; another solution would have to be found. Moreover, he pointed out that the 
Federal German government had spent more on defence than the British.
93
 Importantly, 
during the meeting Leber asked that ‘British actions should not compel Germany into a 
position of dominance among the European members of the Alliance’.
94
 The Germans 
wanted the British to sustain their leading role in European security. They were afraid of 
being in a prominent position in the Alliance for political reasons. The shadow of their 
own history made the Germans hesitant about playing an open leadership role in 
European defence. Yet, when it came to the renewal of offset agreement, they were 
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Nevertheless, the expectation of the Callaghan government for the fact finding talks 
was still high. The FCO reminded the Bonn embassy that the meeting was to be used for 
not only fact finding but for ‘impressing on the Germans that we take the problem very 
seriously and are looking for an early solution’.
95
 The British were doomed to 
disappointment as the long-awaited 11 November discussions established broad 
agreement on the impact of stationing costs on the Britain’s balance of payments but 
little else. The Germans stressed again that the discussions were just for fact finding and 
should not be regarded as the start of formal negotiations. On the other hand, they 
implied that the entire question depended on Schmidt’s decision and he strongly 
preferred ‘some wider arrangement’ in which offset would be contained.
96
 After the 
discussions it was agreed that the Germans would take two weeks to consider their 
position. Now the ball was in the German court and, in particular, in Schmidt’s hands. 
The British needed to give their allies ‘reasonable time’ for their considerations but in 
the process London faced an irritating delay yet again. 
Along with the Anglo-German offset agreement talks, negotiations with the IMF for 
another loan were under way. The IMF team arrived in London on 1 November and 
tough bargaining continued for the next six weeks. Concurrently, the British had to 
avoid any increase of the total amount of public expenditure to protect the amount of 
savings agreed in the Cabinet in July. For this purpose, on 4 November, the Cabinet 
requested a further cut of £50 million in defence spending. Naturally the MOD objected, 
arguing that the previous cuts had dismayed the allies, in particular the Americans and 
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Germans, and that a further reduction would make the Germans refuse to negotiate a 
new offset agreement.
97
 Moreover, Mulley warned that the cut could be made only by 
reducing manpower and equipment; there was no longer any ‘tail area’ to trim. But after 
the discussion Callaghan concluded that considering the balance of opinions between 
for and against, a cut of £30 million should be made. This was an unavoidable reduction 
to protect negotiations with the IMF team. Callaghan told the ministers that ‘(i)n terms 
of the Government’s bargaining position with the IMF, it might be important to show 




Nevertheless, the government’s scheme did not satisfy the IMF team who asked for 
a far greater reduction as a condition for a loan. On 19 November, the IMF team 
presented PSBR reduction proposals which contained a massive expenditure cut of £3 
billion for 1977/78, and £4 billion for 1978/79.
99
 This IMF proposal caused serious 
dispute in the Cabinet meetings on 1, 2 and 6 December. By this stage, it became clear 
that the Americans and Germans, whose assistance Callaghan longed for, were ‘not 
prepared to bring pressure to bear on the Fund on the United Kingdom's account’.
100
 
Callaghan intended to use his personal connections with Ford, Kissinger, and Schmidt 
to press the IMF in its requirement for further cuts by emphasising potential political 
and military fallout. Yet, his personal ties with them could not deter the Fund. In fact 
these politicians were ready to help the British, but regarded the conclusion of IMF-UK 
negotiations as the proviso of their assistance for the safety net.
101
 The Cabinet was still 
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divided, but on 1 December finally agreed £1.5 billion cuts for 1977/78 (£1 billion 





 Along with these massive public spending savings, additional defence 
spending cuts were agreed in the Cabinet on 6 December: £100 million in 1977/78 and 
£200 million in 1978/79.
103
  
Further defence expenditure cuts made the early conclusion of Anglo-German offset 
negotiation more critical. After the bilateral fact finding talks on 11 November, the 
British side had refrained from pursuing the offset negotiation to avoid confusion during 
the IMF negotiations. However, London now had little time. The MOD needed to have 
specific information on the amount of offset payments and the Federal German Budget 
was nearing completion. Hunt wrote that ‘unless we get a positive response from the 
Germans in the near future, a new approach at the highest level will be required if 
further progress is to be made’.
104
 Mulley told Callaghan on 5 December that the offset 
negotiation ‘is now even more important than it was before’. While confessing that 
without the £50 million offset payment it was impossible to make further cut in the 
defence budget, he pointed out the possibility that the offset payment would be 
subsumed in ‘some wider international financial arrangements.
105
 It meant that the 
safety net for the sterling balances might not give the British any direct relief for the 
defence budget. For this reason, Healey, Crosland and Mulley agreed to try to push the 
Germans towards a separate offset agreement by having the Prime Minister’s personal 
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message to the Chancellor.
106
 After further discussions, Callaghan finally wrote to 
Schmidt on 17 December. In his letter, he repeated the financial difficulties involved in 
stationing British troops in Germany and asked Schmidt to find a political solution for 
this problem at the highest level.
107
 
The next day, 18 December, Ambassador Wright delivered Callaghan’s personal 
letter to Schmidt. The Chancellor simply told the ambassador that his immediate 
reaction to the letter was no reaction. Instead, he then quite eloquently outlined his 
thoughts on offset. He pointed out several reasons for his reluctance including the 
financial problem which Germany was also facing. There were two other reasons. First, 
he explained that he disliked the occupational overtone of offset and noted his 
determination to terminate it. Secondly, he argued that offset was not a problem which 
could be settled by a personal relationship between Callaghan and him. He continued 
that this should not be dealt with by officials who were ‘inflexible in their approach’ and 
should be handled by people ‘with sufficient flexibility’.
108
 That is to say, in Schmidt’s 
mind the traditional offset agreements were a vestige of unfair Anglo-German relations 
since the end of the Second World War and he was determined to end them. Thus, it was 
clear that the problem was not as simple as the Callaghan government envisaged, and 
would not be settled in a short period even with the help of personal rapport between the 
leaders of each country. It was also apparent that the offset problem needed to be 
handled in the wider perspective of the redefinition of the post-war Anglo-German 
relationship. In Schmidt’s mind, offset was not just a financial issue, but a fundamental 
one which related to West Germany’s status in post-war European politics.  
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In the meantime, détente was about to lose its momentum and East-West relations 
were, once again, gradually deteriorating. In Europe, concerns about the expansion of 
Soviet armed forces increased. The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in London 
assessed that for the past ten years the Soviet Union had been spending 11-12% of its 
GNP on military expenditure, instead of 7% which the British had thought, and its 
leadership had accepted the knock-on harmful effect on the civilian economy. In the JIC 
analysis, while the Soviets sought improved East-West relations in order to avoid 
further damage to the civilian sector caused by the military build-up and arms race, they 
would not compromise in arms control talks.
109
 Soviet intentions were also a feature of 
the North Atlantic Council (NAC) discussions held on 5 November where allies 
considered the future of East-West relations in the fact of the Soviet politico-military 
activities in and outside Europe.
110
 In addition, at the end of November, the Supreme 
Commander Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Alexander Haig sent a 
report to NATO ambassadors on the combat effectiveness of Allied Command Europe. 
In his report, Haig argued that if the Alliance did not make greater efforts towards the 
improvement of conventional forces, the nuclear threshold would fall to an unacceptable 
level. He warned that ‘the plain truth is, our current force position is increasingly 
inadequate to support a credible deterrent or mount a successful defense’.
111
  
Likewise, the communiqué of the NATO Defence Planning Committee (DPC) held 
in December referred to the strength of the ‘relentless growth in the Warsaw Pact forces’ 
and declared that ‘there is a need for all of the Allies to undertake further measures if 
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the Alliance is to reverse effectively the adverse trends in the NATO-Warsaw Pact 
conventional military balance’.
112
 The Americans tried to mitigate these worries by 
stressing the significance of détente for European security. In his last address to the 
NATO ministerial meeting in December before leaving the US administration, 
Kissinger said that Soviet military power was increasing as a consequence of the growth 
of Soviet industrial strength. Thus, in his view, Soviet foreign policy was fundamentally 
opportunistic and was not motivated by any specific plan for world domination or any 
other particular purposes. Kissinger was convinced of the correctness of his détente 
policy and stressed that it was the task of political leaders to recognise ‘the calculations 
of “objective realities” on which Soviet policy was based, but also to appreciate that 
détente required us not only to maintain our military strength but to show understanding 
of the elements of international order’. At the same time, Kissinger warned that if the 
West did not maintain a global military balance ‘our own capacity for creative foreign 
policy’ would be weakened, and it should indicate the limit of their tolerance ‘at the 
earliest possible point in any emerging crisis’.
113
 This logic can be applied in the 
following way to European security; in fact the Russians had been building up their 
armed forces extensively but they were motivated by the opportunism of the Soviet 
leadership and their task was eased by the military imbalance in Europe. Given strategic 
nuclear parity, it was necessary and more important than ever to maintain a 
European-wide military balance. What is important here is that even if the Americans 
and the Europeans did not necessarily share a same interpretation of Soviet intentions, 
or perceived the threat by the same measure (the Europeans generally judging it to be 
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higher for them), the allies nevertheless thought the same in terms about the necessity of 
deterrence to maintain the military balance in Europe, particularly in the conventional 
forces.
114
 With this consistency, the communiqué of the Ministerial meeting stated the 
same concern as which that of the DPC stated.
115
  
It is important to note that Britain’s decision to make deep defence expenditure cuts 
was taken just when the Alliance affirmed how critical the maintenance of a military 
balance in Europe was as Soviet armed forces continued to expand. Mulley’s letter just 
before the NATO ministerial meeting captured the difficulties which Britain faced from 
the military view: 
 
I believe therefore that we have to recognise that, if we have to present further British 
defence cut to NATO, we shall have to demonstrate either that we disagree with General 
Haig’s assessment (which I think would not be justifiable on the facts, and on which we 
should be in a minority of one) or that, while accepting it and taking it fully into account, 
we nonetheless have no alternative but to make cuts. The argument that we are squeezing 
out more fat without significant effect on our force contribution to the Alliance would 




His apprehensions were understandable, but there was no choice other than the IMF 
loan for the Callaghan government to save the country from bankruptcy. In a minute to 
Callaghan in preparation for his meeting with the Chiefs of Staff on the expenditure cuts, 
Hunt noted that it was impossible ‘both arithmetically and politically’ to satisfy the IMF 
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leaving defence expenditure untouched, and if Britain rejected the IMF loan and tried to 
manage the crisis on their own, the defence cuts would be ‘much greater’.
117
 Thus 
while Britain shared allied concerns about Soviet military power and could not deny 
Haig’s assessment, the second of Mulley’s two alternatives was the only one the 
government could pursue. The question was how the British would convey to their 
allies that they understood the increasing Soviet threat but still had to reduce their 
contribution to defend Europe from it. Crosland’s reserved statement to the NATO 
ministerial meeting contrasted with those of his colleagues and Luns told Killick of his 
deep concern about British cuts.
118
 He said that he had tried to assure their allies that 
Britain’s economies would not affect its contribution to European defence but that ‘it 
was no longer possible for the Alliance to take the British government’s word for 
this’.
119
         
Now the loss of Britain’s prestige was as clear as day. At the same time, it was also 
evident that the pursuit of détente was in trouble. Britain’s approach to this unstable 
situation was outlined in a 15 December 1976 FCO Planning Staff report named 
‘Détente and the Future of East-West Relations’. It judged the recent alteration in 
East-West relations as changes in degree, not in kind, as the nature of Soviet and 
Eastern European governments had not varied. Grounded in this understanding, the 
Planning Staff assessed that the recent criticism of détente was a result of exaggerated 
and unwarranted expectations based on political hyperbole.
120
 This view was relatively 
close to Kissinger’s, but it did not lead the planners to take an optimistic view. Their 
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report warned that although there would be no major changes in East-West relations in 
the next few years, defence spending reductions in some European countries including 
Britain would only increase the uncertainty of the East-West military balance. Moreover, 
the Planning Staff pointed out that this tendency could increase Germany’s dominant 
military power in central Europe and it might make that area unstable. They then posed 
the question which was now pressing for the Callaghan government: how should Britain 
now secure its status in Europe and the Atlantic Alliance? As a marker of the nation’s 
reduced capabilities, and in line with policy approaches from the mid-1950s, the report 
argued that crisis management was the field in which the Americans should take the 
lead. The prescription was straightforward: the European allies, including Britain, ‘need 
to maintain pressure on the US for substantial […] consultation, and to respond to it and 
reciprocate where appropriate.’ For this reason, the Planning Staff concluded that 
Britain could contribute to the development of détente by feeding ideas into 
intra-Alliance and intra-European discussions.
121
 Ideas and diplomacy, rather than 
troops and ammunition, would be the way to enhance the British commitment to 
European security. 
As mentioned above, the idea of Britain’s fulfilling the role of coordinator or 
mediator in the Alliance had frequently emerged in the FCO’s deliberations during 1976. 
However, from the point of view of European security, it fizzled out and was 
overshadowed by the repeated defence spending cuts during the year. Britain could not 
act as a coordinator for the Alliance while it was undermining its defences. If the British 
government wished to play a major role through their ideas for the future of the Alliance, 
it was necessary for them to recover their credibility or to offer a new and feasible 





strategy in which Britain could play a reasonable part based on the changing 
international setting. Over the next year, the seemingly intractable difficulty of dealing 
with this dilemma against the backdrop of Britain’s worst ever economic crisis was 





By spring 1976, British defence policy had clearly become Europe-centred as a result of 
the two Statement of Defence Estimates in 1975 and 1976. These Statements put an end 
to Britain’s external military commitment which had survived even after the decision of 
retreat from east of Suez in 1967. They also established as Britain’s main priorities 
defence and détente in Europe based on NATO. Fundamentally, this change was a way 
to adapt to realities; Britain’s policies were now finally undergoing the transformation 
wrought upon them by its evident decline. Unable to maintain its external commitments, 
Britain accelerated the concentration of its resources upon Europe.  
However, persistent economic crisis deprived Britain’s new defence policy of its 
momentum for either defence or détente. In 1976, the euphoria of détente diminished as 
a result of increased Soviet military power and the threat it presented to the West. 
NATO allies had to boost their defence expenditure to maintain military balance in 
Europe. In this sense, 1976 was a watershed in the Cold War for defence and détente. 
Nevertheless, although Britain intended to commit to European defence, economic 
crisis prevented it from doing so. In these circumstances, Britain was in a severe 
predicament. in his Annual Report for 1976, the UK ambassador to NATO Killick 
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wrote that, in response to Britain’s massive defence spending cut, ‘there has until now 
been headshaking sympathy rather than outright criticism, and the former is almost 
harder to take’. He also predicted that ‘(t)his will doubtless now change for the 
worse’.
122
 This sympathy was, however, a sign of Britain’s declining presence in the 
Alliance. The allies could no longer rely on Britain to maintain its military contribution 
to European security at the levels they had grown accustomed to. 
The Anglo-German offset negotiations were awkwardly entwined with these events. 
For the Labour governments the fundamental concern was the rise of German 
politico-military influence in the Alliance. Enhanced US-German relations deepened 
long-held British anxieties that the traditional Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ 
might be superseded by a new US-German ‘special relationship’. However, for the 
British, suffering from heavy defence spending cuts, the financial assistance from the 
Germans was the last hope to maintain their military presence before savage cuts. It 
remained an irony that the Labour government asked the Germans for help to deter 
Germany’s dominance in Europe. Such was the weakness of Britain’s position. 
Moreover, the negotiations between Britain and Germany held within them a wider 
issue: the future of the Atlantic Alliance as a whole. As described above, the Germans 
were fundamentally ready to help the British financially, but they did not want 
traditional offset agreements and wished to negotiate defence issues with more equal 
status. However, it is significant that Schmidt’s government did not wish to change the 
Atlantic Alliance. Thus, it was necessary for the British government to decide how to 
deal with Germany, as an old rival or a fair partner in Europe.  
While British ministers were preoccupied with economic crisis, officials were aware 
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of these foreign and defence policy pressure points. As Killick pointed out: ‘(c)ertainly 
we are in no position to throw our weight about, but we still have considerable 
resources to offer in ideas, reasoning and argument. Our friends will not resent this; they 
will be glad of any sign that we still have confidence in ourselves’.
123
 The lack of a 
hardware contribution drew more attention to the diplomatic contribution that Britain 
could make. With these shifts in mind, British foreign policy thus faced two challenges 
in creating European security: how to handle the rise of West Germany’s influence, and 
also how to cooperate with the new American administration. Therefore, in 1977, the 
British had to offer new ‘ideas, reasoning and argument’ to stabilise Europe as the Cold 
War went into a new and uncertain phase. 
 







European Security and a Revived Anglo-American Relationship 
 






On 3 January 1977, the IMF extended £2.3 billion to the British government. For the 
past few hundred years, Britain had been a global empire which dominated the world. 
Now, it was a country which could not maintain its economy without borrowing money 
from outside. The IMF crisis symbolised starkly the decline of Britain’s power. Yet, the 
conclusion of talks with the IMF for its financial loan programme by the end of 1976 
gave the British economy possibilities for recovery. Successful negotiations between the 
Bank of England and central banks of the donor countries followed after that for the 
safety net for sterling balances. The improvement in the vulnerability of the currency 
and the sterling balance then prompted the revival of British economy from the 
beginning of the year.
1
  
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the weakened British economy had preoccupied 
ministers’ minds since Callaghan became Prime Minister in April 1976. The economic 
crisis occupied much of their time and inevitably left little for deliberation on foreign 
and defence policy. Improvements in the economy from the beginning of 1977 then 
freed ministers from the shackles. It was particularly true of Callaghan himself. Once he 
was released from tough negotiations with the IMF, he was absorbed more in foreign 
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affairs where he had had most interest.
2
 It was fortunate for him to be able to calm the 
economic problems and to concentrate on foreign affairs before important events took 
place in the first half of 1977: the inauguration of the new US President Jimmy Carter in 
January, Callaghan’s visit to Washington in March, the NATO ministerial meeting and 
the economic summit both in May. The first three of these events was particularly 
closely related to Britain’s attitude towards European security.    
The prospect of stability in European security seemed far from bright. In his annual 
report on NATO for 1976, Killick warned again of the expansion of Soviet armed forces 
in Europe and the European governments’ lack of preparation against this likelihood. 
Referring to General Haig’s report presented to NATO in November of the previous 
year, he wrote that ‘there is no burking the fact that the Alliance must make the 
necessary effort’.
3
 He continued: 
 
So far so good. But Alliance Ministers, meeting in December, gave no tangible sign that 
their Governments would act accordingly. Defence Ministers said that they were convinced; 
but they still had to convince their colleagues at home. Only 1977 will show how hard they 




For Britain, even if its economy began to recover, there was a limit to what it could do 
due to the shortage of money for defence, and this fact put the country’s credibility 
further at risk. Killick repeated his concern that the consecutive reductions of defence 
spending eroded the worth of Britain’s contribution to European security. Furthermore, 
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he drew London’s attention to the danger of damage to Britain’s political standing after 
the defence budget cuts, arguing that ‘the importance attached to us in domestic 
counsels in Washington and Bonn must already be steadily declining’.
5
 Therefore, by 
this logic, the primary problem in Britain’s defence policy towards Europe was still 
unchanged: how to improve or at least maintain the UK’s presence in the Alliance. True, 
there were indications of economic recovery, but it was only possible due to the IMF 
and the agreement of massive expenditure cuts. But the expansion of Soviet military 
power, particularly in conventional forces, required enhanced Alliance defence 
contributions in this area. The budget cuts unavoidably reduced Britain’s influence in 
military hardware, and the severity of this fact induced policymakers to pursue an 
alternative way in which Britain could preserve prestige. 
Taking these factors into consideration, this chapter traces Britain’s policy towards 
European security during the first half of 1977. It revolves around Britain’s response to 
US defence policy under the new US President, Jimmy Carter. Carter’s new style 
marked a break with the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger line which had formed the US foreign 
policy since 1969. This chapter shows that Carter’s radical change almost inevitably 
brought tensions in transatlantic relations and concerns within the Alliance from the 
outset of the new US administration. It then illustrates Britain’s contribution as a 
mediator in transatlantic relations to fill the crack which was developed by the new 
administration’s policy.  
 
 
1. The New Year and British Defence Policy 
 





On 2 November 1976, the American presidential campaign ended in a narrow victory 
for the democratic candidate, Jimmy Carter. Carter was not a famous figure in the 
international arena; he only served two terms in the Georgia Senate, and as Governor of 
Georgia for one term from 1971 to 1975. As his career indicates, Carter had little 
experience in foreign affairs and his views on international matters were unknown, even 
if his inexperience contributed to his victory. Carter’s righteousness appealed to many 
voters who wanted the reaffirmation of American values after the turbulent period of 
Vietnam, Watergate, and Angola.
6
 However, there were some clues which enabled the 
British to anticipate the outline of his foreign policy opinions. On 5 October, in the final 
days of the presidential election, Cyrus Vance, Carter’s adviser for the campaign, visited 
London. Vance confirmed to Crosland that American foreign policy would not change 
significantly even if Carter won the election. He said that a new administration would 
increase contacts at a lower level rather than make ‘changes in fundamental structure’ 
and assured that ‘there would be no “year of Europe”’. But importantly, Vance told 
Crosland that on European security Carter was thinking of a fundamental review of 
NATO capability by the US and its allies jointly to improve NATO’s effectiveness 
against the Soviet Union.
7
 
In Washington, Ramsbotham was not anxious about the immediate future of 
American foreign policy. Three weeks after the presidential election, he argued in a 
telegram to the FCO that although the new administration would cause changes of style 
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and emphasis, the broad lines of foreign policy would remain.
8
 On 15 December, senior 
FCO officials held a meeting on this topic with Ramsbotham taking advantage of his 
return to Britain. It was important for the British government to gain a more precise 
estimate of Carter’s ideas for US foreign policy, and to have early contact with the new 
President-Elect. Thus it was agreed in the meeting to pursue an invitation to the Prime 
Minister from the President and to ensure that he was at the top of the queue.
9
 Officials 
also judged that the new administration should be encouraged to have early contact with 
European allies through a prospective economic summit meeting.
10
 The NATO 
ministerial meeting was another possibility, especially if it was elevated to the heads of 
government level under Britain’s initiative as the potential host.
11
 
Vance reacted favourably to the idea of an early visit by Callaghan, but was less 
keen on the idea of an early multilateral summit meeting ‘without adequate preparation’, 
and ‘without knowing how a constructive result might be achieved’.
12
 Carter himself 
supported the concept of multilateral meetings between the heads of government,
13
 but 
he had expressed his wish not to travel outside the US for one year after his 
inauguration in order to concentrate on domestic problems.
14
 Therefore, the British 
needed to push the new administration further by emphasising the significance of 
summit level meetings with Carter’s attendance. 
While preparing for the incoming new US administration, the Callaghan 
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government needed to announce the UK defence estimates based on expenditure cuts. 
The Statement of the Defence Estimates 1977 was published on 28 February. At the 
beginning of chapter one, it offered reassurance that Britain’s security ‘remains firmly 
based on the North Atlantic Alliance’ while stressing the difficulties in maintaining its 
contribution due to its economic conditions.
15
 Along with this reassurance, it expressed 
anxiety about uncertainty in the progress of détente and warned of the continuing Soviet 
military expansion in Eastern Europe. Consequently, it argued for the maintenance of 
force strength in the West: 
 
Military power is regarded by the Soviet Union as a legitimate and important diplomatic 
weapon and there can be little doubt that the Soviet Union could exploit to the full the 
opportunities which would be offered by any weakening of Western political and economic 





The Statement stressed the importance of the conventional forces highlighting that ‘(a)t 
a time when there is broad parity in strategic nuclear weapons between NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact […] the Alliance must maintain an adequate conventional capability’.
17
 
Superpower détente had accomplished the parity in strategic weapons, but it naturally 
increased the importance of the power balance in non-strategic areas. Nevertheless, for 
Britain, which was unable to maintain previous levels of defence expenditure, 
maintenance of conventional forces was obviously difficult ever more difficult. 
                                                 
15







Concurrently, the Anglo-German offset issue remained a big problem. As already 
noted in the previous chapter, it was not a simple budgetary question, but a more 
fundamental point about West Germany’s position in the Alliance after 30 years since 
the end of the Second World War. Ambassador Wright’s two despatches to London sent 
in January contained a sharp and in-depth analysis on the matter. Germany was a 
‘friendly but reluctant Giant’ and the Anglo-German relationship was good in 1976 not 
least because the Germans had played an important role in helping Britain’s economy 
over the economic crisis. But in his view, the two issues of significance were the 
personal rapport between Callaghan and Schmidt and British troops in West Germany. 
They were, in his words, ‘our most important foreign political assets’.
18
 At the same 
time, he pointed out the tendency in West Germany’s foreign policy. He wrote that he 
was ‘struck more by its reluctance and caution and by its concern for the general 
well-being than by an impetuosity or muscle-flexing pursuit of narrow German 
interests’. In other words, he observed that the Germans were still hesitant to take 
visible or powerful initiatives in foreign affairs. 
His analysis of this reluctance was more clearly shown in another despatch sent to 
the FCO two weeks after his annual report. The Germans’ loyalty to the EC, NATO and 
détente was undoubtable, but why did they not take one step forward? His interpretation 
was as follows: 
 
Despite the talk about the Federal Republic pulling its political weight, all the evidence here 
is that this country is not yet ready to play the kind of role in the world stage that others 
might expect or even ask of it. Brash through they may be as individuals, West Germans as 
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a nation seem to lack the will to lead. The older generation remember too clearly the 
catastrophe of the Thousand Years Reich: their sons and daughters have done too well out 
of the Federal Republic as it is. Schmidt and Genscher may try to shake off the label of 
‘economic giant and political pygmy’, but this is the kind of country which very many 
Germans seem content to live in. At least they prefer this label to that of “the ugly German” 
which neighbours are always ready to pin on them at the slightest hint of a jackboot. […] 
The Federal Republic is a country which does not wish to make itself conspicuous, except 




Wright nevertheless pointed out that as a result of ‘becalmed’ European politics – 
despite imminent issues such as direct election and European Monetary Union (EMU) – 
there was a shift in German interest in US-German relations, one of the two pillars of its 
‘Westpolitik’. He admitted the existence of a US-German ‘special relationship’ and 
pointed out that it was likely to be strengthened in economic and politico-military fields 
‘under the pressure of events’. Yet he added that the US-German version of 
‘special-relationship’ was different from the US-UK ‘special relationship’ and less 
privileged, and Britain’s task was not to make the US-German relations unfavourable to 
strengthen Britain’s interests.
20
 Here the nub of his argument was clear; while the 
traumas of German history made the Germans still hesitant about playing a bigger 
political role, and while they were content with existing conditions, Schmidt and 
Genscher might intend to give Germany a new role where possible. If Wright’s analysis 
was correct, British foreign policy needed to be more skilful, particularly when West 
Germany began to take initiatives. By this time Britain and the Western allies needed a 
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greater German commitment to international politics and the political leaders at least 
seemed to be ready to play such a role. But once they started doing so, even if 
Anglo-American relations could keep some ‘specialness’, Germany’s presence might 
easily overtake Britain’s already reduced one and become dominant in European 
international relations in the long run. In this circumstance, it was more crucial than 
ever to Britain to retain good relations with the Federal Republic. 
Anglo-German offset negotiations epitomised what Wright reported. Schmidt had 
already revealed to him in December 1976 that he regarded the traditional 
Anglo-German offset agreement as the continuation of the subordination of West 
Germany in post-war international politics. By the finalisation of the US-German offset 
agreement Schmidt partly succeeded in terminating that situation. Importantly for 
Britain, it removed a long-standing thorn in US-German bilateral relations and further 
improved ties between Bonn and Washington. Thus, if Britain persisted with a new 
offset agreement, it would complicate Anglo-German relations and increase the relative 
importance of the US-German ‘special relationship’. Nevertheless, the hard fact was 
that unless the negotiations were concluded successfully, Britain’s defence expenditure 
would be cut yet deeper and protracted negotiation would doubtlessly erode Britain’s 
position in the Alliance. For these reasons, the British did not, or could not, abandon the 
hope for a breakthrough via direct negotiations between Callaghan and Schmidt.  
The German Chancellor was to visit Chequers on 23 and 24 January for a 
six-monthly meeting with the British Prime Minister. The main agenda item was 
economic issues, particularly the British government’s efforts for recovery, but the 
long-standing offset negotiation was also a crucial topic.
21
 Given Schmidt’s hard line so 
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far, a tough negotiation was expected. Hunt pointed out in his minute to Callaghan that, 
judging from Schmidt’s reply to Callaghan’s personal letter sent before last Christmas, 
Schmidt’s reaction would be ‘almost wholly negative’. He therefore provided three 
alternative options. First was to drop the maintenance of good Anglo-German relations. 
Yet needless to say by taking this option Britain’s defence expenditure would still face a 
budget shortage. The second was to stick to a new offset agreement, but Schmidt 
already made his position quite clear on his preference. Therefore these two options 
would not offer any satisfactory outcomes. Then, as the third option, Hunt suggested a 
short term agreement before the termination of the main agreement. This would, he 
argued, ‘at least give us a breathing space to consider other possible ways’.
22
 In 
addition, Crosland raised one more option: Britain would withdraw a corresponding 
number of troops if Schmidt was unable to meet the government’s requirement. 
However, he warned that this option would cause Anglo-German difficulties and a 
dispute in the Alliance about Britain’s fundamental contribution to the European 
security. True, the government had been forced to envisage this option under the critical 
economic conditions of the previous year and thus it could work as a tactic of 
brinkmanship. Nevertheless, if it was done the British would definitely lose credibility 
in the Alliance. Thus, Crosland inevitably backed Hunt’s third option stating that it was 
on a par with the final US-German agreement concluded in July 1976 and thus Schmidt 
did not have a logical reason to reject it.
23
 
In the middle of this debate about how to handle the offset problem, Schmidt’s 
wrote a very short and blunt note to Callaghan, simply proposing discussion of the issue 
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 The brevity of the letter implied dissatisfaction, but no matter what 
Schmidt thought about Callaghan’s proposal, the British government was eager to 
secure German payment and a ‘breathing space’. Callaghan, Healey, Crosland, Mulley, 
and Lever discussed this on 19 January. They agreed that the British government would 
seek a terminal offset agreement for the next two years on the basis of previous 
estimates of a minimum of £50 million (DM250 million in 1976 survey price) a year, 
while leaving possibilities of multilateral arrangement after the next two years open. It 
was also argued that the British should raise the problem of the distribution of defence 
costs with the new Carter administration because of its potential readiness to listen to 
their allies’ suggestions.
25
 Nevertheless, considering the new administration’s demand 
increases in defence expenditures (mentioned later in this chapter), the prospect of 
persuading Carter of anything other than enhanced defence spending was quite low. 
Schmidt, Genscher and other German ministers arrived at Chequers on 23 January 
and European security was discussed that evening after dinner. The ministers reached a 
general consensus upon the fragile parity of power between the East and West. They 
also noted the difficulties in maintaining defence expenses under severe economic 
conditions while facing the expansion of the Soviet conventional armaments. In these 
circumstances, they welcomed the new US administration’s intention of giving SALT 
and MBFR negotiations a new impetus.
26
 Regardless of these generally shared views, 
when it came to Anglo-German offset, the discussion took on a more divisive tone. 
Talks on offset were strictly restricted to the two premiers and the highlight of their 
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discussion happened on the second day, 24 January. Schmidt had already said that he 
could not accept any additional burdens on the Federal German budget, but could 
compromise on DM125 million per annum for up to three years. The gap was huge; 
Britain’s initial demand was DM500 million per annum for two years and wanted to 
reserve the right to pursue a multilateral solution after the final year. In fact DM500 
million was double what the British initially envisaged; DM250 million was the 
minimum figure in their mind.
27
 But DM125 million was thus only half of this 
minimum. Nevertheless, Callaghan accentuated that a £50 million (DM250 million) 
offset payment was already included in the defence budget and should it not been paid, 
he would have to find additional cuts ‘by thinning out’ troops, warning that ‘there was 
no fat anywhere’. But by saying so Callaghan implied that £150 million, or £50 million 
per annum for three years (a total of DM750 million), was a minimum requirement. 
Schmidt countered nu saying that there was also ‘no fat in its [Germany’s] 
budget’.
28
 Moreover, Schmidt argued that the NATO Council decision on offset 
payment in July 1957 was concluded on the premise of the fixed currency exchange rate 
and was thus no longer valid given the free floating of European currencies. However, 
no matter how different their demands were, they both determined to end the dispute. 
Since they ‘got some components of an agreement’, they assented to settle a German 
contribution and its duration before the NATO ministerial meeting in May on a strictly 
private basis. In fact they had not reached a final conclusion, but at least a potential way 
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out was in sight.  
As stated above, 1977 seemed the year in which the Callaghan government finally 
gained a stable basis to carry out its own foreign policy after the economic crisis settled. 
Nevertheless, this expectation was broken by the untimely death of Crosland. On 13 
February, he suffered a cerebral haemorrhage at his home in Oxfordshire, and died six 
days later without recovering from coma. His death was totally unexpected and was a 
serious blow to the government as well as Callaghan himself. However, Crosland’s 
successor needed to be appointed quickly to avoid disruption to foreign policy. 
Callaghan’s choice was David Owen, Minister of State at the FCO. Callaghan reflected 
upon this appointment in his memoirs: 
 
(T)he thought came into my mind that it would do the Government no harm if I surprised 
the press and others who were already picking Tony’s successor by bringing in someone 
entirely fresh and young whom they had not thought of. Anthony Eden had after all become 
Foreign Secretary at the early age of thirty-eight, and had rapidly become a senior figure in 
the Cabinet. To do something similar would have the additional advantage of strengthening 
the group of younger Cabinet Ministers who would be restless with new ideas, and prevent 




This indicates that he appointed Owen for mainly domestic and party political reasons. 
Callaghan acknowledged that Healey was best to take over the FCO, but he was ‘in any 
case indispensable’ at the Treasury. Similarly, Roy Jenkins was to be the President of the 
European Commission thus his appointment was not a choice. In addition to these 
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reasons, Callaghan highly valued Owen as a young, talented politician.
30
 
It was a surprise appointment. Owen had occupied the position of the Minister of 
State at the FCO for six months, thus in this sense he already had some experience in 
foreign affairs. But even so, the stunned Owen became ‘visibly pale’ when Callaghan 
informed his intention of nominating him as Crosland’s successor.
31
 Callaghan was 
inclined to support the new Foreign Secretary with his ‘background knowledge of the 
problems he would face’.
32
 Indeed, it is likely that Owen’s appointment reflected 
Callaghan’s wish to handle foreign policy personally.
33
 Palliser speculated that the 
appointment of Owen would not mean the downgrading of the FCO.
34
 However, even 
if Owen already had some experience in foreign affairs, this appointment inevitably 
increased Callaghan’s influence as a mentor. Doubtlessly, Callaghan had far more 
experience and skill in the management of foreign affairs because of his long career in 
the politics; he was the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary under the Wilson 
government before being the Prime Minister. Compared with this highly experienced 
politician, Owen was inevitably a lightweight figure at this stage. Healey recalled in his 
memoirs that this was a ‘premature promotion’ and wrote that Owen became arrogant to 
people around him ‘to mask his insecurity’.
35
 As such, the making of British foreign 
policy from February 1977 was a result the combination of Owen’s spikiness and 
Callaghan’s mentorship. 
The FCO’s view in this period was manifested in the Planning Group’s brief 
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prepared for the new Foreign Secretary.
36
 The major part of the brief overlapped with 
that for Owen’s predecessor produced one year ago, but was more elaborate on 
Anglo-American relations. It admitted that the UK-US relationship was ‘excellent’ and 
the Americans attached ‘importance to us as major partners for our defence 
contributions in NATO and for our experience and continuing influence in international 
affairs’.
37
 Nevertheless, it expressed a rather pessimistic view on the future of the 
‘special relationship’: 
 
The old exclusiveness of Anglo-US relationship has, however, long since gone. The US 
looks increasingly at its relations with Western Europe in the round, especially since the 
formation and enlargement of the European Community. This is indeed an unavoidable and 
expected result of our accession. In many areas links with West Germany matter as much as 
those with Britain. US-French relations are on a firmer basis than in the past. Inevitably, 
Britain’s economic difficulties and their impact on our defence contribution have reduced 




Since this paper was prepared for the incoming Foreign Secretary, it is hard to regard 
such pessimism as a personal or departmental analysis in the FCO; it most likely 
reflected a general consensus. Thus the new Foreign Secretary’s task was important one; 
he was expected to put US-UK relations on a better footing. It also meant that Britain’s 
relations with the US would be the key to the vicissitudes of Britain’s status in Europe. 
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2. Callaghan’s Washington Visit: ‘The “Special Relationship” Revived’ 
 
On 20 January 1977, Jimmy Carter became the 39
th
 President of the United States. His 
new foreign policy was not fully but his blueprint had been stated to some extent before 
that date. On 9 January, Carter told a press conference at Plains, Georgia, that he would 
despatch Vice-President-Elect Walter Mondale immediately after his inauguration to 
Western Europe and Japan. He explained that the purpose of Mondale’s trip was ‘to 
become quickly acquainted with the views and attitudes of our closest friends and 
potential adversaries’, and ‘to outline the new Administration’s priorities in foreign 
policy’.
39
 This quick move aimed to enhance the new President’s awareness of the 
international affairs and display his intention to establish close consultation with 
America’s allies. In his first telephone conversation with Callaghan on 13 January, 
Carter confirmed that Mondale had Carter’s full confidence and authority. At the same 
time, they agreed that the President would invite the Prime Minister to Washington in 
March.
40
 Patrick R. H. Wright, Callaghan’s private secretary for overseas affairs, 
recorded that the conversation was ‘very friendly’.
41
 Seemingly, that was a good start 
for the British who wished to establish a strong personal relationship between Callaghan 
and Carter. 
Mondale gave a speech at the NAC in Brussels on 24 January. He began by 
emphasising the new administration’s full commitment to NATO and Carter’s strong 
hope for strengthened consultation and cooperation with America’s allies. With this 
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premise he said that Carter was determined to maintain the American commitment to 
European defence, but then added that the President had concerns about NATO’s 
posture. For this reason, Mondale said that Carter was prepared to consider increased 
American investment in NATO and hoped the allies would contribute to improvements 
in NATO’s defence forces with the US even with economic and social difficulties in 
mind. He added that ‘in a time of détente it is easy to lose sight of the need for adequate 
defence. But this need is inescapable’.
42
 
Before his inauguration, Carter had already revealed his thoughts about European 
security. During the presidential campaign as well as in his inauguration speech he had 
spoken of his hope for nuclear disarmament. For him, a build-up in nuclear arms was 
anathema and thus he chose the strengthening of NATO’s conventional forces to prevent 
the escalation of military conflict into nuclear war. In fact, Carter demanded a ‘deep cut’ 
in US defence expenditure, but this intent did not necessarily mean a reduction on all 
fronts. His aim was to maintain military equivalence by increasing conventional forces 
while limiting nuclear weapons through negotiations with the Russians.
43
 Taking 
Carter’s thoughts into consideration, the new administration’s defence decisions were 
almost a natural consequence. Carter later revised the US defence budget for fiscal year 
1978 by a reduction of $2.8 billion, even though this figure still meant a 5% 
year-on-year real increase.
44
 Originally, Carter was a proponent of defence budget cuts, 
but given the swing in public opinion, he took a firmer stance towards defence 
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expenditure. Nevertheless, for the British government which had been facing reductions 
in defence spending for a long period, Carter’s proposal might damage its presence in 
the Alliance further. As outlined in the Statement of the Defence Estimates 1977, the 
British recognised the danger of military imbalance caused by a build up in Soviet 
conventional forces. To rectify this imbalance, reinforcement of the Alliance’s 
conventional forces became more imminent. Nevertheless as Callaghan told Schmidt, 
there was no fat in defence budget and inevitably it was impossible for the British to 
follow the Americans. Mondale was to arrive in London a few days after his Brussels 
visit. It was expected that he would no doubt repeat the new administration’s concern 
about Britain’s defence spending to those British ministers who had just a month 
previously decided to make cutbacks for 1977/78.
45
 
Mondale arrived in London on
 
27 January. Fortunately for the British, his visit was 
rather ceremonial; the talks between the British ministers and Mondale contained few 
detailed discussions on current situation of European security. Mondale’s remark at the 
NATO Headquarters was touched on only very briefly. He simply noted his hope for 
Britain’s continued commitment to NATO despite its economic difficulties. As such, the 
visit became a chance for the British to emphasise their close relationship with the US. 
At the beginning of their first private meeting, Callaghan stated that while the 
Americans shouldered a great burden, ‘our function should be to try to take a 
world-wide look at problems and to offer opinions on that basis’ and the British hoped 
that ‘we could together look at world affairs as far as possible though disinterested eyes’. 
He then added that he was very happy to work with Carter and Mondale because of their 
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The Carter administration indicated clearly that they regarded Britain as a special 
partner from the very beginning. David Aaron, Deputy Assistant for National Security 
Affairs, told Ramsbotham that the Prime Minister was ‘at the top’ of the invitation list to 
Washington.
47
 Similarly, Ramsbotham was the first ambassador to be invited by Carter 
to the White House as early as 26 January, just five days after his inauguration. Carter 
told Ramsbotham that there would be ‘a special emphasis on consulting the United 
States’ closest allies, not only on matters where their interests were equally engaged, but 
also in other areas’. The new President continued that he would ‘always benefit from 
constructive criticism and from the experiences of America’s friends’.
48
 Ramsbotham 
judged that his audience was a calculated event to illustrate the new administration’s 
different foreign policy stance from its predecessors and its determination to consult 
more closely with the allies, especially Britain.  
During this period, London emerged as a possible venue for the next multilateral 
economic summit. Giscard publicly supported the economic summit in London at the 
beginning of the year and Schmidt told Callaghan that he supported London since it 
could coincide with the NATO ministerial meeting and Carter’s attendance.
49
 Given 
European leaders’ support for London as the venue, Carter agreed with the idea and 
with Giscard’s proposal to have a separate and informal summit meeting to discuss 
political problems.
50
 With Carter’s confirmation, one of the two Britain’s objectives, 
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pulling Carter into the economic summit, was achieved. The other, his attendance to the 
NATO ministerial meeting, was still under discussion. 
The forthcoming meeting between the British Prime Minister and the new American 
President in March was crucial for the British government. The briefs prepared for 
Callaghan’s visit elucidate what the British government expected of it. According to one 
of these briefs, here was an opportunity to establish a close personal relationship with 
the new President, to implant in the new President’s mind ‘Britain’s value as a 
consultative partner and ally within the European Community and NATO’, and to know 
his view on international affairs. It was still necessary to ascertain more precisely 
Carter’s outlook as which remained an ‘unknown factor’.
51
 It stressed that it was 
important to discuss the problems between the US and its European allies which arose 
from the administration’s early actions. As the holder of the Presidency of the EC, it was 
important for Britain to ease the tensions in transatlantic relations before they grew. 
French and German suspicions about the new administration’s policy were developing 
by this time. Thus, careful management was necessary for the British as the French were 
also suspicious that they wished to be closer to US rather than Europe.
52
 
In the light of these objectives, it was necessary for Callaghan to impress on Carter 
Britain’s efforts to maintain its contribution to NATO. This was particularly important 
when Britain’s influence was fading as a result of continuing defence expenditure cuts 
while West Germany’s weight was growing. The MOD brief recommended that while 
the Prime Minister should emphasise the extent of Britain’s contribution, he should 
‘seek to counter the growing signs of the development of a US/German axis in the 
Alliance which contrasts starkly with the traditional special relationship we have tended 
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to enjoy with the United States’.
53
 This showed how much the MOD was concerned 
about Germany’s increasing power, and how much British officials hoped that the 
development of personal relations between the Prime Minister and the President could 
compensate for the decline in Britain’s physical strength. 
While officials in London prepared for Callaghan’s visit, Ramsbotham continuously 
sent telegrams to report views from Washington. In his despatch to Palliser dated 4 
March, Ramsbotham explained the perception in the new administration about the UK’s 
current situation.
54
 He pointed out that although the British economy had been 
stabilised, the administration remained concerned ‘about Britain’s declining political 
and military influence as a consequence of our economic troubles, particularly as the 
decline in our military power affects the United States in areas crucial to her security’ 
and added that ‘we should not assume that the under-lying worries […] have been 
allayed’. Given these doubts in the administration on Britain’s capability as an ally, 
Ramsbotham argued that Callaghan should try to ease the Americas’ worries by 




As described above, since the presidential campaign the new administration had 
repeatedly expressed its intention to pursue American foreign policy in close 
cooperation with its allies. Callaghan’s visit was supposed to determine how far the 
President was ready to listen to the views of his partners. The Americans had already 
shown their readiness to listen to the British Prime Minister’s opinions. On 1 March, 
about a week before Callaghan flew to Washington, Carter wrote a personal letter to ask 









him to give his own ‘personal views on the subjects you think we should discuss, both 
on bilateral matters, and on major international issues’.
56
 Callaghan immediately 
replied to Carter with three agenda items: the present world economic situation, defence 
and East-West relations, and other international issues such as problems in Africa.
57
 
Ramsbotham judged that Carter would appreciate Callaghan’s ‘great personal 
experience in international affairs’ as well as Britain’s experience as a nation. From this 
point of view Callaghan’s agenda seemed favourable to Ramsbotham and thus he 
recommended that the Prime Minister concentrate on global problems in his 
forthcoming discussion with Carter.
58
 This pre-meeting correspondence satisfied 
Callaghan. As an Atlanticist, he not only wanted to establish a personal relationship with 
Carter but also make a greater contribution to international affairs. This outlook 
coincided with Ramsbotham’s recommendation which was that with their rich 
experience in international affairs the British could help the Americans and also partly 
balance the loss in the UK’s global influence. Thus, before the first Callaghan-Carter 
summit meeting, there was reason to believe that the two leaders shared common 
approaches. 
Strangely enough, this close consultation only existed between Britain and the US. 
From the Carter administration’s inauguration, the French and the Germans were 
suspicious of its new commitment to consultation with allies and Paris in particular 
doubted Washington’s promises. At the Quai d’Orsay (the French Foreign Ministry), the 
planning staff doubted Carter’s intent.
59
 Such French concerns about America’s 
reliability made US-French relations difficult and put Germany in a diplomatically 
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awkward position being a close ally of both states.
60
  
Furthermore, even if the President was genuine in his desire for consultation, this 
too would cause France problems as it might require a greater French commitment to 
NATO in the political sphere at least.
61
 Because of this interpretation, the French 
thought that the enlargement of political consultation in NATO would encroach upon 
Europeans’ political influence in the Alliance. Likewise in Bonn, as early as the 
beginning of February, Ambassador Wright reported that Schmidt and Genscher were 
‘very concerned about the various statements which were being loosed off from time to 
time by various members of the Carter Administration’, and that the West German 
government regarded ‘the opening days of the American Administration as more a 
matter for concern than reassurance’
62
. One example of this was the administration’s 
attitude towards the nuclear deal between West Germany and Brazil which included the 
transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technology. Since his inauguration Carter had 
required the repeal of the FRG/Brazil deal in the light of nuclear non-proliferation while 
also not proposing any countervailing alternatives.
63
 This uncertain attitude increased 
German suspicion of the Carter administration and its policy, a suspicion which was 
already heightened given Germany’s Cold War position, directly bordering on the East.  
In contrast, Callaghan was rather optimistic about Carter’s foreign policy and did 
not share Franco-German concerns, adding a comment to Wright’s despatch: ‘Give 
them time! No need for the Germans to get jumpy yet’.
64
 Clearly he thought that, as 
Ramsbotham pointed out, the US foreign policy would not change substantially under 
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the Carter administration, and that the Europeans were too sensitive. However, 
regardless of Britain’s optimism, the lack of intra-Alliance consultation caused 
misgivings in NATO soon after Carter’s inauguration, as did uncertainty about his 
foreign and defence policy. On 15 February, only three weeks after Carter’s 
inauguration, Ramsbotham arranged a meeting of the EC Nine ambassadors in 
Washington. The meeting revealed anxieties among the ambassadors about US defence 
policy and, more fundamentally, the lack of consultation with them. Ramsbotham, with 
West German Ambassador Berndt von Staden, stressed the necessity of consultation 
among the Nine on the US foreign policy, but added that it would take some time until 
the Carter administration developed rigid thinking.
65
 While he recognised the 
frustration among them, he thought it was still premature to complain to the Americans 
that their deeds did not match their words. 
Killick reported the situation in Brussels. He wrote to Sykes that even in Brussels 
the Americans had not taken any initiative to consult with the allies, and there was a 
‘crying need to ferret out more information and compare notes’. He pointed out that: 
 
The trouble is that – undoubtedly and unwittingly – in choosing the area of foreign policy to 
make his first public impact, President Carter has put forward a number of propositions and 
taken certain actions which have quite important implications for the Alliance, without, 




Provoked by Ramsbotham’s effort, Killick also organised a meeting of the EC Nine in 
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Brussels on 3 March. He raised two main concerns, the impact of Carter’s human rights 
remarks and his desire for disarmament and arms control. The representatives agreed 
that Carter’s current human rights policy ‘would not change the character of the Soviet 
Union’, even if the Russians wished to see progress in the SALT negotiations: 
 
The general consensus was that we had no grounds for worry about the longer term as the 
realities and facts of life were borne in on the President. But in the foreseeable future it 
seemed most improbable that we would succeed in changing his approach which seemed to 
be a matter of deep personal conviction. Nevertheless it was most important to bring home 
to him our view of the implications of what he was doing and to commence the process of 




Officials in London seemed to take a more neutral attitude even if they did not entirely 
share Callaghan’s optimism. They were more cautious about taking any actions towards 
the new administration at this point. Sykes told Ramsbotham that the Americans would 
consult with NATO on Vance’s forthcoming visit to Moscow for his first SALT 
negotiations, adding that it was unthinkable that the US intended to break the nuclear 
balance by unilateral disarmament. He also stressed that Callaghan’s visit to Washington 
would give the British a chance to know more about the Carter administration.
68
 On 
Killick’s coordination of the EC Nine to discuss Carter’s policies, Sykes was 
unsupportive given the sensitivity of the human rights issues. He wrote to W. J. A. 
Wilberforce, the Head of the Defence Department, that ‘(w)e do not want Sir J. Killick 
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queering the pitch by jumping in too soon’ before Callaghan’s visit.
69
 This attitude was 
in sharp contrast to the concerns and frustrations of other European allies.   
The puzzlement of Western Europeans about the new administration’s foreign policy 
soon came to surface in preparation for the NATO ministerial meeting. The first 
problem was the uncertainty of Carter’s attendance at the meeting. In February, Carter 
had not yet made up his mind and this attitude caused concern in Brussels. On such 
matters, Killick reported his talk with Haig and Luns. They told Killick that when Haig 
was in Washington he had recommended, with strong support from Brown, that Carter 
attend the NATO ministerial meeting; he argued that the Alliance leaders ‘were waiting 
anxiously to hear the President’s views on many fronts’. Nevertheless, Carter remained 
negative since ‘he did not know what he could usefully say to the other NATO heads of 
government’. Luns also lamented that Washington was ‘strangely reticent’ about his 
early visit to Washington and he was disturbed that NATO was not counted in the series 
of meetings in Washington at all.
70
 Because of these concerns, they even argued that if 
Carter continued to be negative about his attendance the British government ‘should 
seriously consider postponing the NATO ministerial meeting’. Luns added his hope that 
Callaghan would raise this issue in the forthcoming meeting with Carter.
71
 Again, 
Callaghan flatly rejected their pessimistic view. He was ‘quite happy’ should the NATO 
ministerial meeting take place at the defence or foreign minister’s level, and Carter’s 
attendance was just a ‘bonus’ if it happened.
72
 Privately, the British government 
consistently regarded Carter’s attendance as all-important and Callaghan was told that 
Carter’s participation was indispensable. Callaghan’s comment rather indicates his 
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conspicuous optimism about American foreign policy, or more precisely, about Carter 
himself. The Prime Minister’s trust in the new administration was even greater than the 
FCO. Before going to Washington, Callaghan told the American correspondents of his 
anticipation of good personal relations with Carter, pointing out the things they shared, 
the same initials, their service in the Navy, their Baptist background.
73
 His remark 
would of course contain some lip service for the American press, but to a large extent 
revealed his hope for, and expectation of, his forthcoming meetings with Carter.  
In the preparations for his Washington visit, Callaghan paid particular attention to 
the effect of human rights on other foreign policy issues.
74
 Yet Britain’s recognition of 
détente and its relationship with human rights did not differ so much from that of the 
Carter administration. This fact was clear in Owen’s speech to the Diplomatic and 
Commonwealth Writers Association on 3 March, a week before he and Callaghan 
visited Washington. In this speech, his first as Foreign Secretary, Owen said that détente 
should be pursued in a pragmatic way. But at the same time he stressed the significance 
of the Helsinki Final Act and drew attention to the violation of human rights in 
communist countries and added that without the free movement of people and ideas and 
respect for human rights ‘we cannot hope for peace and stability in the longer term’.
75
 
This mirrored what Carter had repeatedly told the public. The difference between 
Britain and the US was the extent of linkage between human rights and détente. For 
Carter, human rights were ‘a central theme for American foreign policy’.
76
 This 
                                                 
73
 TNA/PREM16/1485, Prime Minister’s Briefing for American Correspondents, 4 March 1977. 
74
 TNA/FCO28/2992, Secretary of State’s meeting to discuss his Speech to the diplomatic and 
Commonwealth Writers Association (3 March) Wednesday we February at 12 noon; TNA/FCO82/755, 
Vile to Kerr, 23 February 1977. 
75
 TNA/FCO46/1477, Palliser to Killick, 15 March 1977; TNA/FCO28/3002, Speech by the Rt Hon Dr 
David Owen MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Prepared for Delivery at the 
Annual Banquet of the Diplomatic and Commonwealth and Commonwealth Writers Association, 
Thursday 3 March 1977. 
76
 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (London: Bantam Books, 1982), p.144. 
94 
 
approach was based on his unshakable moral conviction of the value of American 
democratic idealism.
77
 In addition, Callaghan noted in his memoirs that Carter held a 
‘manifest dislike of horse trading’.
78
 Thus it is not hard to assume that the new 
administration’s emphasis on human rights, and Carter’s uncompromising attitude, 
made the new administration’s détente policy inflexible. 
Callaghan arrived in Washington in the late afternoon of 9 March and a friendly 
atmosphere ensued. The British Prime Minister and the American President did not 
hesitate in referring to Anglo-American closeness. In the opening ceremony next 
morning at the White House, Carter said ‘I think it is not an exaggeration to say, nor is it 
any reflection on our friends and allies to say, that we enjoy a special relationship with 
Great Britain’.
79
 At the beginning of their first meeting after the ceremony, he 
underlined his point saying that ‘there was a kinship between the United States and the 
United Kingdom which was not the same as that of other countries’; he was proud of 
this link and hoped that it would remain.
80
 Callaghan answered to this warm welcome 
in his speech at dinner:  
 
(I)n the last 40 years history has changed the relative strength of the United States and the 
United Kingdom very much to your advantage. As the result you have built up a wide 
network of relationships and friendships around the world, and in the process we have 
become a little shy of using the traditional term ‘a special relationship’ to describe our 
friendship with each other. But I see no reason why we should refrain from using this term, 
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it is not an exclusive relationship. It shut no one out, and it does describe with accuracy the 
ease, the intimacy, the common feeling which Americans and Britons share with each other 
when they meet and talk, a common feeling that comes from similar political systems 
rooted in the same common law. This intimacy and partnership reached its highest 




Britain had declined, but the ‘special relationship’ remained, a conviction held by the 
convinced Atlanticist Callaghan. Over the visit, he took advantage of every opportunity 
to emphasise the closeness of these two countries. 
Nevertheless, despite this amicable atmosphere, Callaghan’s visit revealed some 
differences between the two allies on European security. The first was on human rights. 
As Owen’s speech on 3 March shows, the British government basically supported 
Carter’s pursuit for human rights in international affairs. The problem was his emphasis 
and energy. Carter took up human rights as the very first topic in their first meeting. 
Callaghan told Carter frankly of European anxieties about his focus on human rights, 
anxieties which were repeated in his meeting with the EC foreign ministers who came 
to London for Crosland’s memorial service on 7 March.
82
 Callaghan observed that the 
Europeans thought that Carter had changed the ‘conventional groove’, but did not want 
anything which upset the existing balance. Further, he added that it was wrong to give 
the Eastern Europeans the illusion on what the West was actually capable of for them. 
Nevertheless, Carter was stubborn; he replied that he took Callaghan’s remark ‘very 
seriously’, but repeated his passionate interest in human rights as an issue. He reiterated 
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that this policy did not target the Soviet Union only and if other countries joined 
together the condition could be eased.
83
 Clearly this meeting revealed the difficulty in 
softening the new President’s unshakable conviction. Even after hearing about the 
Europeans’ concerns, Carter’s did not move even an inch. 
The second discord was on European defence. General European defence policy was 
discussed between Callaghan and Harold Brown on 11 March. Brown reassured his 
colleagues that NATO and European defence were ‘high on the new Administration’s 
list of priorities’. However, over the future of European defence their visions were not 
identical. Brown reiterated the importance of reinforcement of conventional forces to 
avoid the use of tactical nuclear weapon in case of the Soviet’s conventional attack. For 
that purpose, he added that the US would have to ‘go for higher spending on 
conventional forces’. Callaghan was reluctant to accept Brown’s analysis, he said that 
he saw ‘no prospect of such an increase’ and ‘everyone in Europe would prefer to live 
with the existing risks rather than increase their expenditure in defence’ and Britain 
would prefer the maintenance of nuclear deterrent rather than increase of conventional 
forces.
84
 Of course Callaghan had a reason for not being able to give Brown full 
support. For a country which had been suffering from severe budget shortage, it was 
naturally difficult to follow the Americans. Any approval of the new build-up of NATO 
conventional forces would inevitably require the allies to increase defence expenditure 
and Britain could not be excluded. For this reason, although he and his government 
recognised the expansion of Soviet conventional armed forces, Callaghan was forced to 
defend the status quo in Europe. 
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The third difference came over Carter’s attitude towards NATO including the 
forthcoming NATO ministerial meeting. At their meeting, Callaghan got a favourable 
answer from Carter on his participation. Apart from this point, Callaghan reminded 
Carter not to pursue ‘new initiatives or ideas for restructuring the Alliance’ at the 
summit, even suggesting that ‘it would be better to leave this until a later meeting, 
perhaps next year’. Carter assented and confirmed his attendance at the NATO summit 
to reaffirm the US commitment to the Alliance and to meet his NATO colleagues.
85
 Yet, 
as will be seen, his promises were reversed the next day. 
Even on European security, there were several points on which Britain and the US 
did not share a common view. Nevertheless, it seems that for the British government the 
primary objective of Callaghan’s Washington visit was the establishment of a good 
personal relationship between the Prime Minister and the President. In this regard, the 
objective was achieved. Ramsbotham reported that Callaghan’s visit was ‘an 
outstanding success’.
86
 His despatch spoke of the renewal of the ‘special relationship’. 
He listed the three reasons why Carter stressed the importance of good Anglo-American 
relations; first, Callaghan’s visit was an opportunity for Carter to show ‘himself to his 
people as the architect and spokesman of an enlightened and coherent foreign policy’. 
Secondly, Carter found that Callaghan was a reliable partner with ‘experience in 
international affairs whose basic approach to foreign policy questions was not dissimilar 
from his own’. Thirdly, and most importantly, the new administration needed Britain’s 
skill in the handling of international affairs. Ramsbotham explained on this point that: 
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There are still many areas in which, despite our reduced power and influence, we can 
contribute effectively to the pursuit of common objectives, and the range of issues on which 
we have had fruitful bilateral talks with the Americans at official level, both before and 




Callaghan’s rich experience in that area seemed to Carter to balance his own 
inexperience. Carter’s reliance on Callaghan’s ability could be an indispensable 
precondition for Britain to play an important ‘soft power’ role in the Alliance with its 
‘diplomatic skills and knowledge’. On the other hand, Ramsbotham added that there 
were potential problems in US-German relations and in French suspicion of the new 
administration: 
 
I wonder whether behind his emphasis on the “special relationship” there may not have 
been an element of calculation that US ties with Britain might be used to foster American 
interests in the wider European context. Such an interpretation may be too cynical. But it is, 
I think, a point which we shall have to watch closely, particularly if US and European 
interests on such matters as the multilateral trade negotiations, arms standardisation and 




The first full-scale summit meeting worked quite satisfactorily towards the revival of 
the ‘special relationship’. But flowery and sweet words veiled the issues which could be 
grow into disputes in the future. The British wanted a good relationship first and thus 
differences in foreign and defence policy were put aside to achieve this purpose at the 







political level. At the same time, the more the Anglo-American relationship became 
‘special’, the bigger the image of ‘Trojan Horse’ might become in the Europeans’ mind, 
particularly the French. Sir M. Ramsay Melhuish, the head of the North American 
Department, agreed with Ramsbotham on the aim of Carter’s emphasis on the ‘special 
relationship’ and commented that the Americans clearly understood that they had ‘at 
least one friend in the European court’ when their relations with France and West 
Germany were becoming choppy.
89
 FCO officials were cautious to avoid dispute with 
the Americans on the appropriateness of Carter’s foreign policy before it took shape. 
But at the same time, they had no illusions about the revival of Britain’s power behind 
the revival of the ‘special relationship’. 
In the Cabinet after returning from Washington, Owen reported that Carter was ‘a 
tough and able man, genuinely concerned about racial prejudice and human rights, and 
was trying to make progress on arms control and nuclear non-proliferation’. Callaghan 
also praised Carter saying that ‘President had achieved of the wide range of subjects 
they had discussed. He was a man of great ability’ and ‘(h)e had also appeared anxious 
to treat the United Kingdom as an equal partner’.
90
 Here Callaghan’s supportive 
attitude is clear once again. On the other hand, he added that Carter’s attitude was 
‘flattering and welcome’, but it was necessary ‘to warn the President not to expect more 
of us than we were able to deliver’.
91
 It is noticeable that Callaghan already found a 
kind of embarrassment in the Carter administration’s excessive expectations of Britain. 
Bernard Donoughue, the Prime Minister’s Senior Policy Adviser, wrote in his diary 
about Callaghan’s confusion having faced a very warm welcome from the new 
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administration. Callaghan said of Carter that ‘“(h)e said he had always wanted to meet 
me – and he meant me!” […] He was also a bit worried that Carter was setting so much 




But even if Carter’s over-reliance and over-emphasis on the Anglo-American 
‘special relationship’ confused him, Callaghan would be willing to accept it under the 
conviction that Carter was an able statesman and that close cooperation with the new 
administration was beneficial for Britain. Because of this he stressed to the ministers his 
positive evaluation of the new President. In this sense, the first Callaghan-Carter 
summit meeting had a significant meaning as the starting point of close 
Anglo-American cooperation, as will be shown in subsequent chapters. 
 
 
3. The NATO London Summit 
 
After the Prime Minister’s return to London, the British government was responsible for 
explaining the result of his Washington visit to the European Council as Callaghan held 
the Presidency for the first half of 1977. The briefs which the FCO produced for the 
Council reveal what the British government had in mind. There were three main 
objectives. The first was to tell the heads of government of Carter’s wish to establish a 
good relationship between the Community and the US. Then, the British wanted to ‘(t)o 
emphasise the positive aspects of the new Administration’ and ‘(t)o counter Community 
[member states’] suspicions (particularly the French) that “special relationship” implies 
a UK role as intermediary between the EEC and the US’. For these purposes, the FCO 
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argued that the British should emphasise the consistency of new administration’s 
foreign policy and that Carter was not ‘shooting from the hip’.
93
 Bearing these things in 
mind, Callaghan told other heads of government at the Council that ‘(i)t should be 
possible to work with him’.
94
 
In the meantime, the SALT II negotiations resumed between the two superpowers. 
On SALT II the Americans seemed to keep their promise of close consultation with their 
allies. Vance’s detailed briefing at the NAC in Brussels before visiting Moscow on 26 
March was clearly intended to show their intent. Killick reported that Vance’s style and 
the change from Kissinger’s ‘headmasterly approach to the Alliance’ was marked and 
welcome.
95
 But the new US administration’s proposal was ambitious; it required a 
drastic reduction of the strategic nuclear weapons which went far beyond the 
Vladivostok accord concluded by the previous administration in 1974. In Vladivostok 
Ford and Brezhnev agreed to limit the numbers of strategic delivery vehicles and 
multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) to 2,400 and 1,320 
respectively. But in his new proposal Carter demanded a reduction from 2,000 and 
1,200. In addition, he proposed a freeze on the future development and deployment of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and constraints on the Soviet ‘Backfire’ 
bombers (they were not to be used for strategic purposes) and a restriction of 2,500km 
range on cruise missiles. 
In Moscow, this proposal was flatly rejected by the Russians.
96
 For them Carter’s 
proposal required more reductions in land-based ICBMs in which the Soviet Union had 
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 Brezhnev warned Vance that ‘(i)f the United States wants to 
reopen questions that have already been solved, then the Soviet Union will again raise 
such problems as the American strategic weapons to its allies’.
98
 For the Russians, 
agreement in Vladivostok was the prerequisite for the next talks. But for the new US 
administration, more exacting agreements needed to be reached than those proposed by 
the previous administration’s foreign policy. Carter had already told Callaghan about his 
hope for an early conclusion of SALT II when they met in Washington.
99
 However, 
since the Soviets flatly rejected the proposal and did not offer a counterproposal, which 
most of the administration expected, a much longer negotiation was inevitable.
100
  
Vance recalled that after the failure of the negotiation in Moscow, ‘the allies were 
deeply concerned that the SALT negotiations and détente were in jeopardy. Repeatedly, 
they stressed a fervent desire that the talks get back on track’.
101
 But among British 
policymakers, there were diverse interpretations of this potentially bleak result. At the 
political level, there seems to be little disappointment or concern. E. A. J. Fergusson, 
Private Secretary for the Foreign Secretary, analysed that, the substance of the Soviet 
Union’s flat negative attitude was not Carter’s human right remarks but the agenda of 
the new SALT proposal itself, the asymmetric reduction in strategic weapons and 
long-range limitation in cruise missiles. But importantly, he was not pessimistic about 
the future negotiations. He wrote that the difficulties of SALT negotiations were always 
expected, and ‘despite the hiccough, the Americans may feel that their opening bid puts 
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them in a good position publicly’.
102
 This positive understanding became clear when 
Vance stopped over in London to meet Callaghan on 31 March on the way back from 
Moscow. The main topic of their meeting was of course the SALT negotiation in 
Moscow. Callaghan was optimistic; at the beginning of their meeting, he told Vance in 
an encouraging tone that he did not take the result of Moscow talks too seriously. They 
agreed that Brezhnev wanted a success in détente, but hard-liners in the Soviet 
government were trying to prevent it by using Carter’s human right remarks. Therefore, 
in Callaghan’s view, Brezhnev’s outright negative response was a tactic at the beginning 
of the long process to deter these opponents and in the long run it would be facilitated. 
In addition, Callaghan told Vance that Carter’s remarks on human rights gave him 
domestic popularity and international standing.
103
 With this encouraging analysis, the 
general atmosphere of their meeting was friendly and sympathetic. 
There were, however, concerns at the official level about the new Administration’s 
handling of the SALT negotiation. S. W. J. Fuller of the Defence Department wrote that, 
what struck him was Warnke’s ‘openness’ to admit that the Americans miscalculated the 
Soviets’ reaction to the new proposals. In addition to the problems in the proposals 
themselves, he pointed out the lack of skill in the Carter administration’s new style of 
negotiation; he felt that the Russians were ‘pressured unfairly’ and were ‘victims of 
brash propaganda’. Furthermore, now that the Americans raised cruise missiles as an 
agenda for SALT II, there was a concern for themselves and other European allies about 
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On 12 April, Ramsbotham and Brzezinski discussed the results of the Moscow 
meeting. Brzezinski stated his optimistic view; Brezhnev wanted negotiations, thus they 
would come back to the table in any case. Ramsbotham reported to London the 
Americans’ view that, even if the US-Soviet negotiations took a longer time, they would 
be ready to come to terms with the prolonged stalemate and in the meantime they would 
develop new weapon systems such as cruise missiles. Facing America’s superiority, the 
Soviets would realise that a stalemate would be more disadvantageous for them than for 
the Americans. Nevertheless, Ramsbotham was not necessarily happy with Brzezinski’s 
judgement. He was now pessimistic about the future of the negotiations. He concluded 
his telegram with concern: 
 
If my analysis is correct, we could face a prolonged period of uncertainty […]. The 
problem, as I see it, is that, even if the Russians perceive the disadvantages to themselves 
of no agreement, they will find it difficult to negotiate on the terms now being offered. The 
possibility of an early change in Soviet leadership will presumably complicate their 
approach. I am not entirely convinced that the President has yet fully appreciated how 





Facing the depressing result of the first SALT II negotiations, officials gradually 
began to worry about the future of détente under the new administration. In contrast, the 
Prime Minister’s support for the new administration’s détente policy remained 
unchanged because of his personal rapport with Carter and belief in the 
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Anglo-American relationship. But given the lack of consultation, the new 
administration’s relations with the European allies became fragile as early as the spring 
of 1977. Among them, US-FRG relations were severely strained. Carter’s attitude on 
human rights caused difficulties for Schmidt’s policy. As soon as Carter came to power 
the difference of views became clear in various fields. In non-nuclear proliferation, the 
Carter administration’s intervention in the West German-Brazilian agreement on the 
supply of nuclear technology produced a severe tension, but more serious friction was 
created over East-West relations. As stated above, from the outset of the Carter 
administration, the West German government was worried about the new American 
emphasis on human rights.
106
 For Schmidt, Carter’s new policy was dangerous for 
détente’s prospects. What he wanted from Carter was a continuation of the practical 
policy of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger era. This was particularly important for West 
Germany since deterioration of East-West relations would directly affect the 
relationship between East Germany and West Germany. Schmidt recalled that 
‘(s)omeone who continually compromised the Soviet leaders by waging a human rights 
campaign could hardly hope to persuade them to go beyond the old agreement for arms 
limitation to actual disarmament’.
107
 Contrary to the meeting with Callaghan in London, 
the Schmidt-Vance meeting took place in a strained atmosphere; Vance had an 
‘uncomfortable session’ with the Chancellor and Schmidt pointed out the risk of the 
new President’s policy. He added that Carter’s policy made situation difficult and 
‘(d)rastic talk about human rights made it more difficult to achieve this aim’.
108
 These 
British and German differences with the Americans are explained by the mood in their 
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separate bilateral relations as well as the gap in their understanding in East-West 
relations and the Carter administration’s policy. 
While cold water was poured on the SALT negotiation immediately after it 
commenced, Britain and the US worked pari passu under the revived ‘special 
relationship’ for the NATO ministerial meeting. But it was not smooth sailing. As 
already noted in the earlier part of this chapter, Carter had confirmed during his meeting 
with Callaghan on 9 March that he would attend the NATO ministerial meeting and not 
develop any new initiatives. Nevertheless, on 10 March, Palliser wrote from 
Washington that Henry Owen, the administration’s Special Representative for Summits, 
told Hunt and himself that although Carter had not yet made a final decision, he was 
envisaged reaffirmation of the US commitment to Western defence based on NATO and 
a proposal for a long-term review of the Alliance as it adjusted to the changing situation. 
Henry Owen listed three points that required analysis in this study: the changing 
political environment of the Alliance and its role in the new international environment; 
improvements that might be required in defence postures; and desirable changes in 
Alliance machinery. Owen said that the administration wished to consult with the 
British first before consulting NATO and its members.
109
 Hunt and Palliser replied that 
while the British government would warmly welcome the President’s participation, the 
impression that the US was deliberating a reduction in their commitment to European 
defence while asking their Allies to increase their contribution should be avoided. 
Clearly Carter wished to make his attendance at the NATO summit more than 
ceremonial.
110
 It was apparent that the US President wanted his statesmanship to make 
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up for his inexperience in the eyes of the American people. Nonetheless, the US 
government soon revised its idea after Hunt and Palliser had given Owen their views. 
On 16 March, Owen told K. B. A. Scott, the head of Chancery of the British Embassy in 
Washington, that ‘a full scale study of the nature and purposes of the Alliance could 
open up questions which were better left unasked’. Instead, he proposed a political 
study in NATO in the light of the changing environment of East-West relations and 




Britain’s first reaction was confusion; even if the Americans revised the idea, it 
obviously contradicted Carter’s line with Callaghan. Fergusson reported that the White 
House and the State Department had pressed the President to take an initiative for the 
NATO summit.
112
 But the FCO took this change of attitude relatively positively. 
Assistant Under Secretary of State P. H. Moberly wrote to Sykes that the revised 
American idea seemed ‘a good deal and less controversial’. Yet, he pointed out that the 
political study could cause troubles ‘(u)nless this is handled very carefully and 
delicately indeed (and the Americans are not famous for such qualities)’.
113
 On the 
other hand, Callaghan and Owen were more positive; Owen argued that this change 
removed the objection which Callaghan expressed to Carter in Washington and judged 
that it would ‘right for us to go along with Mr Henry Owen’s revised idea’.
114
 
This American demarche was communicated to the other NATO members through 
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Luns on 15 April, after his return from Washington.
115
 The allies were in some doubt as 
to what the Carter administration really aimed to do for European security. Killick 
reported that in fact all delegations in Brussels were cooperative but not happy with the 
proposal. Even Luns could not see what they meant; he told Ramsbotham in 
Washington that he had advised Henry Owen that ‘what was needed was not new 
studies to produce new information, but the political will to adopt the necessary 
policies’.
116
 Under these difficult circumstances Britain’s help with the US proposal 
was crucial for the administration’s diplomatic success. Importantly, this UK-US 
cooperation was kept secret. Killick wrote that ‘nobody else is in a position to know the 
extent to which Owen’s original ideas have been modified as a result of our earlier 
interventions’.
117
 The Americans appreciated highly British help and close cooperation 
with them.
118
 By acting behind the scenes, the British clearly tried to avoid the 
Europeans’ old criticism of Britain as a ‘Trojan Horse’ for the US while strengthening 
the bilateral relationship. 
In the meantime, there were some developments in the Anglo-German offset 
negotiations. As mentioned above, Callaghan and Schmidt agreed in January to continue 
their discussion and seek finalisation. Nonetheless, the German side proposed a rather 
prudent procedure whereas the British had run too far ahead of the Germans. At the first 
exchange of notes, the British outlined a new agreement while the Germans started by 
listing issues.
119
 Although the negotiation was already behind schedule from the 
beginning, its overall pace was dominated by the Germans. On 16 March, the first 
meeting was held in Bonn between the German officials and the British delegation, 
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Stowe and Sir Clive Rose, Deputy Secretary, Civil Contingencies Unit of Cabinet Office. 
The discussion was businesslike, but despite the impatience of the British, the only but 
not advantageous new development was a proposal made by the Germans: negotiations 
between foreign ministers to settle the points on which agreement had not been reached. 
This idea reflected Schmidt’s wish and German internal politics. According to the 
German participants Schmidt thought that he could not impose an agreement on 
Genscher.
120
 It can be easily understood that Schmidt wished that Genscher would 
share the burden of concluding this highly unpopular agreement by getting him 
involved in the negotiation. This  frustrated the British as it would inevitably delay the 
negotiations further. It was doubtful from the beginning that the negotiation could be 
concluded by the NATO ministerial meeting. 
The British studied a compromise at the time. Rose envisaged that, in case Schmidt 
might stick to his original plan of DM125 million for three years and would not accept 
‘optimum requirements’ (a total of DM750 million), they would have to agree a total 
payment of DM500 million for two or three years. In Rose’s report, should the Germans 
argue for a three year agreement, DM 250 million was allocated to 1977/78 and DM125 
million for 1978/79 and 1979/80 respectively. But the British still wished to maintain 
their reservations on the multilateral scheme after the traditional offset was 
terminated.
121
 With this compromise in mind, Callaghan hoped to push Schmidt again 
during their encounter at the European Council in Rome on 26 March. However, his 
effort did not bear fruit. Rather their meeting revealed Schmidt’s firm determination to 
terminate the traditional offset agreement. Schmidt only said that he could not stop 
Callaghan raising the idea of the multilateral scheme, but he was not prepared to agree 
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During this period, Britain’s attempts to justify defence expenditure cuts for 1977/78 
were not successful. In Killick’s despatch to Palliser dated 23 March, he reported his 
effort of ‘ploughing a somewhat lonely furrow’ in Brussels. Killick deplored that ‘we 
can no longer argue, as we have done hitherto, that having undertaken the necessary 
surgery of the Defence Review, we have been maintaining the essential level of our 
contribution to NATO’.
123
 He pointed out that the current tactics of penalising Britain’s 
defence effort arbitrarily for reasons of economic difficulties were no longer persuasive 
enough to maintain Britain’s position in NATO and emphasised the need of a coherent 
defence policy. His despatch showed the distress of a frontline diplomat who was 
instructed to fight a defensive battle without sufficient materials. Palliser’s reply was 
hard-headed: 
 
I honestly do not think that it makes sense for you to attempt to re-write our defence policy 
from Brussels, and I think you should beware of exaggerating its deficiencies or giving 
anyone in London any grounds for suspecting that you may not be wholehearted in your 




From the Whitehall’s point of view, the diplomatic front in Brussels had to be held or 
Britain’s credibility as a whole would be seriously damaged. Hence Killick’s defensive 
battle was critically important and had to be maintained even if it was a lonely furrow. 
In addition, the American administration’s demand that the allies increase their 
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defence budgets would be a heavy pressure on the ongoing offset negotiations. It 
evidently meant that the delay of the offset negotiation could unavoidably put Britain 
into a more difficult position in the Alliance due to financial pressures. The British 
wanted an early conclusion at any rate. DM500 million was nothing but a half of the 
original requirement, but Callaghan approved Rose’s suggestion, and Owen, Healey and 
Mulley followed.
125
 Grounded within this consensus, officials discussed the future 
tactics on 5 April. They were sceptical whether the negotiation could be concluded in 
time, but decided to recommend that Owen write a personal letter to Genscher 




For Owen, direct negotiation with Genscher was a tough job. He commented ‘I wish 
I could understand a word of these papers. They are most confused I have read and that 
is saying something! […] I need urgent advice on the handling of this issue’.
127
 Yet 
little time was left before the target date, 10 May, the day of NATO ministerial meeting. 
There was no moment to lose before that; his letter was sent on 12 April, but the 
Germans’ reaction was still lukewarm.
128
 Genscher was ‘fully seized of the problem’, 
but wanted to ‘obtain precise guidance from the Chancellor on certain key point’.
129
 
Understandably Genscher did not want to commit to this unpopular negotiation. 
Meanwhile, the second official level meeting took place in Bonn on 29 April. Again the 
Germans’ attitude was ‘businesslike and friendly’, but there was no advance in 
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discussion due to the very rigid instructions given to them by Schmidt because of 
German internal politics.
130
 Under existing conditions it was as clear as day that the 
negotiation would not be able to be concluded ahead of the NATO ministerial meeting. 
Owen suggested that Callaghan raise this problem when he saw Genscher during the 
summit meetings. Should their discussion become inconclusive, it would be desirable 
that Callaghan and Schmidt discuss this long-standing problem again.
131
 Given the 
shortage of the remaining time, the negotiations came back to the direct talks between 
the heads of the government for rapid completion. 
London became the centre of the international politics in the first half of May. The 
Economic Summit took place on 7th and 8th, the quadripartite summit between Britain, 
the US, Germany and France on 9th, and the NATO summit meeting on 10th
 
and 11th. 
Among these international meetings, the latter two were directly related to European 
security. Ostensibly the quadripartite meeting was set to discuss over the situation of 
Berlin between the four-power of occupying that city, but its real purpose was to discuss 
wide range of international issues. The four heads of government hurried through the 
discussion on Berlin and moved to the main topic, Carter’s foreign policy. The 
atmosphere was testy from the beginning. The Chancellor came to London already ‘in a 
smouldering mood, exacerbated by Carter’s method of handling discussions’.
132
 But 
according to Callaghan’s note of the meeting, it was Giscard who voiced the doubt most 
explicitly in the meeting. He criticised Carter’s human rights diplomacy saying that the 
President had broken the code and ‘gone outside the rules of the game’ by condemning 
human rights in the Soviet Union. Carter countered that ’(a)fter Vietnam and Nixon, it 
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was necessary that there should be something clean for the United States to latch on to, 
because their honour had been besmirched’. This sharp exchange of words shows the 
fundamental perception gap between the European leaders and the US President. Carter 
was determined to free America from the old Nixon-Ford-Kissinger line by his own 
morals-oriented foreign policy. But the European leaders, particularly Giscard and 
Schmidt, did not need such change which would shake the existing equilibrium even if 
they also wanted a change in East-West relations. However, Carter assured that the US 
commitment to European defence would continue, saying that that there was no 
‘Mansfield proposals for withdrawal’ and that ‘his readiness to continue full support’ 
would be made clear at the NATO ministerial meeting. This reconfirmation was 
naturally aimed to ease increasing doubts about US leadership. But at the same time he 
argued that Europe should not be dependent on the US and West Germany.
133
 This 
hardball discussion implied the troubled period in transatlantic relations in the late 
seventies which the following chapters examine. 
This quadripartite meeting on 9 May was a preliminary discussion for the NATO 
ministerial meeting. Since the quadripartite meeting was closed, these four heads of 
government talked more openly about their thoughts. Compared with this meeting, the 
NATO summit did not expose the severe gap in the Alliance in terms of Carter’s foreign 
policy. Rather, it was set to re-confirm the unity of the Alliance under the new US 
President. As he promised during the previous day, Carter declared at the beginning of 
his speech that NATO was the heart of the US foreign policy and the US would be a 
‘reliable and faithful ally’; the US hoped mutual consultations with its allies would 
strengthen the Alliance politically, economically and militarily. While stressing his 
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attachment to human rights, Carter reaffirmed the US commitment to SALT, the MBFR, 
and maintenance of nuclear and conventional forces. He then repeated his decision to 
increase conventional force provision and stated that the US was ready to make more 
efforts if the other allies played their part. Based on this premise, as had been expected, 
he proposed a more effective consultation via a long-term study on ‘future trends in the 
Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe and in East-West relations’ and on ‘implications of 




Other European leaders reacted generally favourably to his proposal. Schmidt 
welcomed Carter’s reaffirmation of the US commitment to the Alliance defence. But he 
argued for the necessity of reviewing the NATO strategy based on the ‘triad’, between 
strategic and tactical weapons and conventional forces. While stressing the importance 
of MBFR under strategic parity, he talked of the military balance in Europe. His 
comments are important considering his role in the latter stage of 1977:  
 
Approximate nuclear parity, which already existed, would be stabilized by a successful 
SALT II agreement and the importance, both political and military, of strategic weapons as 
a component of defence and deterrence could be expected to diminish. Such weapons 
would come to be regarded more and more as an instrument of last resort. This 
development would undoubtedly lead to a re-orientation towards conventional defence and 
deterrence. In other words, a stabilization of strategic nuclear parity led to the necessity to 
achieve conventional parity as well, including not only levels of forces but also their 
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That is to say, as Schmidt pointed out, as parity in strategic nuclear weapons existed 
between the US and the Soviet Union, parity in other areas would have more 
significance as deterrence. On the other hand, while Callaghan shared Schmidt’s 
concern about the need for parity in the conventional field, he was otherwise optimistic 
and pledged Britain’s support for Carter’s line. Importantly, he stated that he did not 
take too tragically the lack of a progress in the first SALT talks in Moscow, and argued 
that ‘a period of quiet diplomacy would produce results’.
136
 Here again, Callaghan’s 
supportive attitude towards Carter’s new foreign policy is evident. Taking the discussion 
in the quadripartite meeting into consideration, Callaghan’s backing was conspicuous 
and the degree of optimism made a clear that difference between Callaghan and 
Schmidt.  
The British generally found the NATO summit successful. Even Killick pointed out 
that Carter’s sincerity and quiet determination, and Vance’s conduct of foreign policy, 
impressed the participants. From his point of view, Carter’s proposal for the summit 
meeting in Washington next year was evidence of their determination. He felt sure that 
‘the Alliance as a whole will have been greatly reassured and morally strengthened by 
their experience’.
137
   
In parallel with these meetings on European security, the Anglo-German offset 
negotiation finally approached conclusion. The British and the West German foreign 
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ministers met during the ministerial meetings on 9 May. Before they met, the British 
revised the compromised plan: a total of DM550 million instead of DM750 million, first 
year DM250 million, second year DM175 million, and third year 125 million, while 
maintaining the final fallback of DM500 million for three years.
138
 In their meeting 
Genscher said that the Germans preferred a degressive payment, but a total of DM750 
million was ‘far above any figure which the Germans could consider’ and again, he was 
reluctant to conclude the negotiation by himself. In response, Owen pressed Genscher 
saying that the British needed an answer by 12 May, when Callaghan would make a 
statement and answer questions on the outcome of the NATO meeting in the House of 
Commons.
139
 Still, Genscher was prudent. He repeated that that the figure Owen 
proposed was ‘beyond the limits of his freedom of manoeuvre’ and would discuss it 
again the next day with Schmidt’s present.
140
 Thus, after the NATO meeting session on 
the following day, Schmidt assured Owen that it was ‘politically impossible to settle for 
any sum beginning with the figure 5’. Owen then suggested DM475 million and 
Schmidt finally accepted it. The following discussion was spent on the allocation of the 
amount for three years but at least they agreed the total amount of DM475 million and 
DM250 million for 1978/79.
141
   
Finally the outline of a terminal offset agreement was formed. It gave the British ‘a 
breathing space’ for a moment and the Ministry of Defence was content with the 
result.
142
 However, in light of the DM475 million figure, the negotiation was not 
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successful from Britain’s point of view. The initial target was DM1,000 million, and 
then it was reduced to 750 million, 550 million, 500 million, and finally settled at 475 
million. But from German side, although this figure exceeded Schmidt’s first offer of 
DM375 million for three years, DM475 million was much closer to their target compare 
to Britain’s DM1,000 million. This outcome indicates two things. First, it showed a 
change in the power balance between the two countries. Already in decline, Britain did 
not have any card to make it negotiating position more advantageous. On the other hand, 
West Germany had consistently been in a dominant position. Secondly, the negotiations 
indicated Britain’s eagerness to gain a breathing space through early conclusion, 
principally due to a shortage of money in the Exchequer.  
Nevertheless, successful management of the NATO summit and the Anglo-German 
offset negotiation did not fully guarantee Britain’s credibility in the Alliance. On 9 May 
Mulley sent a minute to Callaghan. ‘I must warn you’, he wrote that of the forthcoming 
NATO Defence Planning Committee on 17 and 18 May, that there was a ‘likelihood of a 
disagreeable clash with the United States’. As the result of the NATO ministerial 
meeting in London, the Americans were arguing for a conclusion in the DPC which 
envisaged that ‘every nation would make some real increase in resources for defence’ 
during the NATO planning period from 1979 to 1984. He continued: 
 
The United States, with strong support from the NATO authorities and at least the 
acquaintance of others, have pressed for wording which would clearly envisage that during 
the planning period 1979/84 every nation would make some real increase in resources for 
defence. There are rival formulations about just how big an increase (the United States for 
example envisage at least 3%, year on year, for all countries), but the basic principle is 
118 
 
contended only by the United Kingdom. I have felt unable to accept any such wording, 
since the PESC process will not be settling the post-1978/79 defence allocation until the 
autumn. The Germans having abandoned a similar initial stand, we are now alone in 





Mulley added that if Britain did not increase its defence expenditure it would inevitably 
damage its position in the Alliance as well as its relationship with the US. The only way 




Yet, even if the Callaghan government had to swallow this bitter condition, they 
wanted to mitigate its impact by amending the wording of the communiqué. 
Consequently, at the NATO Council meeting, Owen should seek to delete words from 
the communiqué which would assume increases.
145
 In parallel, officials made a form of 
words which argued that the member states’ present contribution and their economic 
situation should be taken into account, while they accepted the annual increase of 5% in 
real terms.
146
 Britain was under the IMF control but still allocated higher percentage of 
gross domestic product for defence than any other Alliance members except the US and 
Greece. But it could be expected that these words would help Britain to limit further 
their burdens.
147
 With this formula Mulley flew to Brussels to persuade Brown. In 
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consequence Brown accepted the inclusion of this principle. As the Americans argued, 
the DPC’s biannual strategic paper, Ministerial Guidance, stipulated the call for the 
increase in defence expenditure ‘in the region of 3%’ but it also stated that ‘for some 
individual countries: – economic circumstances will affect what can be achieved’ and 
that ‘– present force contributions may justify a higher level of increase’.
148
 Clearly this 
reference reflected Britain’s efforts to ease the impact of the new administration’s 
initiative while not preventing it. Along with this Ministerial Guidance, NATO defence 
ministers decided to set up nine task forces to study Carter’s LTDP, and agreed that 
these task forces should be completed by the NATO ministerial meeting which was 
planned to be held in Washington in May 1978.
149
  
Britain’s efforts to amend the DPC communiqué indicates the fragile reality of the 
new Anglo-American ‘special relationship’. Apparently, the Americans did not fully 
adopt what Callaghan told Carter and Brown in Washington in March. The British 
government repeatedly said to the Americans that Britain had no room in its budget for 
armed forces expansion. Conversely, for the Carter administration the Alliance response 
to the Soviet military build-up was an imminent issue, particularly if they did not wish 
to see a reinforcement of nuclear arsenals. Because of this consideration, the Carter 
administration repeatedly asked its allies to contribute more and to keep pace with the 
Americans in the increase of defence spending for conventional forces. The 
Anglo-German offset negotiations were almost concluded if not successful, but the 
Callaghan government still needed to settle the problems which arose from the 
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economic crisis to maintain its status in the Alliance. Britain’s weaker position was clear 
even with a strengthened Anglo-American relationship. If the Callaghan government 
wished to maintain its position in the Alliance with its declined presence, it needed to 
find a way very carefully to use that ‘special relationship’ most efficiently.  
In the meantime, the SALT II talks were resumed in Geneva in May between Vance 
and Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister. After the unsuccessful Moscow talks, 
the Carter administration proposed a ‘three piece’ method, which consisted of a general 
treaty lasting until 1985, an interim two or three-year protocol which would limit certain 
types of cruise missiles, and a joint statement of principle on the future of SALT process. 
Gromyko accepted this approach and agreed to reduce the 2,400 strategic delivery 
vehicles by 150 and argued for the inclusion of air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) in 
the treaty. The Americans maintained that these should be covered in SALT II only on a 
temporary short term basis and that the submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLCMs) 
or ground-launched ballistic missile (GLCMs) should not be included in the protocol 
‘unless there were matching restrictions on heavy MIRVed Soviet systems [ballistic 
payloads equipped with multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles]’. In 
addition, the Soviets wished to restrict the American forward based system (FBS) in 
Europe. Against this, Vance confirmed that the US position had not changed and if the 
FBS was to be included, the Soviet Backfire bombers and the SS-20s would have to be 
taken into consideration. There were still many difficult points to be settled, but the 
Americans thought there was a ‘decent chance’ of agreement before the expiry of SALT 
I in October.
150
 Carter was optimistic – in the press conference on 26 May he stated that 
the Geneva talks were ‘very upbeat’.
151
 Nevertheless, this new approach caused further 
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concerns in the Alliance. Regardless of the administration’s emphasis on the increase of 
the NATO conventional forces, from this period, SS-20, the newly deployed Soviet 
intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), became the focus of the intra-Alliance 





The Anglo-American special relationship was re-established as the Carter 
administration took office. This development complied with the Callaghan 
government’s aim to establish good relations with the US, not least as a way to maintain 
political status in Europe. Facing Britain’s declining presence in the Alliance due to the 
lack of resources, British policymakers recognised that what they could offer was 
knowledge based on their rich experiences in international affairs. Fortunately for them 
it was exactly what the new US administration wanted. Here, both countries had a 
common interest in the revival of Anglo-American relations. 
However, the British at the same time recognised the difference between the two 
countries in foreign and defence policy which did not extend from Washington to other 
European allies. The first full scale Anglo-American meeting revealed President 
Carter’s strong personal conviction in human rights and Brown’s belief that the allies 
should reinforce their conventional forces. Furthermore, the first days of the Carter 
administration showed awkwardness over the handling of both East-West and 
transatlantic relations. In contrast to the establishment of close Anglo-American 
cooperation, the Carter administration did not pay much attention to their consultations 
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with other European allies although they repeatedly promised to do so. With this lack of 
consultation, their radical policy and clumsy attitude towards East-West relations 
brought European worries about the future of détente as well as transatlantic relations. 
Also, for the British, although the Anglo-German offset negotiation was about to be 
concluded, thus giving them breathing space, the Carter administration’s demand for the 
reinforcement of NATO conventional forces put Britain in a difficult position. The 
superficial optimistic mood about the future of Anglo-American relations involved 
dangerous risks which might cool off these initial warm bilateral relations. 
It was evident that Callaghan realised those potential sources of future conflict. 
There were two choices for him in this situation. The first was to try to change Carter’s 
foreign and defence policy from outside of the policymaking process with other 
European leaders. The other was to modify it from inside by committing US 
policymaking more deeply to the special relationship. Apparently Callaghan preferred 
the latter. In the light of the new administration’s reliance on the British, the Prime 
Minister’s choice seems pertinent. The preparation for the NATO ministerial meeting 
was its example. The British helped the Americans make their proposal for a NATO 
long-term study more acceptable to the other European allies, and the Carter 
administration appreciated London’s help. In this sense, the Callaghan government 
played the role of mediator in the Atlantic Alliance by transmitting the concerns from 
Europeans to the Americans, as well as the demands from the Americans to Europeans. 
With Britain’s efforts, the NATO ministerial meeting succeeded in protecting the unity 
of the Alliance under the new US President’s leadership. Nevertheless, beneath the 
friendly atmosphere there were growing concerns about the future of European security 
in the face of the problems in the resumed US-Soviet SALT II negotiations. As long as 
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the perception gaps persisted between the US and the European allies, particularly 
France and West Germany, Britain’s position as a mediator in transatlantic relations 
remained important but at the same time fragile. Consequently, the latter half of 1977 







Alliance in Cacophony 
 






The success of the London NATO summit in May 1977 mitigated, if not entirely, the 
concerns amongst European allies over the Carter administration’s attitude towards 
European security. Carter’s reaffirmation of the continuation of the US commitment to 
European defence and his initiative on the LTDP impressed the Alliance members; the 
US seemed now to be providing leadership in the Alliance’s preparation for the 
changing circumstances of Cold War Europe. For the Callaghan government, the 
re-establishment of the Anglo-American special relationship with the Carter 
administration convinced them that they could play a role of mediator between the both 
sides of the Atlantic. By doing so, they envisaged that they would maintain the unity of 
NATO under US leadership while preserving Britain’s major status in the Alliance.  
This chapter investigates the development of Britain’s policy towards European 
security after the NATO ministerial meeting of May 1977. It sets two key questions: 
how did the British government see the development of US foreign policy; and what did 
Britain do as a mediator in transatlantic relations? To answer these questions, this 
chapter focuses on the controversy surrounding enhanced radiation warheads (ERW), or 
the neutron bomb. As this chapter will indicate, the dispute on ERW became the focus 
of discussions on European security during this period, and for this reason it can be used 
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as a case study to investigate an intra-Alliance consultation and Britain’s role in it. 
Recent declassification of primary documents has enabled scholars to explore this 
important controversy on European security.
1
 Nevertheless, there has arguably been too 
much attention given to the relationship between ERW and NATO’s so-called ‘dual 
track decision’, which marked a major change in NATO defence strategy in December 
1979, rather than the Alliance politics itself. Moreover, while much ink has been spilled 
on the West German and the American attitudes to this dispute, little has been used on 
Britain’s approach.
2
 This chapter aims to reveal to what extent Britain contributed to 
the settlement of the dispute over the ERW in the latter half of 1977. 
 
 
1. Calm before the Storm 
 
Ten days after coming back from London, Carter made a commencement address at 
Notre Dame University, Indiana, on 22 May. The address, drafted by Brzezinski, was 
not just a speech for the graduates. It contained the administration’s review on its 
foreign policy after being power for four months since January.
3
 In this speech, Carter 
re-stated the basic principle of his foreign policy, that the US could ‘have a foreign 
policy that is democratic, that is based on fundamental values, and that uses power and 
influence, which we have, for humane purposes’. With this re-confirmation, he admitted 
the existence of the ‘limits of moral suasion’ on human rights, and ‘the risk of some 
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friction with our friends’ over the nuclear non-proliferation and conventional arms 
limitation. It indicated that he recognised that his administration’s highly idealistic 
policy faced the reality of international politics and some revisions were necessary. 
Nevertheless, Carter’s speech still showed his strong conviction about the fundamental 
value of the democracy and human rights, as well as his confidence in American 
leadership among the non-communist countries in the pursuit of these values in 
international affairs. With this conviction, Carter made clear his support for the 
continuation of détente ‘to produce reciprocal stability, parity and security’.
4
 
Ramsbotham reported the interpretations of the nine ambassadors of EC member 
countries on this speech. He noted that Carter’s remarks reflected that ‘the lessons of the 
last four months have not been lost on the President and that the raw edges of his earlier 
statements have been worn smoother by the impact of the realities of international life’. 
Nevertheless, he wrote that the flexibility which Carter had shown in the address was 
‘tactical rather than strategic’, and added that ‘the real test of his statesmanship and 
leadership will come if some of his premises are shown to be over-optimistic and to 
have led to policies which do not produce results’.
5
 Importantly, Ramsbotham’s 
comments were largely shared by the other EC Nine ambassadors. In this sense, there 
was almost a single European view in Washington. Consequently Ramsbotham’s 
judgement – that Carter’s speech did not ally the Europeans’ concerns on the 
still-remaining radicalism of his foreign policy – was indicative of all nevertheless not 
being well in transatlantic relations.  
Ramsbotham’s own thoughts were expressed more fully one month later in his 
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despatch titled ‘Mr Carter’s Planet’. He argued that Carter’s new foreign policy should 
be understood from his views on the world and America. In Carter’s vision, containment 
was superseded by détente, and his détente was more dynamic and more offensive than 
his predecessors’ more static version. Under his presidency, American foreign policy 
pursued not only cooperation but also ideological competition with the Soviet Union. In 
the post-colonial world, Carter pursued this aim by a wider alignment with the Third 
World as well as the industrial countries under US leadership which was now 
overcoming the struggle with the Vietnam War and Watergate. Ramsbotham wrote that 
the Carter administration was convinced that it was in ‘an increasingly strong position 
morally, politically economically and militarily’, and added that Carter aimed ‘to 
change the world, not tame it’.
6
 However, Ramsbotham pointed out that given this 
ambitious vision, Carter’s foreign policy was ‘still more a matter of words than deeds’. 
It evoked a number of suspicions and concerns, such as on policy priorities, the pursuit 
of objectives, Carter’s ability to gain Congressional approval for his foreign policy, and 
the lack of longer-term aims. Yet, Ramsbotham was cautious about reaching a final 
verdict on the administration at this stage, saying: 
 
To some extent Mr Carter is still in a phoney war period, although we are probably closer 
to April 1940 than November 1939. The tone has been set and the style – confident, 
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However, judging from this description it is obvious that he thought that major and 
perhaps harsh diplomatic issues would come to the surface before long. Ramsbotham 
argued that Carter had the capability to achieve success in international affairs, but the 
key was his radicalism. He wrote that:  
 
(I)f we are to dissuade Mr Carter on selected issues, it will be up to us to offer solutions of 
equal cogency and urgency. This may be the real measure of the President’s contribution. 
He is forcing the United States, the Soviet Union and ourselves to reshape our thoughts. 




In this logic, Britain could still influence the new administration’s policy making 
process. But if they wished to do so, they needed to offer a second opinion which could 
be enough to convince Carter himself who had the manifest conviction to change the 
world.   
Ramsbotham’s balanced but not rosy analysis seems to be more or less shared in the 
Washington embassy. R. Mark Russel, Counsellor of the British embassy in Washington, 
confessed that the FCO staff in Washington ‘underestimated what a change of style 
would mean’. He pointed out Carter’s strong influence in the making of the 
administration’s foreign policy: 
    
It seems to me to have been so great as to constitute a change of substance. In particular, 
the switch from an essentially defensive to an offensive strategy lies at the root of the 
change. Mr. Carter does not see containment in defensive terms. By deploying America’s 





(and the West’s) full resources, military, industrial, technological, political and moral, he is 
seeking to put the West “on the side of history”, moving with the tide instead of always 
against it. If successful, he appears to see this as a surer way of containing the Soviet 
Union, than the reacting to events which by and large has been the West’s posture since the 
War. It is a bold concept. Mr. Carter may fall short. But it is the essence of U.S. foreign 
policy at this time and stems personally from Carter. Brzezinski, Vance and others may 




During this period the European allies’ doubts about Carter’s foreign policy were 
increasing. On 29 June, at the informal discussion during the European Council in 
London, European leaders talked about the Carter administration’s foreign policy. In 
this meeting, Giscard reported Brezhnev’s visit to Paris which had taken place a week 
before the Council. He said that Brezhnev had thought it had been ‘foolish’ that Carter 
had proposed new proposals on SALT II at short notice and that the Soviet leader had a 
‘deep and lasting mistrust’ of Carter. Giscard even called Carter ‘a green horn’ in 
international affairs. Schmidt agreed with Giscard on this grave suspicion, as did Italian 
Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti. Callaghan thought the European leaders to be ‘too 
gloomy’, and that Giscard’s and Schmidt’s doubts had been formed when they met in 
Bonn recently. The British prime minister believed Carter was ‘genuinely wedded to 
détente but that he had his own ideas’. He went on to say that Schmidt should not to go 
Washington with prejudice about the President. Giscard still countered, saying that the 
Europeans should have their own view on East-West relations and Schmidt assented to 
this point. Callaghan thought that Giscard was too much influenced by Brezhnev who 
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did not understand Carter’s thinking on human rights.
10
 The discussion in the Council 
clearly showed the deep difference in the perception of European leaders on Carter’s 
foreign policy. In Callaghan’s mind, European leaders did not understand Carter’s 
goodwill. Any collusion against his leadership which could divide the Alliance should 
be prevented.  
Giscard escalated his criticism about Carter. In the interview with Newsweek 
published on 18 July, he criticised Carter’s policy towards the Soviet Union, stating that 
he had broken the rule of détente by emphasising human rights issues. For him, Carter’s 
foreign policy was beyond the current ‘code of conduct’.
11
 He was worried that it 
would risk weakening the basis of détente and producing instability in US-Soviet and 
East-West relations. Basically, this was what he had said to Carter in London in May, 
but he revealed his criticism publicly this time. The British Ambassador to France, 
Nicholas Henderson, observed that Giscard’s main motive was not to improve 
Franco-Russian relations after Brezhnev’s visit to Paris, but to strengthen his political 
position in and outside France.
12
 Judging from his comments, there were few risks that 
Giscard might act independently from the Americans in East-West relations, but it was 
evident that Carter’s foreign policy could slacken the bonds of the Alliance and give the 
Soviets room to cause divergence.   
Despite increasing criticisms, London was more optimistic than the Washington 
embassy. In general terms, Whitehall shared the Washington embassy’s concerns on the 
Carter administration’s foreign policy, but they thought that close transatlantic 
consultations could add flexibility. Importantly, it was thought that a cooperative 
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attitude was more productive than direct confrontation if the administration was to be 
encouraged to shift its policy to the benefit of the Europeans. George E. Hall, Assistant 
Under-Secretary, commented on Ramsbotham’s despatch that ‘I am sure that in public 
we must give the President and his Administration the benefit of the doubt wherever 
possible. Reservations and criticisms of the kind voiced by other Europeans, most 
particularly by the French President, do not help anyone’.
13
 
At the same period, a study was undertaken in the FCO under Palliser’s 
chairmanship on the Carter administration’s foreign policy in the light of current 
US-European relations. The conclusion of the study was submitted to Owen as a short 
report titled ‘American Foreign Policy: A European View – The First Six Months of the 
Carter Administration’. It admitted that the Carter administration did not have 
‘intermediate doctrines’ while having long term goals for a better world. Given this lack 
of ‘intermediate doctrines’, the administration tended to tackle the problems 
pragmatically although they recognised that ‘pragmatic tactics and the conflicting 
elements of some of the goals’ would cause inconsistencies in their foreign policy. This 
was the reason why his European allies were critical and suspicious. Based on this 
premise, the report analysed current problems related to European security. On human 
rights and East-West relations, it observed that the Carter administration began to 
recognise the harmful effects of their excessive emphasis on human rights in US-Soviet 
relations. Moreover, current American initiatives in East-West relations made the 
Soviets deeply suspicious. Also on arms control, it stated that fundamentally the 
European allies shared the hope for the development of arms control even if they had 
been worrying about the Carter administration’s handling of negotiations. For this 
                                                 
13
 TNA/FCO82/749, Hall to Palliser, 18 July 1977. 
132 
 
reason, close consultations in the Alliance was important to avoid misconception and to 
make the Americans take the European view more into account. Thus, this report 
arrived at an optimistic conclusion. It argued that, the Americans were ‘still holding 
firm to its goals’, but they were ‘ready to be flexible in seeking to achieve them’. It 
referred to the attitude that the Europeans should take towards transatlantic 
consultations: 
 
(I)t is of particular importance to be in consistent touch at all levels with the 
Administration; and to engage it in a constructive, candid, but where necessary firm, 
dialogue. Because this is a strong Administration with decided views of its own, this is the 
only way in which the process of cooperation and consultation to which both sides of the 




Interestingly enough, unlike Ramsbotham’s view, this report valued the change in the 
Carter administration’s attitude. Because of this evaluation, it rather required the 
European allies to take a more cooperative stance towards the administration. Palliser 
submitted this report with his comments. His attitude towards the Carter administration 
was in marked contrast with the criticisms in France and West Germany:  
 
The lesson to be drawn from this is not only that we in Europe can influence American 
policy, but that we do so by saying what we think candidly as well as tactfully. We, the UK, 
can best achieve this by identifying clearly what our interests are; keeping in close touch 
with the US Administration, with whom we have indeed managed to establish close 
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relations at all levels; and also by keeping in touch with our European partners who in 




Similarly, the report’s conclusion and Palliser’s comment reflected FCO officials’ 
confidence in their ability to make transatlantic relations more harmonious by 
fashioning a bridge between the US and Europe. Such confidence came from the newly 
established ‘special relationship’ with the Carter administration. The FCO officials 
believed that they could influence US foreign policy more than the other European 
allies and shift it to the benefit of Europe as well as Britain. This view seems to be 
largely shared at the political level. Ted Rowlands, Minister of State for the FCO, 
commented on this report that: 
 
My own personal view is that we should never give any Europeans encouragement to think 
that we do not back Carter on human rights. I find Carter’s view far more attractive and 
reasonable than Giscard’s. I think it also important to be candid and frank with our 
European partners. We should give no encouragement to Giscard’s Newsweek views.
16
   
 
Contrary to the optimistic FCO, the Washington embassy was concerned about the 
drastic change in the US foreign policy caused by Carter. If the administration strived 
for their own vision regardless of the suspicions in and outside their country, and if that 
policy did not satisfy the Americans and the Alliance, a ‘phoney war’ would become a 
‘real war’. By using the term of ‘April 1940’, Ramsbotham warned that the possibility 
of crisis was imminent. 
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By this time, US-West German ties emerged yet again as a source of tension in 
transatlantic relations. As the previous chapter showed, the US-FRG bilateral 
relationship after Carter’s inauguration was not as stable as the one under Carter’s 
predecessors. Amongst them, the personal relationship at the top of the government 
remained unstable. Schmidt’s distrust to Carter persisted even after the economic 
Summit and the NATO ministerial meeting in May.
17
 In addition to the awkwardness in 
their personal relations, Wright reported from Bonn ‘new factors in the FRG/US 
relationship which did not exist a year ago’ and ‘a series of disputes on policy’ such as 
Carter’s policy on the world economy, nuclear non-proliferation, and human rights.
18
 In 
terms of European security, human rights were the most serious problem. Wright 
pointed out that the Germans, who had worked hard for Ostpolitik to minimise the 
East-West divisions, saw ‘Carter’s flamboyant and philosophic approach to human 
rights as placing German practical achievements in this field at risk’, and it gave the 
political opponents to Schmidt in Germany ‘a stick to beat him with’.
19
 Carter’s human 
rights policy did not assist West German foreign policy towards the East which had 
made remarkable results under Ostpolitik in a close cooperation with Nixon, Ford, and 
Kissinger. Nevertheless, it is important that Wright was still not so pessimistic at this 
stage about the future of US-FRG relations. He analysed that given the significance of 
the bilateral relationship in the Alliance, the two countries would not ‘impair the 
fundamental community of interest between Washington and Bonn’. With this 
consideration in mind, he concluded with the ‘hope that the present state of the 
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relationship is as ephemeral as it is novel’.
20
  
Nevertheless it was also a fact that fragile relations increased the Americans’ doubts 
about the Europeans. There was a suspicion in Washington about the loyalty of the 
Europeans to the Alliance, particularly the Germans. On 1 July, Brzezinski told 
Ramsbotham his distrust of European attitudes towards international issues, particularly 
tendencies towards neutralism and the risk of West Germany’s ‘finlandisation’ given 
their ‘curious’ attitude towards East-West relations. Furthermore, he added that many 
Europeans, particularly the French and the Germans ‘looked on contemporary America 
with contempt’.
21
 Wright commented from Bonn, critically that he really could not 
‘imagine what reason Brzezinski may have for talking of the FRG in such terms’. 
However, whether or not this was Brzezinski’s personal view or that of the US 
government, it was at least a sign that the Carter administration did not give West 
German foreign policy full trust. At the same time, it also indicated that the worsening 
bilateral relationship was certainly eroding the mutual trust in each country’s foreign 
policy. In contrast to his distrust towards West Germany, at the end of June, Brzezinski 
told Ramsbotham of his admiration for the US-UK ‘special relationship’. He said that 
Carter was not saying it ‘to please – nor even to entice the British to deliver the other 
Europeans’; rather it was that the Americans and British ‘could discuss any problem 
without hang-up’.
22
    
Schmidt’s visit to Washington in the middle of July was a touchstone for the future 
of the troubled US-German relationship, and, in a wider context, that of transatlantic 
relations as a whole. After the Chancellor’s visit, Berndt von Staden, the West German 
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ambassador to the US, stressed in his briefing to the EC Nine ambassadors in 
Washington that ‘(a)ny past misunderstanding [between the US and West Germany] 
reflected in published and unpublished reports had been removed’.
23
 Actually the 
Chancellor’s visit marked a revival of a good and cordial bilateral relationship. On 19 
July, once Schmidt returned to Germany, he explained to Callaghan on the telephone 
more about his talks with Carter, adding that ‘in the personal field it was very, very nice 
and friendly’. But personal courtesy and international politics were different matters. 
Their main concern was whether Carter was going to continue his foreign policy 
towards the Soviet Union expecting change in their attitude. Schmidt observed that their 
SALT talks would stagnate ‘for a number of months to come’, but the current US 
strategy would continue with an expectation that it could change the Soviet attitude. 
Schmidt added that Carter understood it ‘had embarrassed the leadership on the other 
side with new many initiatives and too many new attitudes at one time’, and Brezhnev 
was unable to understand Carter’s intentions. Nevertheless, according to Schmidt, 
Carter was not sure how to handle the situation.
24
 They agreed that consistency in the 
next few months was decisive for the future of East-West relations. Callaghan argued, 
and Schmidt agreed, that the European leaders, particularly Schmidt, Giscard and 
himself, should think together about their possible attitude during that stagnation period 
and if there was misunderstanding between them they should try to clear it up. On the 
other hand, on the US-German relationship, Callaghan tried to re-assure Schmidt about 
Carter’s reliability. He spoke frankly to Schmidt of the dangers of the European 
Council’s negative attitude towards Carter’s seriousness. He stressed that Carter was 
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going ‘the right way’, so once the Chancellor understood the President he should speak 
about it with others in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. Callaghan asked Schmidt 
particularly to convince Giscard to work with Carter without suspicion.
25
  
The overall impression which Callaghan got from the telephone conversation was 
quite positive. He thought that Carter had done much to improve the Chancellor’s view 
of him. Schmidt now understood Carter’s aims and so would not ‘go along with 
President Giscard so completely as before’.
26
 While the Prime Minister was optimistic, 
officials were neutral. Wright admitted that the visit was ‘clearly a first class public and 
personal relations success’, but reported that the perception gaps had remained. In his 
analysis, differences appeared over East-West relations, and West German officials were 
‘in the ludicrous position of claiming that Schmidt is in fundamental agreement both 
with Carter and with Giscard’.
27
 The Germans had reason to emphasise Alliance unity: 
if US-Soviet relations stagnated, the Soviets might take advantage of NATO divisions 
during Brezhnev’s potential visit to Bonn. It is notable that Wright’s view of the 
US-German relationship was less optimistic here in comparison with the one in his 
previous despatch. Interestingly, while FCO officials still had hopes for the future of the 
Carter administration’s foreign policy, they were less so about the US-German 
relationship. Alan E. Furness of the Western European Department argued that distance 
still remained between the US and West Germany on the three issues which Wright had 
mentioned. Importantly, Furness wrote of the risks of weakened US-German relations: 
 
(T)he Federal Government has shown itself ready to question for the first time the absolute 
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nature of its link with Washington and to take up a position closer to the French on such 
fundamental issues as détente and nuclear matters. It remains to be seen whether the 




His apprehension was that the West German’s distrust of Carter’s foreign policy would 
shift the Germans towards Franco-German cooperation, and that this would 
consequently strengthen the Franco-German relationship and induce them to cooperate 
towards an independent European détente policy. For the British policymakers who had 
always put the solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance on the top of their diplomatic priority, 
this could not be acceptable. Although Callaghan dismissed this concern, FCO officials 
still kept it in mind.  
Unfortunately, the US-German relationship was shaken again by the 
administration’s study on European defence. On 3 August, the Washington Post reported 
that the Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) 10, the review of the US strategic 
posture considered in the NSC under Brzezinski’s guidance, concluded that the US 
would concede one third of the territory of West Germany to the Soviet Union in case of 
its aggression.
29
 The US government denied this article, and the NSC made a statement 
immediately that ‘(i)t is the US policy to engage in the forward defence of all of western 
Europe. That long-standing policy, shaped jointly with our NATO allies, remains 
unchanged in its totality’.
30
 Understandably, the Germans were stunned. The British 
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embassy in Bonn reported the calm reaction of the FRG government.
31
 But it was 
observed in Washington that while the Germans considered the review as a hypothetical 
analysis, it was ‘not easy to allay their doubt completely’.
32
 Even if it was just a 
blueprint as the Germans wanted to believe, the Germans might regard the article as 
proof of the Carter administration’s passive attitude towards the reinforcement of the 
US commitment to European defence at the West German border, particularly when the 
Soviet military build-up heightened their concerns. With no doubt, there was now new 
awkwardness in US-FRG relations. Given the remaining distrust towards Carter’s 
détente policy shared by Schmidt and Giscard, it was plausible for FCO officials to 
assume that Schmidt might be likely to shift further German attention towards 
strengthening ties with France.  
When the unity of the Alliance was in question, the Soviet armed forces build-up 
was continuing. With the reinforcement of tank troops, a new and even more significant 
threat emerged in this period: SS-20 intermediate ballistic missiles. SS-20 was designed 
to replace their SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. It was a much more accurate missile and could 
hold three MIRVed warheads. But the most striking advantage of this missile was its 
mobility and this gave SS-20 higher survivability.
33
 Although these features could be 
new serious threats to Western Europe, the SS-20 was out of the category of SALT and 
MBFR as it was neither a strategic nor conventional weapon.
34
 Although NATO had 
discussed SS-20, it had not been a topic of open debate in Europe for fear of reducing 
public true in the Alliance.
35
 However, it was becoming clear that the threat of Soviet 
military expansion was increasing. Facing that clear and present danger, the allies 
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needed to consider how they would react.  
It was during this period that the review of Britain’s defence expenditure had been 
completed. The result was, as usual, not rosy. Mulley reported to Callaghan the result of 
the review: now the figure rose from £230 to £267 million taking the 1977 Public 
Expenditure Survey into consideration. Mulley had tried to protect Britain’s front-line 
contribution to NATO and no major equipment programme was to be cancelled. But he 
had to admit that the defence budget was cut to 8% below the level agreed in the 
Defence Review. It is important that this was announced when other allies were trying 




Negative responses from other NATO members were easily expected. In a letter to 
Mulley, Luns expressed the allies’ deep disappointment about Britain’s continuing 
reductions. Although the intent of the letter was softened by the efforts of the British 
delegation in Brussels, it was a ‘rebuke’.
37
 Luns wrote that: 
 
It is particularly disturbing that these negative developments coincide with a sharpened 
awareness of the Alliance of the unremitting effort made by the Warsaw Pact to improve its 
offensive posture and of the extremely serious implications for our future security of the 
widening gap between the conventional capabilities of NATO and its opponents. […] Your 
allies feel bound to point out that the United Kingdom’s action will not be helpful to other 
Governments who are making major efforts to halt or reverse the alarming trend in the 
                                                 
36
 TNA/PREM16/1574, Mulley to Callaghan, 20 May 1977. Furthermore, he cautioned the impact of 
overstretch on the Army because of its commitments in Northern Ireland. On the overstretch he pointed 
out in another despatch to Callaghan that the Army’s Northern Ireland commitments damaged the training 
and operational availability of the BAOR as the result of its despatch to the area. Importantly the 
weakened BAOR ability directly influenced the NATO’s response in European front. 
37
 TNA/PREM16/1574, Mulley to Callaghan, 1978/79 Defence Cuts, 14 September 1977. 
141 
 




Criticism also came from the other side of the Atlantic. The US ambassador to 
Britain, Kingman Brewster Jr, warned Palliser that the issue of Britain’s contribution to 
NATO could be a likely candidate of future source of friction in Anglo-American 
relations. Washington felt that ‘Britain could and should be expected to do a little more’ 
– when its economy and balance of payment showed signs of recovery Britain should 
take a more positive line and a 3% increase in defence spending. Palliser countered by 
emphasising again that Britain was spending a higher percentage of its GNP on defence 
than either France or Germany; Brewster said that this was nothing new.
39
 Apparently 
the continuous defence cuts eroded Britain’s credibility. Britain still spent 5% of GNP 
on defence, but after the NATO decision for a 3% increase in defence expenditure, the 
logic which Britain had used to justify itself was surely less persuasive. 
Nevertheless, despite the repeated defence expenditure cuts, the Labour 
governments continued the development of the Britain’s nuclear deterrent. When Harold 
Wilson came back to Downing Street in March 1974, his government took over from 
the previous Heath government the successor to the Polaris SLBM.
40
 Codenamed 
‘Chevaline’ this programme was aimed to update one Polaris warhead to three with 
multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs). As a result, Britain’s nuclear force was expected to 
meet the ‘Moscow Criteria’, a capability to penetrate Moscow, breaking Soviet 
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anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defence. 
Although a huge amount of money was expected for the continuation of the 
development from the beginning, and its figure was even increasing further thereafter, 
the Wilson government approved a full-scale development programme in September 
1975.
41
 Nonetheless, even after this decision, the development cost grew. In June 1976, 
then the defence minister Roy Mason reported that the cost increased from £337 Million 
at September 1974 survey price to £594 million at September 1975 survey price due to 
the inflation and the growing real costs. Moreover, the deployment of Chevaline was 
expected to be delayed for 1.5 – 2 years.
42
 Based on this report a restricted ministerial 
meeting took place on 29 July. This meeting, named the ‘Nuclear Policy Study Group’, 
consisted of only four ministers – the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Defence Secretary – and was strictly kept secret 
from other ministers. Such secrecy in nuclear policy was not new in British political 
history, but in the Labour governments in the seventies it reflected the party’s deep split 
over this issue. The DOP contained Michael Foot, a leader of the Party’s left-wing, so a 
separate small group was needed to talk about military nuclear issues in confidence 
without him.
43
 In the meeting, Mason confirmed that Chevaline could provide a 
credible deterrent until 1994 when the present submarine reached their operational end. 
There was a general agreement that Britain’s nuclear deterrence was the ‘one area where 
Britain was able to make a special contribution to the Alliance’, and the Polaris force 
was ‘an important reassurance to our European allies, and it gave us a unique entrée into 
United States thinking on a wide range of defence matters’. Importantly, it was argued 
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in the meeting that the expenditure on nuclear deterrence was ‘only a small part’ and 
thus its reduction would not result in ‘a radical improvement in our conventional 
capability’. However, the increasing cost was still a problem when there was no money 
in Britain’s moneybag. For this reason, while the ministers agreed that the Chevaline 
programme should go ahead, they approved funding only for two years and asked the 
Defence Secretary to prepare a progress report in one year’s time.
44
 
One year later, on 21 July 1977, Mason’s successor Fred Mulley reported progress 
on the programme. The contents were not bright at all; the cost increased even further, 
£810 million at 1977 survey price for the full programme through 1983-4. Despite 
facing this steep rise, there was no way to compress the material cost, thus Mulley 
raised the cancellation as the only alternative which could save about £350 million over 
the next decade. But this would certainly be known to the public and ‘(t)he 
repercussions, both immediate and long-term, would be enormous’. For this reason, his 
conclusion was the continuation of the programme regardless of the cost.
45
  
The report shocked the ministers, but they still sought to pursue the Chevaline 
programme. What they considered was the political advantage of the possession of 
nuclear deterrent. Callaghan replied Mulley that he agreed with Mulley’s fear of 
political risk even if the report was ‘disappointing’.
46
 Healey and Owen also thought 
that, though the Chevaline was pre-empting an increasing share in defence expenditure, 
the cancellation would bring a serious political risk by damaging Britain’s nuclear 
deterrent.
47
 Hunt’s comment well explains that political risks of the cancellation: 
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(A) decision to cancel Chevaline would imply that we’re withdrawing from the nuclear 
deterrent business at a time when the Russians are building up their armoury of 
intermediate range ballistic missiles. These are not the subject of negotiation in SALT I any 
more than is the British Polaris Force. But we can expect the Russians to revert to the latter 
in SALT III and we shall need to consider, with our European Allies, what position to adopt 




As this shows, for the Labour governments in the late seventies the maintenance of the 
nuclear deterrent had significant political meaning rather than pure military value. 
Consequently, the British observed the SALT II negotiations very carefully. With the 
inauguration of Carter, a high level officials group named GEN 63, chaired by Sir Clive 
Rose, had discussed the aspects of nuclear arms control. A report submitted in late April 
pointed out three problems in the future of SALT II talks. The first was non-transfer (a 
ban on transferring all strategic systems and components to third parties) and 
non-circumvention clauses (prevention of using third parties to circumvent the 
agreement). Any kind of limitations in weapon and technology transfer from the US 
would put Britain’s nuclear deterrent at risk since it was highly dependent on American 
assistance under the United States/United Kingdom Agreement for Co-operation on the 
Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes which was concluded in 1958. 
Secondly came cruise missiles; this new weapon system’s capability was still under 
discussion in NATO as well as in the British government. It was particularly important 
for the British since it was regarded as an option for the future British nuclear deterrent. 
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And thirdly, the ‘non-central system’; this referred to a nuclear weapons system which 
was not included in SALT II negotiations, such as battlefield nuclear weapons, Soviet 
intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles (IRBM/MRBM), SLBM/SLCM, and 
British and French nuclear forces.
49
 These were not subsidiary issues; all such weapons 
would affect the future of European nuclear balance as well as British and French 
independent nuclear deterrents. 
After the initial failure of the March negotiations in Moscow, the Americans and the 
Soviets continued their SALT II negotiations, but these developments were not so 
positive for the British. On 27 June, Warnke said in the NAC that they were thinking of 
tabling a general non-circumvention clause in the forthcoming SALT talks. While not 
compromising on no-transfer provision, they feared anything which would ‘give 
sanctity’ to the Soviets on drafting.
50
 The Americans had confirmed that they would 
refuse the inclusion of no-transfer and non-circumvention clauses into the SALT II 
agreement until other matters had been settled. Understandably, the British were 
anxious about the effects which would be generated by this change of tactics. Warnke 
stated that the Americans would not make further compromises, and it soon reassurance 
was given that this US position would not prevent Anglo-American cooperation in 
nuclear policies.
51
 But for the British this change meant a shift in Washington’s stance; 
in fact, they suspected this development but it came earlier than expected.
52
 The British 
still hoped that there would be a delay.
53
 But the Americans decided to table the new 
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 Even if the Americans assured the British that their interests 
would be protected, it is easy to assume that these American tactics enhanced Britain’s 
concerns about their own nuclear position and about the Carter administration’s policy 
towards European security. 
During this summer, there was an important reshuffle in the Washington Embassy. 
After sending his latest report on Carter’s foreign policy, Ramsbotham left Washington 
to be replaced by Peter Jay, then the economics editor of The Times. This was a decision 
made for political reasons. Owen did not expect that Ramsbotham would be able to 
establish a good relationship with the new US administration. Additionally, he observed 
that the Prime Minister and the ambassador were not in tune. More importantly, Owen 
recalled that he had found the existence of a hidden series of ‘personal and confidential’ 
exchanges between the officials in the FCO and the Washington Embassy using the 
official diplomatic distribution network. As this exchange had bypassed him, Owen 
thought that the only way to prevent such practices was to appoint ‘a personal friend or 
political ally in Washington’ in order to establish his control over the FCO. Jay was his 
close friend, and, in Owen’s mind, perfectly suited for that post.
55
 Owen formally 
announced the new appointment on 11 May saying that Jay was ‘one of the most able’ 
of his generation and would establish ‘an easy and informal relationship’ with those of 
that generation in the Carter administration.
56
 This appointment caused wide 
controversy.
57
 First of all, Jay was Callaghan’s son-in-law at that time. Thus his 
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appointment could not escape from the charge of nepotism. Furthermore, even if Jay 
was a civil servant before becoming an editor, he had worked in the Treasury, not in the 
FCO. With this in mind, Ramsbotham recalled that he had made a sarcastic remark to a 
British journalist: ‘I’m quite sure that Mr Peter Jay will be as good as ambassador in 
Washington as I would be economic editor of “The Times”’.
58
 Such a sentiment would 
have been held fully by a career diplomat who was replaced by a journalist with no 
experience of diplomatic service. In a sense, as Raj has rightly pointed out, 
Ramsbotham was a victim of Owen’s distrust of the FCO.
59
 
Before leaving for Washington as the new ambassador, Jay called on Callaghan on 
19 July. The atmosphere was intimate, probably because of their close relationship as 
father-in-law and son-in-law. Callaghan talked frankly about what the new ambassador 
should bear in his mind. On US-European relations, they both thought that it was 
unrealistic for Britain to make a choice between the US and Europe, and agreed that 
Britain and the US shared the purpose of containing Germany within Europe. Here their 
preference for UK-US cooperation is evident. On SALT II and nuclear matters, 
Callaghan stated that the maintenance of nuclear power status gave Britain ‘a type of 
relationship with the United States which other allies could not command’. Callaghan 
added that maintaining the nuclear deterrent was ‘a costly business; [but] the importance 
of our nuclear capability was primarily political – it gave us a lever on world peace’.
60
 
The record of the meeting shows that there was little difference between these two men 
in terms of their perception on transatlantic relations. If this assumption was correct, the 
skilful Callaghan could be a good mentor of inexperienced Jay and Jay could be a good 
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spokesman for the British Prime Minister in Washington. Moreover, as stated above, the 
appointment of Owen in February had already increased Callaghan’s commitment to 
foreign affairs. In the same vein, the replacement of Ramsbotham increased Callaghan’s 
and Owen’s influence in the handling of Anglo-American relations. 
 
 
2. Descent into Cacophony 
 
On 6 June, The Washington Post reported America’s ‘secret weapon’: the enhanced 
radiation warhead, subsequently known as neutron bomb.
61
 This was the beginning of 
the controversy on ERW which shocked the Alliance over the following year. ERW was 
a tactical nuclear weapon, but was a refinement upon existing technology. Whilst it 
maintained the same effect in terms of nuclear radiation, the blast, heat and fallout were 
reduced. Because of this feature, it was expected to minimise the unnecessary damage 
and casualties when used on Alliance territory in the face of invasion by the Warsaw 
Pact’s armed forces. As it was a tactical nuclear weapon, it was not to be discussed in 
either the SALT II or MBFR negotiations. For this reason the ERW was thought to give 
the Alliance a significant advantage in European defence while the conventional 
military balance shifted in the Warsaw Pact’s favour. It was regarded as particularly 
effective against the invasion of Soviet tank forces which were numerically dominant in 
comparison with those of the West. 
The article stunned the public, but for the defence policymakers in the Alliance it 
was already a known issue. The US had pursued ERW’s development since the 1960s. 
The NPG had considered this new technology from 1973 and it approved the 
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development plan in the meeting held in London in November 1976.
62
 The then Ford 
administration informed Congress of the development as it needed to ask for a budget 
allocation, and the Carter administration did the same.
63
 Importantly, ERW had been 
discussed in the Alliance in the context of the modernisation of NATO’s TNF. Since the 
approval of the flexible response doctrine in 1967, NATO had been considering the role 
of theatre nuclear weapons as a mean of deterrence to prevent the escalation of military 
conflict. The establishment of parity in strategic nuclear weapons as the result of the 
superpower détente and the development of military technology, such as ERW and 
cruise missiles, the US started to pay more attention to TNF modernisation. Also in 
Europe, particularly in West Germany, defence experts accelerated their development of 
the role of European tactical nuclear weapons, facing reinforcement of Soviet 
conventional forces and medium-range nuclear weapons. Of these threats, the most 
serious was the newly developed Soviet IRBM/MRBM, SS-20.
64
 However, these 
worrying innovations were not known outside of defence circles.  
On 12 July, one month after the Washington Post article, Carter publicly admitted 
the existence of the programme in a press conference, but did not make his own attitude 
clear. While he repeated his hopes for total nuclear disarmament, he stated that he had 
not taken a decision on the deployment of ERW, and added that it was not ‘useful to 
specify ahead of time the particular circumstances in which nuclear weapons would or 
would not be used’. He stressed that as it was a tactical weapon SALT would not be 
affected, and ‘the improvement of NATO’s conventional forces was an important 
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 He had the choice to cancel the development of the ERW at this point based 
on his own belief in nuclear disarmament. He had won the presidential election by 
arguing for nuclear disarmament, and in his inaugural speech, he stated his hope for a 
world without nuclear weapons. This idealism was a mainstay of his foreign policy. He 
recalled in his memoirs that ‘(t)o me the demonstration of American idealism was a 
practical and realistic approach to foreign affairs, and moral principles were the best 
foundation for the exertion of American power and influence’.
66
 Given this idealism 
and moral principles, Carter’s hesitation in approving the plan was genuine. Yet, the 
advantage of ERW was evident from the military point of view in the light of 
strengthening NATO’s counterattack capability against the Warsaw Pact’s conventional 
attack. As the President who argued for the continuation of the US commitment to 
European defence, Carter needed a rationale to justify cancellation of the development.  
In the meantime, on 13 July, the day after Carter’s press conference, the Senate 
approved ERW.
67
 Nevertheless, Brzezinski recalled Carter’s reluctance to order its 
production and deployment.
68
 Carter, he said, ‘did not wish the world to think of him as 
an ogre and we agreed that we will press the Europeans to show greater interest in 
having the bomb and therefore willingness to absorb some of the political flak or we 
will use European disinterest as a basis for a negative decision’.
69
 This indicates that 
from the beginning the Carter administration wanted the Europeans to take a lead in the 
intra-Alliance discussion on the development and deployment of ERW. Militarily, this 
attitude seemed understandable: ERW was not effective unless it was deployed in 
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Europe thus its deployment could not be decided by the Carter administration’s own 
discretion. If Carter wished to induce the Europeans to take an initiative, close 
intra-Alliance consultations became even more important to forge an Alliance consensus 
over this issue. 
What is important here is that, even though the DPC approved the development of 
ERW, it was still in the development stage and no firm decision had been made. For this 
reason, Mulley repeatedly answered parliamentary questions by saying that ERW was 
still in an early stage and it was premature to consider its future deployment in 
Europe.
70
 In fact ministers had not yet shaped their attitude, thus it was politically 
impossible to announce their support. But at least at official level London was clearly 
supportive because of its military value. A background note prepared by the MOD 
reveals their position. It pointed out that the announcement had not been fully discussed 
in the Alliance beforehand and ‘the worst possible construction has been placed on the 
potential utility of these warheads’. Nevertheless it argued that these developments 
would make NATO’s military deterrence more credible, without lowering the nuclear 
threshold.
71
 ERW was regarded as militarily useful, but officials were particularly 
worried that the US administration’s lack of consultation made the situation more 
complicated; moreover, Washington’s mishandling of the issue would make public 
opinion more hostile to ERW. The background note said that the ERW had ‘even been 
adduced as evidence of the West’s attaching a higher priority to property than to human 
life’. From their point of view, the Americans’ way of presentation expedited this public 
concern in Europe.
72
 The Soviet media had already reacted critically. Taking advantage 
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of growing unfavourable reactions in Western Europe, it had launched a propaganda 
campaign against ERW and appealed for the continuation of East-West détente, 
criticising Carter’s policy for inflaming the arms race.
73
 These criticisms aimed to 
emphasise the discrepancy between the deployments of a new nuclear weapon and 
Carter’s stand on disarmament.  
In Brussels, the situation was similar. On 20 July, one week after Carter’s press 
conference, NATO Permanent Representatives, including Killick, discussed matters. 
They were not happy with the lack of advance consultation. Furthermore, they thought 
that the poor presentation skills of the US ‘led to unfortunate press and other reactions’. 
Thus, they hoped that the Americans would emphasise the advantage of ERW, such as 
‘it can be selectively used to kill the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact […] while 
minimising damage to the environment in which they are operating, whether human or 
physical’.
74 As this response indicates, the allies did not fundamentally deny the 
military advantage of ERW. What they were afraid of most was the critical public 
reaction amplified by the US administration’s mishandling of the issue. In their view, 
there had been little American attention to the need for mitigation of concerns although 
intra-Alliance consultation was indispensable. 
Under these circumstances, the Carter administration slowly moved towards 
intra-Alliance consultation to gain the support of its European allies. On 2 September, 
Killick reported that a US team would to come from Washington to the NPG Permanent 
Representatives’ meeting in Brussels on 13 September to consult on the deployment of 
ERW. Killick observed that the American attitude would be ‘listening and reporting 
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back’, and not necessarily taking the initiative.
75
 The Americans would prefer that the 
Europeans were the first to indicate a favourable attitude towards ERW. As stated above, 
the British government did not oppose ERW’s development on military and deterrent 
grounds. However, given the lack of information on the details of the US plan, they 
were not able to give the development and deployment a green light. Consequently, the 
FCO thought that ERW would have to be considered at the forthcoming NPG meeting 
in Bari, Italy, on 11 and 12 October, in the context of the improvement of NATO’s TNF 
under the studies for the LTDP. London thought that the prospects of a positive decision 
in the Alliance would improve through these discussions.
76
  
Nevertheless, the Americans were dissatisfied with their allies’ caution. They argued 
that, first, discussion in the NPG was not a favourable option for the administration for 
their ‘domestic political purposes’. They wanted more visible and striking 
decision-making to persuade the sceptics in their own country. Secondly and more 
importantly, they wanted European allies’ clear support before Carter made his final 
decision. Leslie H. Gelb, Assistant Secretary of State, indicated to Russell that Carter 
wished to take the final decision by the end of the year. Furthermore, once the 
judgement was made, another 45 days were necessary for Congress to decide whether or 
not to approve the President’s decision. Theoretically, calculating backwards, the 
administration wanted an answer from their allies by the end of October and rapid 
movement to achieve this outcome.
77
  
In contrast, London thought that Carter could wait until the end of the year at most 
and deployment would follow after the conclusion of the LTDP next May. Under this 
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consideration the FCO instructed Killick to stress in the September 13
th
 meeting that 
Britain considered the deployment of the ERW desirable, but given public controversy, 
the Alliance should discuss this issue more carefully in the NPG in the light of the 
NATO TNF improvement. The British did not think that consultation would be 
concluded as soon as the Americans envisaged, but they were not going to lead the 
discussion. In the draft telegram to Brussels, Killick was instructed that ‘(t)here may be 
advantage in your trying to leave your intervention until the Germans and the Dutch, at 
least, have spoken’.
78
 This evidence indicates that the British were in a completely 
receptive position from the beginning of the intra-Alliance consultation. True, they 
strived to give their allies more time for consideration, but they did not spearhead the 
discussion itself. As this chapter shows later, they particularly hoped that the Germans 
would take the lead because of their uncertainty in response to public opinion. 
On 13 September, the NATO NPG Permanent Representatives’ meeting took place 
with the presence of the American team. The Americans, led by David McGiffert, 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, reiterated the advantages of the deployment of ERW, 
particularly in light of the modernisation of NATO TNF. Along with this, they stressed 
that ERW did not lower the threshold in the use of nuclear weapons, and assured allies 
that there was no linkage between ERW and any disarmament negotiations. 
Nevertheless, while speaking of the advantages of ERW, they warned that Carter had to 
take a final decision in October; so additional discussion in the NPG was not justified as 
it would cause further delay. If the European allies accepted this plan, they had only 
about six weeks for consideration, and this was apparently too short. In the meeting, 
apart from West Germany’s positive attitude, all the permanent representatives reported 
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that their governments’ positions were not yet firm. Facing such indecision, Luns 
suggested a compromise plan of a further round on 23 September.
79
 Thus, the 
Americans were already behind schedule from the very beginning of intra-Alliance 
consultation. This prudent European response annoyed Brzezinski; to him, it was just a 
‘diplomatic minuet’. He recalled that the American team ‘gave the Europeans a 
balanced presentation […] and genuinely asked them what they wanted’. But it seemed 
to him that without American initiative ‘they were unwilling to commit themselves and 
began to waffle’.
80
 This criticism is too harsh of the Europeans. In fact the Americans 
did explain their thoughts to their allies, but discussion was not thorough enough and 
did not give the allies sufficient time to consider their positions before making a 
decision. With this unskilful handling it was definitely tough to convince the Europeans 
that they were fully consulted. 
In London, after the discussions of 13 September, Mulley proposed that Britain’s 
attitude would be made clear by the next NPG meeting of 23 September. He argued that 
Britain had ‘a variety of cogent political as well as military reasons’ to support the 
Americans. First, it would contribute to the improvement of the NATO TNF, and 
secondly it would help maintain Britain’s influence politically. He wrote that:  
 
A lukewarm reaction from us on the 23rd would not only disappoint the Americans but 
would stand in marked contrast to the German attitude. Besides not wishing to split the 
Alliance over the issue, I should be unhappy to risk losing influence with the Americans – 
even temporarily – at the present delicate stage of our relations with them on a whole range 
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of issues such as SALT, CTB and policy on theatre nuclear forces. In addition, I understand, 
the Americans took a very tough line in the criticism of our defence cuts and wanted an 




In Mulley’s view, Britain’s active leadership had two consequences. First, it would 
compensate Britain’s already damaged credibility in the Alliance and strengthen 
relations with the US. Secondly, it could prevent divisions in the Alliance over this issue. 
Mulley’s letter shows his, and most likely the MOD’s, recognition of Britain’s place in 
the Alliance. Obviously, Britain was in a defensive position as a result of defence 
expenditure reductions and this induced a more active attitude towards ERW 
consultation to work towards regaining an already heavily damaged reputation.   
Callaghan was more prudent. He also did not oppose the idea in principle. 
Nevertheless, he was not only unhappy about the shortage of information due to the lack 
of consultations, but he was not content with the Americans’ handling of the situation 
which had only been at official level. He responded to Mulley’s minute that:  
 
I do not rule out supporting the Americans but if our support is to be worth anything, then 
we must be satisfied about the case for the weapon. […] the Americans must also give us 
the opportunity of getting public opinion to understand what is involved if we are asked to 
be publicly committed in support.  
 
His critical comment continued: 
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President Carter wants to act quickly for Congressional reasons. For Parliamentary reasons, 
I wish to be sure of my ground. […] The Americans should be told that we need proper 





Callaghan’s dissatisfaction was more clearly shown in the record of his meeting with 
Italian Prime Minister Andreotti. Callaghan complained that ‘[the Americans] have 
launched the neutron bomb very badly. President Carter now says he wants a quick 
decision from Congress. But we have problems with our public and Parliamentary 
opinion too’. Andreotti responded that ‘He wishes to appear as a prudent, moderate man 
on nuclear matters. It seemed amazing to me that he should have allowed the neutron 
bomb discussion to develop in this way and that he could have taken his decision so 
quickly. […] it is a question of psychological preparation’. Callaghan replied, ‘I share 
your views exactly’.
83
 Andreotti was right, as the Carter administration needed time to 
deal with the domestic politics, the European leaders needed to prepare for their own 
domestic issues. But from Europeans’ eyes, he just shifted the burden of decision 
making while putting himself behind the public image of the protagonist of nuclear 
disarmament.  
For the Callaghan government, the problem was not only the public opinion, but 
also inner-party politics and the lack of consensus among the ministers. Among the key 
ministers Owen objected to Mulley’s view pointing out the political risk. If the 
government started the discussion at this point, particularly when the Labour Party 
conference was about to begin, it would ‘risk raising all the old political and public 
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anxieties about nuclear war’. For this reason, he argued that ‘(t)his is too serious an 
issue for rushed decision’.
84
 However, his fundamental concern was that the ERW 
would lower the nuclear threshold and this would inevitably stimulate a widespread row. 
Due to this anxiety, he considered this issue as much more political than the US thought 
and thus an early decision was more difficult to take.
85
 Owen’s stance was substantially 
different from either Mulley and the MOD, or the FCO officials to a lesser extent. 
Because of this divergence in the government, the Callaghan government adopoted a 
slow approach. For this reason, although the Americans’ response was negative earlier 
the same month, London instructed Killick to propose the idea of discussion on ERW at 
the NPG meeting at Bari in October. The British recognised the US wish for an early 
reply from the European allies, but they thought based on their observation that their 




It was West Germany where the announcement of the development of the ERW 
caused far more widespread public discussion. As mentioned above, West Germany’s 
generally supportive attitude influenced Britain’s line on this issue. The West German 
Defence Minister Georg Leber made clear in the Defence Committee of the Bundestag 
on 10 September that Germany was in favour of ERW’s production and subsequent 
deployment.
87
 On the other hand, the SPD’s Executive Party Secretary Egon Bahr’s 
long-term vision for détente, disarmament and the potential breaking up of military 
alliance in Europe, attracted popular support.
88
 The Germans’ hope for disarmament 
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was plausible: once Soviet military action was launched, West Germany was most likely 
to become the battlefield and the place where the ERW would be deployed and possibly 
used. For this reason, public consent was more significant than in any other NATO 
countries. But for Schmidt, who had been pursuing the maintenance of ties with the 
West through the Alliance, Bahr’s argument was nothing but trouble. Because of this 
deep division in public opinion, the Germans could not do more than what they did on 
13 September. As in Britain, there was a consensus at the official level on the military 
value of ERW, but at the political level, its impact on East-West relations, and arms 
control negotiations, and on public opinion, had yet to be discussed.
89
 In this sense, the 
situation in the West German government was more serious than the British 
government. 
While waiting for the next NPG meeting, the British tried to estimate what the 
Carter administration thought on this ERW and to encourage them towards Alliance 
consultations. Their major problem was the reaction of Congress. If Congress opposed 
the President’s plan, the handling of this issue would become even more difficult. Jay 
reported that as the result of their contacts with the US officials it seemed that Congress 
would likely support the President’s decision, but European support was still 
indispensable to ensure Congressional approval. Jay wrote that the administration had 
no specific deadline for Alliance consultation even if they still hoped that a decision 
would be taken in October. This was a compromise, but it also implied inconsistency in 
the administration’s attitude. Yet, they believed that a delay would be ‘damaging to 
NATO’, thus Jay warned that the Alliance’s attitude was crucial and ‘any signs of 
dissent, particularly from ourselves or the Germans, could unsettle the currently 
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accommodating attitude in Congress’.
90
 Clearly the Carter administration expected 
support particularly from Britain and West Germany and considered their roles as 
decisive. This was the reason that the Americans softened their attitude. Brzezinski told 
Jay that they did not see ‘great difficulty about stretching out a decision for a matter of 
weeks’, but a few months would be rather a long time. He repeated that the ‘best 
outcome’ would be the President’s announcement backed by support from the Alliance 
before Congress adjourned by the end of October.
91
 This flexibility indicates that how 
much the Americans were eager to gain their European allies’ support, but at the same 
time that the administration still did not have a clear consensus in terms of the timeline. 
Paradoxically because of this inconsistency, the Americans decided not to press a 
deadline for the Alliance discussions.
92
 
Even if the Carter administration compromised, the remaining time before the end 
of October was not enough at all for allies to reach a decision on such a critical problem. 
The discussion in the NPG took place on 27 September instead of the 23rd. Its 
conclusion was, as expected, still inconclusive – no allies except Turkey gave full 
support. The other allies, even the Germans, did not oppose the US idea but required 
more time to handle public opinion with care. Under this situation Britain’s proposal 
was a reasonable interim solution and thus it was ‘universally agreed’. Facing the 
prudent attitude of America’s allies, William T. Bennett, the US Permanent 
Representative to NATO, could only affirm that the US would not set ‘an artificial 
deadline’ although the US hoped to have the allies’ final response ‘in weeks rather than 
months’.
93
 This compromise was what the Americans had already told the British 
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several times, but now the American publicly retreated by one step from their original 
stance which had required the Alliance to make their mind up fairly soon. Commenting 
on this outcome, Killick wrote:   
 
My feeling now is that the Americans will expect ourselves and the Germans, as 
bell-wethers, to keep up the momentum and give a stronger steer at Bari, in the hope of 




But the British were more cautious than the Americans expected. At the end of 
September Brzezinski visited London, Paris, and Bonn to explain Carter’s view on 
foreign affairs to three European leaders. In the meeting with Callaghan on 27 
September, the American confessed that ‘the insistence on an early reaction from the 
Alliance had been a mistake’ and admitted that Carter’s initial announcement was 
‘ill-timed and awkward’. But since ERW was significant only if deployed in Europe, 
Carter believed that ‘the political costs of the weapon should be shared’. Nevertheless, 
despite Brzezinski’s push for an early decision, Callaghan did not assure him of 
Britain’s support; while pointing out its impact on domestic politics, he only said to 
Brzezinski that he ‘would consider the matter carefully and give the President a 
response as soon as he could’.
95
 Considering the disagreement among the ministers and 
the difficulties in the handling of public opinion, this prudent response was 
understandable. However, this prudence weakened Britain’s role as mediator in the 
Alliance. In principle, Britain and West Germany both admitted the significance of 
ERW from the military point of view. Nevertheless, neither West Germany nor Britain 




 TNA/PREM16/1911, Dr. Brzezinski’s Call on the Prime Minister, 27 September 1977. 
162 
 
actively promoted it. For these two governments, active support might well ignite the 
disputes in and out outside of the government. Thus for both governments the 
establishment of an encouraging attitude in the Alliance towards the production and 
deployment of ERW was important to blur their support. Thus these two countries tried 
to find out how the other envisaged the future of the discussions.  
However, it is important that Britain was always one step behind the Germans in the 
discussions even if the Germans were not going to take the lead. In the debates on 13 or 
27 September, Rolf Friedemann Pauls, the West German Permanent Representative to 
NATO, expressed a more positive attitude towards the development of ERW in light of 
the expansion of Soviet armed forces, even if he had some concerns about public 
opinion. Whereas Killick argued consistently carefully, with the instruction of London, 
that further Alliance discussions were necessary. In fact, Britain’s idea – holding ERW 
discussions at the NPG – brought the withdrawal of an early deadline by the Americans 
and paved the way to further discussion. Nevertheless, Britain’s attitude did not lead 
towards European consensus on the development of the ERW.  
The ERW discussion at the NPG meeting in Bari on 11 and 12 October was also a 
good opportunity for the British to understand the US and West German thoughts in 
more detail. The US Defense Secretary Brown assured that the Carter administration did 
not wish the Alliance to take an urgent decision. But he privately told Mulley that, 
without European allies’ support, at least from Britain, West Germany, and ‘two or three 
smaller countries such as Italy and Belgium’, Carter would not take the decision. He 
added that Washington hoped that the Alliance would take a decision by the end of the 
year rather than the end of October.
96
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On the other hand, the other allies did not question the military advantages of ERW; 
among them Leber supported the development of the ERW most strongly.
97
 But the 
discussion itself was again inconclusive. Brown added that since the NPG could not 
conclude the issue, the final decision was dependent on the heads of government.
98
 
There was still time for consideration until the end of the year. But considering the 
result of the discussion in Bari, direct negotiations between the heads of government, 
particularly between the US, Britain and the FRG, emerged more clearly as an option 
for the final decision. In addition to the discussion on ERW, important developments 
took place in Bari on the NATO LTDP. To supplement the nine task forces which were 
set up in the DPC in May, the NPG agreed to set up a High Level Group to discuss the 
modernisation of NATO’s LRTNF.
99
 
After the Bari meeting, knowledge of Schmidt’s attitude became more important for 
Callaghan’s visit to Bonn on 18 October. Since Schmidt had been completely 
preoccupied with the Lufthansa Hijacking in Mogadishu until the day before, there was 
no comprehensive discussion on European security, but in terms of the ERW problem, 
Schmidt explained his attitude to Callaghan in detail. Schmidt stressed that it was the 
Americans who should take the decision. Moreover, he added that once they decided to 
proceed, the Carter administration ‘should use the weapon as a bargaining card, to be 
discarded in return for appropriate Soviet concessions’. If the US would accept this line, 
Germany would agree to ERW deployment in Germany in two years’ time.
100
 The latter 
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half of Schmidt’s comments had a significant meaning. First, Schmidt explained to 
Callaghan his idea of a quid-pro-quo, and secondly, the Chancellor declared that he was 
prepared for the deployment of ERW in his country, subject to the US attitude. The idea 
of quid-pro-quo itself was not necessarily Schmidt’s original concept. In the NPG 
meeting on 27 September, the Danish representative, Anker Svart, had already pointed 
out that since the development of ERW might well induce the arms race, it could 
possibility be used as an bargaining chip in the current arms control negotiations.
101
 
However, it was important that this was stated by the Chancellor himself. His reference 
to the deal was far more influential and obviously drew the Carter administration’s 
attention.  
On the other hand, this Prime Minister’s visit to Bonn marked the end of the 
long-standing Anglo-German offset negotiation. Following the agreement between 
ministers in May, officials in both countries continued to negotiate to settle the 
details.
102
 At the press conference after their meeting, Callaghan and Schmidt 
announced the conclusion of the offset talks and the signing of and agreement.
103
 Thus, 
this particular problem which had been a thorn in the side of Anglo-German relations 
had finally been removed. The end of the negotiation set up a condition for both 
countries to cooperate more closely on European security. 
On 28 October, four ministers – Callaghan, Owen, Healey, and Mulley – discussed 
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Britain’s defence policy, including ERW, in their restricted ministerial meeting. Before 
the meeting, on 18 October, Mulley sent two papers on ERW to the other three ministers 
and Hunt. In these papers he argued that while domestic explanations were necessary, 
there was a ‘general feeling in NATO that it would be unwise and possibly 
counterproductive to delay a decision’; thus he recommended support of the US line.
104
 
The MOD officials expected Mulley would be able to persuade his fellow ministers in 
the meeting.
105
 Nevertheless, what they agreed was only to defer the final decision until 
next discussion which was to be held in three weeks’ time.
106
 There are two reasons for 
this deferment. First, the ministers had not yet reached an agreement; Owen was still 
quite critical. In the meeting with the FCO officials on 17 October, he told them that 
given the uncertainty of the intra-Alliance discussion, the British should adopt ‘a low 
profile’ and the problem was ‘how the proposal could decently killed off’.
107
 As long as 
one of the key ministers had such negative view, a decision was far from likely. 
Secondly, the ministers wanted to know more specifically how the Carter administration 
was going to handle this issue. From their point of view, the Americans had not taken 
any clear initiative, and their stance was inconsistent. West Germany’s attitude in 
particular was always a major concern for British policymakers while they determined 
their own attitude, because of the FRG’s geopolitical situation and possibly because 
they wished to avoid the criticisms involved with taking an initiative on this highly 
sensitive issue. But at that time the prudent approach was more or less the same in 
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Schmidt’s mind. In the Federal Security Council held on 6 October, he argued that the 
West should use the ERW as a lever in the MBFR talks, or a trade-off between ERW 
and the Soviet tanks. But he was still ambivalent. He did not oppose the ERW itself, but 
argued that West Germany should not take a lead as it was already facing a lot of risks 
in its security because of its frontline position in European Cold War.
108
 Along with the 
ERW issue, the four ministers also discussed the Chevaline programme. While some 
doubts were raised on the plausibility of the ‘Moscow Criteria’, they approved the 
continuation of the project.
109
 In this meeting much longer time was spent discussing 
the future of Britain’s nuclear deterrent. As this reveals, the maintenance of the 
independent nuclear deterrent was a more fundamental issue for British ministers. 
Compared with the seriousness of the problem in the West German government, ERW 
was yet to be the centre of the key policymakers’ mind. 
 In the meantime, the SALT talks continued in New York and Geneva. By the end of 
September both governments agreed the figure of 2,250 for an overall aggregate of 
strategic nuclear weapons under the ‘three piece’ method. By this agreement the initial 
difference between the Vladivostok agreement and Carter’s demand was resolved and 
SALT II negotiations got back on the track. Yet, there were some important new aspects. 
In the briefing at the NAC on 6 October on the development of the SALT II negotiations, 
Warnke and Ralph Earle II, Chief of the US Delegation to the SALT talks, told the allies’ 
representatives that on non-circumvention it might be necessary ‘to move to the 
fall-back position’. The Americans yet again confirmed that their position would not be 
changed. But in US-Soviet negotiations throughout the autumn the US agreed to include 
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the ALCMs into the subtotal aggregate figure of 1,320 with MIRVs. Furthermore, the 




This agreement did not so much ease as increase Britain’s concerns for the future of 
the SALT II negotiations. They were particularly worried about the no-transfer and 
non-circumvention clauses since these two closely related to the future of Britain’s 
nuclear deterrent. This meant that there was a possibility that the US-UK nuclear 
cooperation based on the 1958 Defence Agreement might be jeopardised by the future 
SALT negotiations. Also, the issue of approaches to cruise missiles troubled the British. 
The Callaghan government regarded the cruise missile as a possible successor system 
for the Polaris force, whereas the US did not as yet see any military need for it in TNF. 
The Polaris force was expected to be in operation till 1994 and a replacement was still 
not imminent, but the British wanted to keep all options open. Among the three types of 
cruise missiles, the SLCMs were the focus of their interest.
111
 
Autumn 1977 was now about to end. The Carter administration repeated its desire 
for an early conclusion to the ERW issue and pressed its European allies for a decision 
by the end of October. Yet the lack of the initiative from the both sides of the Atlantic 
meant that time passed without result. The British occasionally informed Washington of 
their concerns and in response, the Carter administration offered reassurance that the US 
would defend its allies’ interest in the SALT negotiation. On non-circumvent clauses,
 
Gelb confirmed that there had been neither erosion nor deviation from the initial 
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 However on cruise missiles, the American attitude was different. Jay told 
Brzezinski of Britain’s anxiety that the temporary three years protocol could become a 
permanent ban, particularly for SLCMs. Brzezinski’s reply was not encouraging. He 
told Jay that the exception of SLCM could be regarded as a ‘wrecking loophole’, thus 
its exclusion was impossible. Brzezinski even added that cruise missiles became 
‘something of a fad’ for the Europeans.
113
 This exchange revealed the different views 
held on cruise missiles by the Americans and the British, but also the difficulties faced 
by the Carter administration. From time to time it had assured the Alliance of closer 
consultation on European security and arms control negotiations, but this promise could 
be an obstacle to the SALT II negotiations. But they still needed support from the 
Europeans to resist the criticism from the opponents in their own country. Hence the 
Americans repeated their earlier confirmation that under the SALT II protocol the 
transfer of US technology, especially on cruise missiles, would not be prohibited, even 
if circumvention was banned.
114
 With this assurance, the British government publicly 
announced its support for the SALT II agreement.
115
 But it could not fully abandon the 
concern that the US might conclude the negotiation by sacrificing Britain’s own defence 
capability and that of European security as a whole.
116
  
The British government refrained from expressing openly their concerns on the 
Carter administration’s handling of arms control negotiations. This would easily harm 
Alliance unity and Anglo-American relations. But West Germany’s sceptical stance was 
revealed in public during this period. On 28 October, a few hours after the four 
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ministers decided to shelve their decision on ERW at the restricted meeting, Schmidt 
publicly spoke of his concerns about the current situation in European security in his 
Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture in London at the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies (IISS). The main topic was global economy, particularly energy policy and 
East-West trade. Defence was touched just briefly, but his lecture brought out a huge 
political debate in the Alliance on the future of European security.
117
 He stated that, 
given the parity of strategic weapons between the superpowers achieved by SALT 
negotiations, the disparities of tactical nuclear and conventional weapons were 
magnified. He continued that: 
 
(S)trategic arms limitations confined to the United States and the Soviet Union will 
inevitably impair the security of the West European members of the Alliance vis-à-vis 
Soviet military superiority in Europe if we do not succeed in removing the disparities of 
military power in Europe in parallel to the SALT negotiations. So long as this is not the 
case we must maintain the balance of the full range of deterrence strategy. The Alliance 
must, therefore, be ready to make available the means to support its present strategy which 





With this understanding, he added that Carter should consider the effect of the 
deployment of the ERW in the light of arms control negotiations: 
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We have to consider whether the 'neutron weapon' is of value to the Alliance as an 
additional element of the deterrence strategy, as a means of preventing war. But we should 
not limit ourselves to that examination. We should also examine what relevance and weight 




In these statements, he stressed the importance of the development of détente and 
deterrence in parallel. In his memoirs he recalled that he tried not to generate 
controversy in the lecture, but ‘the international audience realized […] that the German 
chancellor was emphasizing matters that were clearly at odds with what was favored by 
the new American president’.
120
  
By this time, Schmidt’s worries about the military imbalance in Europe increased, 
particularly in the TNF field. His growing concerns were amplified by the Carter 
administration’s lack of policy towards the TNF. In July, he suggested to Carter that the 
TNF should be included in the SALT II talks. Needless to say, what Schmidt wanted 
was SALT II control of Soviet’s medium-range nuclear systems, but, he said, ‘my ideas 
in this area fell on deaf ears when it came to Carter and his advisers’. He had explained 
to Brzezinski again in September about the political threat of the SS-20s, but added that 
‘(m)y effort had only slight results’.
121
 Therefore he used his speech to draw attention 
again, especially in Washington, to the increased politico-military threat in Europe 
created by the build-up of Soviet armed forces. Schmidt’s idea of a link between ERW 
and Soviet tank forces did not gain full agreement in the West German government, but 
there was a broad consensus that unless being ERW was in production, it could not be a 
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Along with his lecture at the IISS, Schmidt communicated his thoughts directly to 
the Carter administration.
123
 However, the Chancellor’s idea was not well-received in 
Washington. Fundamentally, Brzezinski felt that Schmidt overestimated the threat of the 
SS-20s.
124
 Nevertheless, whether or not they liked Schmidt’s view, the Carter 
administration had to respond and its suggestion was for a deal on ERWs and SS-20s. 
On 22 November, the UK Washington embassy reported that the administration ‘had 
reached no firm conclusions other than that all these ideas involved formidable 
difficulties’. But Gelb told Kenneth B. A. Scott, Counsellor and the Head of Chancery, 
that:  
 
For example, MBFR was already complicated enough and the inclusion of a further 
dimension, especially if it imposed new requirements for tank reductions on the East, 
might block all possibility of progress. Another possibility was to make an offer, outside 
the framework of the MBFR negotiations, e.g. to trade the deployments of ERW for the 
deployments of the SS20, but NATO would then have to face the possibility (perhaps 
probability) that if the Russians refused this offer and went ahead with the SS20, NATO 
would be forced to deploy ERW. On the other hand a Soviet refusal to negotiate on this 
basis might strengthen the allied case for deploying ERW. A further possibility was merely 
to defer the deployment of ERW in the hope that the Russians would defer development of 
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Gelb added that in Washington there was an ‘emerging consensus’ on a trade-off 
between the deployment of the ERW and SS-20s outside the MBFR negotiations. This 
line had not yet gained consensus in the administration as Vance still took a prudent 
position. He told Jay that the Carter administration wanted to talk with the British and 
the Germans before they made a decision and had advised the President that ‘he should 
not decide until the European response had been received’. This is what the 
administration had repeated to its allies. But at the same time he presented Jay with a 
different view on the trade-off. He indicated that a consensus had not yet been made in 
the administration as to the way ERW should be used as a bargaining card.
126
  
In the middle of the intra-Alliance discussions, on 9 November, a personal letter 
from the Soviet leader was delivered to Callaghan through the Soviet ambassador. In 
that letter Brezhnev warned that the deployment of ERW would make détente wane and 
the arms race accelerate.
127
 It became clear later that other heads of European 
governments also received a letter from him.
128
 It was now evident that the Russians 
intended to discourage the Europeans from accepting the US offer of ERW and to divide 
the Europeans by threatening détente. Against this, the Alliance needed to show that 
their unity or resolve were not affected by such psychological offensives.  
Given unsettled American attitudes and the Soviet counter initiative, the British 
government started reviewing the feasibility of the trade-off. Hunt raised four points: 
the potential of the trade-off, the credibility of ERW as a bargaining-chip, the 
difficulties in the Alliance for the ERW deployment, and public opinion. The conclusion 
of his study was that the trade-off in arms control negotiations was ‘attractive’, but 
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ministers would ‘not wish to get ahead of the Germans in their consideration of this 
issue’. He pointed out that the appropriateness of the trade-off needed to be considered 
very carefully. Above all, the use of ERW should be preceded by an Alliance decision 
on its deployment. Importantly, he wrote that it should also be studied whether the 
quid-pro-quo could be the Alliance’s advantage, since despite the fact that TNF 
modernisation would have to be dropped, the Soviet preponderance in IRBM/MRBM 
would not be changed even if they gave up SS-20.
129
 
Although everyone recognised the significance of ERW, no one took the initiative in 
the Alliance. The final decision was in the hand of the US President as the leader of the 
Alliance. Consequently the lingering ERW discussion raised questions about Carter’s 
ability to secure unity in the Alliance. Jay was rather optimistic about his capabilities. At 
the beginning of November Jay sent a despatch to London titled ‘Is Mr Carter in 
Trouble?’. In this despatch he wrote that the recent disillusionment about Carter’s 
ability to lead his country was ‘premature and probably wrong’. He explained that the 
reason of this misconception came from the lack of understanding on Carter’s political 
strategy. Jay continued that Carter took a ‘high road’ approach rather than ‘low road’ 
approach. In his definition the former was an ability to ‘mobilise the general will against 
the sum of the special interests’, contrary to the conventional ‘low road’ approach which 
required ‘an accommodation with a preponderance of the organised minorities in 
society and using the support to win to promote the objectives of the leader’. Jay 
admitted that Carter had been taking tactical retreat in some areas, such as SALT II and 
Middle East in foreign policy, but he argued that his determination and ability to pursue 
the ‘high road’ strategy should not be underestimated. He concluded that even if Carter 
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was facing criticisms due to the relative negligence of ‘low road’ politics, his policy 
based on his faith would bring political success next year, and ‘those who are already 
inclined to write Mr Carter off are dead wrong’.
130
  
The FCO did not seem to agree with this optimistic analysis. Melhuish commented 
that the ‘high road’ and ‘low road’ strategies were inseparable. From his point of view 
the problems Carter was facing represented ‘a combination of mounting pressures’ and 
he was trying to tackle them by ‘the methods traditionally used by US Presidents’.
131
 
Hall commented that what was important for Britain was not the definitions of Carter’s 
‘high’ and ‘low’ strategies, but how far Britain should support his original political 
objectives while he was going his own way.
132
 Earlier in the year, FCO officials were 
still optimistic about the future of the Carter administration’s foreign policy. But looking 
at Carter’s skill in mobilising domestic and international supports for his policy, this 
optimism was about to be superseded by scepticism. Interestingly enough, opposite to 
the change of tide in London, reports from Washington now offered hope. This was an 
obvious effect of Jay’s appointment. On 9 November, Owen and returned Jay had a 
discussion on the current state of the Anglo-American relationship. Jay’s judgement was 
that the British were genuinely consulted though they were sometimes puzzled by the 
administration’s behaviour. In fact Carter’s action was unpredictable, but the British 
could have up-to-date information through the ‘strong link’ with the government. Owen 
fully agreed with Jay, saying that the Carter administration ‘had consulted us faithfully 
and certainly more than their other allies’. He went on that it was important to ‘fight our 
case resolutely and aggressively’ where there were issues with the Americans.
133
 As 
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noted above, Owen was not fully content with the Carter administration’s handling of 
the arms control problem. But he, as well as Jay, still firmly believed the goodwill of the 
administration, their ability to handle political issues, and the value of the ‘special 
relationship’.   
Wright commented from Bonn on Jay’s analysis in the light of US-West German 
politico-military relations. He wrote that the PRM-10 scandal worried them seriously 
even if it was one of the hypotheses, and the future of the SALT II negotiations 
deepened their concerns. What was important for Wright was the change in the German 
attitude. He wrote that ‘(i)f the German doubts are belated and crudely expressed, this 
perhaps illustrates how this year [they] have begun to scrutinise aspects of the 
transatlantic relationship which they had previously been inclined to take on trust’. 
What was worse was that the personal relationship was not improved in the end. Under 
these circumstances Wright’s answer was that Carter was ‘in trouble’, even if he still did 
not abandon hopes for improvement in US-West German relations.
134
 
On 1 December, the restricted ministerial meeting took place again to discuss 
Britain’s attitude towards ERW. The conclusion was more or less the same as at the 
meeting of 28 October.
 
It was argued that the Carter administration was still divided on 
the ERW issue thus ‘we must not get involved in backing one side or the other’. 
Whereas it was also pointed out that the best trade-off was between the ERW and the 
Soviet tanks in the context of the MBFR, the line which West Germany preferred. But 
Callaghan concluded the discussion by saying that the Americans’ attitude was not yet 
clear, and West Germany was cautious, thus ‘while we might see some military 
advantages in ERW they were not essential for our purposes and we would only 
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consider supporting the weapon if it were quite clear that the Americans wanted it.’
135
 
Here Britain’s passive attitude is obvious. If West Germany was cautious, Britain was 
more careful to go. Even if the Germans and the Americans began to move forward, the 
British would follow one step behind them. This conclusion showed that they were not 
going to do anything unless the Carter administration would make their attitude quite 
clear, or Schmidt took the initiative in the consultation. 
In the same meeting the future of Britain’s nuclear deterrent was also discussed. It is 
important that in occupied much of the agenda of both 28 October or 1 December 
meeting. As Owen recalled that the main interest of the ministers at this time was the 
replacement of the Polaris force, and ERW was a secondary issue.
136
 Particularly in the 
latter meeting, they discussed the options for the post-Polaris nuclear force after the 
expiry of Chevaline. As the report by the GEN 63 committee shows, the cruise missile 
was a potential option for the successor system as well as the American Trident 
SLBM.
137
 In the meeting it was agreed that although the Labour Party’s October 1974 
General Election Manifesto stated that ‘(w)e have renounced any intention of moving 
towards a new generation of strategic nuclear weapons’, a study should begin in secret 
to compare all options ‘covering the political, financial, and technical implications’. 
This was justified by the logic that since no decisions would be made in the tenure of 
present government, this decision did not deviate from the Manifesto.
138
 As this point 
indicates, the main concern among the key ministers on Britain’s defence policy was the 
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future of their nuclear deterrent. Compared with this, other issues were given lower 
priorities and Britain’s slow response partly came from this attitude. It seems undeniable 
that this ministerial priority made policymakers’ perspective narrower on the state of 
European security taking the changing European military balance and the rise of 
Germany’s worries into consideration. 
While the British maintained a wait-and-see attitude, the Carter administration 
slowly began to move forward. Whether or not they liked Schmidt’s view, the US 
administration thought it was necessary to respond to it. Carter was ‘impressed’ by 
Schmidt’s remark at the IISS in October, ‘not because of wisdom, but because of the 
evidence it gave of potential misunderstanding between the U.S. and its European 
NATO allies’. But he thought that the Alliance should study the ‘pros and cons of 
specific arms control negotiations in the overall context of the Alliance’s strategic 
objectives and to talk this understanding out fully within the Alliance’. For this reason 
Carter thought to establish a forum for security consultation between the four major 
allies, the US, Britain, France, and West Germany ‘above the level of political directors’. 
But importantly, Carter added that it should be initiated by the Germans. That is to say, 
Carter still expected to handle matters behind the scenes; he wanted to be invited rather 
than to take a lead.
139
 At the same time, the American desire for an early decision from 
the European allies also softened their attitude even further. On 7 December, the US 
Defense Secretary Brown told Mulley that it would be sufficient if the allies would not 
publicly criticise the US decision to produce ERW with the expectation of future 
deployment. Brown also said that there was ‘no significant differences’ between himself 
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and Vance on the ERW.
140
 The separation of the production and the deployment of the 
ERW seem to make the Europeans’ decisions easier. By postponing the discussion on 
the deployment, European allies could be free from the decision which much more 
directly related to their own countries. In addition, the production of the ERW could 
force the Soviet Union to consider the deal more seriously. Yet, Brown added, Carter 
could not ask America’s European allies for their positive support before recommending 
production to Congress. The Carter administration still wanted a positive and 
spontaneous response from European allies first even if they appeased the Europeans by 
postponing the deadline. As a proponent of nuclear disarmament it was still difficult for 
him to lead the Alliance openly towards the production of ERW. 
The European strategic balance was discussed in the restricted sessions of the 
Eurogroup ministerial meeting and the DPC ministerial meeting, both held in Brussels 
at the beginning of December.
141
 In these meetings Mulley and Leber worked together 
to reach a common European position. Nevertheless, the extent of their enthusiasm was 
different. Mulley tried carefully not to put Britain ahead of the Germans. In the 
restricted session of the Eurogroup ministerial meeting on 5 December, Leber stated that 
‘(i)t was most important to decrease the disparities between the Alliance and the 
[Warsaw] Pact, and in the light of this the ERW would improve the European deterrence. 
Then he stressed that the FRG wished to evaluate the value of ERW as a bargaining chip 
but ‘the US must take their decision to produce the weapon’. Leber’s statement implied 
the limit of West Germany’s support for ERW, but it still showed clear backing for the 
American initiative. Mulley also stressed the importance of the unity of the Alliance, but 
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on ERW he did not give any specific comment. He just said ‘it was not clear how their 
introduction into arms control negotiations could further our aims, especially if we had 
not already publicly decided to produce and if necessary deploy them’.
142
 Apparently 
Mulley’s statement had less impact and did not imply any clue as to what the British 
government envisaged on the development of ERW.  
While the Alliance discussed ERW, they observed the future of SALT II talks with 
apprehension. The four power foreign ministers meeting – Vance, Owen, Louis de 
Guiringaud, French foreign minister, and Günther van Well, State Secretary of the 
Auswärtiges Amt – took place during the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels. The 
European representatives expressed each country’s worries; de Guiringaud stated 
France’s concerns on public reaction, decoupling of strategic nuclear weapons from 
Alliance defence, and the future of non-transfer and non-circumvention clauses. Owen 
added only the concern about the three years protocol. Van Well’s comment was a 
mixture of hopes and worries. Referring to Schmidt’s IISS lecture, he said that while 
West Germany was confident about the US negotiation tactics, the Alliance, at least the 
four powers, should consult more closely about SALT negotiations. Since the 
conclusion of SALT II was approaching and non-strategic weapons would certainly be 
included in SALT III, it was more imminent than ever. Vance countered that the 
conclusion of SALT II made the world much safer and the strategic balance became 
‘undoubtedly better’. As for the ‘decoupling’, Vance pointed out that talking about this 
in public would ‘destroy’ NATO’s collective defence concept. Further, Vance 
re-confirmed that the US would work on the basis of Alliance approval on the issue of 
non-circumvention. Clearly, he was eager to deal with allied doubts by re-affirming the 





administration’s consideration of allies’ concerns. He stressed that ‘(t)he United States 
was doing nothing which would be detrimental to European security’.
143
 
In the meantime, Alliance officials held further discussions about TNF while the 
politicians were lingering over their decision. The High Level Group (HLG) had the 
first meeting at Brussels on 8-9 December. When the US Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
David McGiffert, who was in the chair, asked other participants for their views on the 
SS-20s, it became clear that they were ‘very alarmed by it’. Among them, Michael 
Quinlan, Deputy Under Secretary for Policy and Programmes in the UK MOD, told him 
that ‘the US should field longer-range missiles itself in Europe’.
144
 From this meeting 
the HLG started substantial discussions on the future of TNF in Europe. Nevertheless, 
the Carter administration was not as enthusiastic about TNF modernisation as the 
Europeans. Rather the Americans tried to mitigate the allies’ persistent concerns. In the 
restricted session of the DPC in Brussels on 7 December 1977, Poul Søgaard, Danish 
Defence Minister, expressed European concern based on the conclusion of the 
Eurogroup ministerial meeting held two days before that the European interests in the 
increasing Soviet ‘regional nuclear delivery systems’, cruise missiles and ERW should 
be well considered in the SALT talks. Naturally Brown reassured against this 
apprehension that the three-year protocol would not limit the development of cruise 
missiles up to 2,500km, and in any case the missile system would not be ready for 
deployment in that period, the US FBS and British and French nuclear deterrence were 
not covered under SALT II, and they would defend the no-transfer clause from the 
Soviet pressure. On TNF, the cruise missile, SS-20 and FBS would be included in SALT 
                                                 
143
 DOP, D709 2/7/16/8, Record of a Four Power Meeting of Foreign Ministers at the French Embassy, 
Brussels, on 7 December 1977 at 21.30 hours. 
144




III talks which were to follow immediately after the conclusion of SALT II, but no more 
detailed reference followed. In contrast, on ERW Brown said that there must be ‘one 
way or another to enable the President to reach a decision’. By saying so, while being 
reluctant to modernise the LRTNF, Brown demanded even stronger European support 
for ERW.
145
 As the next chapter shows, TNF modernisation would add a new source of 
complexity; consequently, the Carter administration was cautious about accepting it for 
the moment. ERW could be a useful tool to make up the deadlock in SALT II 
negotiations. It could alos work effectively as a way to alleviate concerns among the 
Alliance by being used as a bargaining card to reduce the Soviet SS-20s outside SALT 
II talks.   
Now the year of 1977 was about to end. The deadline which the Carter 
administration set for the allies’ response was almost due. Nevertheless, the 





During the summer of 1977, the Carter administration’s foreign policy was still a major 
subject for discussion in the British government. FCO officials believed that Britain 
could influence US foreign policy with other European countries through close 
intra-Alliance consultations. It is important that they believed that Britain could do so 
better than others under the re-established Anglo-American special relationship. 
Britain’s skilful management in consultations was expected to recover the nation’s 
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already damaged presence in the Alliance which was facing further criticism due to the 
defence expenditure reductions from 1976. Britain’s role as a mediator became more 
important not only for the revival of Britain’s status, but also for the unity of the 
Alliance. Facing the expansion of Soviet armed forces, a harmonious transatlantic 
relationship was a sine qua non to counter its potential military and political pressure.  
The initial tranquil period after the London NATO ministerial meeting did not last 
long. To use Ramsbotham’s words, a ‘phoney war’ turned into a real war in a short time 
from the summer of 1977. The Alliance was in cacophony over arms control and 
European security and the discord emerged most clearly on the ERW controversy. 
Importantly, the ERW issue contained the concerns which the British government 
foresaw in summer 1977: the Carter administration’s idealistic foreign policy and the 
lack of Alliance consultation were the main background to the instability. 
By investigating the discussions on ERW this chapter has revealed that Britain did 
little to ease the tension in the Alliance although they intended to be a mediator in the 
Alliance. There are three reasons to explain this ineffectiveness. First of all, the Carter 
administration’s inconsistent policy on this issue increased confusion. From the outset 
of the dispute there was no consensus in the administration on this issue until the very 
end of the year. Consequently, as the course of the Alliance consultation indicated, the 
Carter administration was unable to show a definite timeline for discussion. The lack of 
a consistent strategy consequently made the British as well as the other Europeans 
hesitate to reach a decision even if they understood the military significance of ERW in 
general. Secondly, the lack of consultation worsened confusion in the Alliance. Over the 
latter half of 1977 Carter had invited the allies to give him a favourable answer, but he 
did not fully explain his vision on how ERW could contribute to European defence, 
183 
 
particularly in light of TNF modernisation. At official level, the Americans played a 
major role with the British and the Germans on ERW. However, at the political level, 
despite the fact that the administration wished their allies to react favourably and rapidly, 
Carter and other ministers took little action to gain what they wanted. And finally, the 
rise of public opinion against the development and deployment of ERW made 
policymakers irresolute. In West Germany the rise of opposition in and outside the SPD 
made Schmidt’s action more careful and slow. The situation was same in London; for 
the Labour government the ERW issue was a delicate problem because of the powerful 
left wing in the government and the party. But the difference between Britain and West 
Germany was that the latter was directly facing the threat from the East. For the 
Germans, the ERW issue directly concerned their country’s survival militarily and 
politically. But for the British, the main issue for ministers was the future of the nuclear 
deterrent, hence they did not pay as much attention to ERW as the Germans did. It was 
symbolic that the Callaghan government’s restricted ministerial meeting and Schmidt’s 
IISS lecture took place in the same city with only a few hours difference between them. 
The Callaghan government’s hesitance to take a lead in the ERW discussion left the 
British behind intra-Alliance discussions. In the meantime, the Carter administration 
began to take the initiative, though it was not wholehearted at all. Importantly it was 
stimulated by Schmidt’s IISS lecture.    
Given these reasons Britain’s completely passive attitude seems to have been 
justified. However, the Callaghan government’s wait-and-see attitude was far short of 
their envisaged role as mediator in transatlantic relations. True, without having a clear 
grasp of US foreign policy this role could not be fully performed, even if the US 
expected Britain to play a major part in the consultation. Yet, in comparison with West 
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Germany’s attitude, Britain’s passiveness is conspicuous. British and West German 
governments shared difficulties in domestic politics with strong protests in and outside 
the party. Nevertheless, the Germans made their views much more clear than the British 
in the end. This left Britain’s new post-1976 tactical approach to sustaining influence in 
the Alliance at sea. 1978 would place demands on British tactics like never before as 
détente declined, the Soviets expanded their armed forces and Alliance uncertainties 





Britain the Mediator  
 






As we have seen, the Carter administration’s lack of clarity in its attitude towards the 
production and deployment of ERW blurred the Callaghan government’s intention to 
play the role of mediator in transatlantic relations over the second half of 1977. While 
the Callaghan government tried to wait until the Carter administration’s line emerged, 
West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt openly revealed his country’s anxieties about 
Soviet medium-range nuclear systems. In particular, Schmidt’s lecture at the IISS in 
October triggered an American reconsideration of policy.     
The following two chapters deal with the period from the beginning of 1978 to 
spring 1979 and investigate how intra-Alliance discussion on European security 
developed. These chapters overlap and deal with two different, but closely interrelated 
topics: intra-Alliance deliberations over ERW, and those on the grey area and the 
modernisation of theatre nuclear forces (TNF). This chapter investigates how Callaghan 
and his government handled the ongoing dispute in the Alliance about the production 
and deployment of ERW between January to June 1978. This issue had lingered on 
since summer 1977 and reached its climax when Carter suddenly announced the 
deferment of production in April 1978. There is no primary source-based research 
which analyses whether the British government actually wanted this controversial 
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weapon in Europe, or to what extent Britain contributed to the course of intra-Alliance 
discussion before and after Carter’s decision.
1
 New evidence from government archives 
and private papers reveals the British effort, and especially that of Callaghan, to build an 
Alliance consensus for the production of ERW from January, and its crucial attempt to 
minimise the damage created by Carter’s unexpected decision after April. Once the 
Carter administration had reached a firm position on ERW, the Callaghan government 
worked hard with the Americans for the settlement of the dispute. These events are the 
subject of this chapter which assesses the development of Callaghan government’s 
policy and provides an analysis of its stance from January to July 1978, when Britain 




1. ERW: The American Initiative 
 
In January, Jay’s annual review reported a ‘feeling’ which ran throughout the US ‘that 
things are not right’. There was the objective erosion of American economic and 
military hegemonic power, and the subjective belief held by the American people about 
persisting widespread problems, such as the economy, energy, the environment, and 
social issues, none of which could be solved by existing notions from past centuries. 
Given these somewhat vague concerns, Jay wrote that ‘the instinct not to trust the wily 
Commies and to rely instead on good ol’ American know how is treading hard on the 
heels of the logic of disarmament’. He was still optimistic about the President’s ability 
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to address the situation. Carter was ‘a better statesman and a worse politician’ which 
was an important judgement because while he had set out a national agenda, his ability 
to mobilise national support was ‘inept and ineffective’. But Jay expected that Carter’s 
real strengths would emerge in 1978.
2
 
Carter’s foreign policy and the future of Anglo-American relations remained 
subjects of discussion in the FCO. At the end of January, the FCO North America 
Department and the Planning Department submitted a report which was originally 
aimed at examining the potential issues which would cause difficulties in 
Anglo-American relations and to lessen those risks. But the report’s significance is in 
what it reveals about the FCO’s perception of Carter’s foreign policy. On the whole, the 
view was rather critical and it was suggested that the main reason for the troubles in 
American foreign policy lay in the US itself: 
 
(T)he fault lies mainly with the intermittent and incoherent nature of the US 
decision-making process, and with more or less spontaneous initiatives taken by the 
President without warning to the State Department. More generally the US Administration 
tends to relay to us and to their other European allies too rosy a forecast of their chances of 




Palliser was somewhat more generous in his own judgement, pointing out that dealing 
with the Americans was always confusing whenever a change of administration took 
place, particularly when it coincided with a change of the party in power.
4
 From 
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Washington, Jay criticised the tone of the report. For him, Anglo-American relations 
were ‘even more than usually healthy’.
5
 He gave three reasons: good personal relations 
between Callaghan and Carter, and Owen and Vance, the harmony ‘on the fundamentals 
of all the major questions between us’, such as SALT, and the ‘un-neurotic’ character of 
the British. Jay commented that the administration’s ‘lapse of diplomatic etiquette’, or 
the lack of consultation, should be regarded as ‘the oversights that a very busy and a 
rather disorganised friend tends to inflict most on the person whom he knows will be 
most easy-going about it’. Importantly, he thought that if the British acted more 
independently, rather like the French, there would be a cost: ‘we should lose more than 
we would gain in most areas’. For this reason, ‘(t)he attempt to concert our policies with 
the United States before we go either public or multi-lateral is the price we pay for the 
real attention which the Administration at the top-level pays if and when we say really 
cannot agree’.
6
 Here, Jay’s firm stance is evident; there was no need for reconsideration 
of Britain’s attitude towards US foreign policy; continuous cooperation with the Carter 
administration was the best way to maintain Britain’s interest. Callaghan certainly 
shared this view. In a meeting with Jay on 1 February, he said that he ‘was satisfied with 
the way things were going’ on Anglo-American relations.
7
 The Atlanticist prime 
minister wanted to sustain a ‘special relationship’ and helping Carter’s policy towards 
European security was one means to achieve that aim. 
In this period, the negative image of Britain’s defence expenditure cuts was finally 
about to come to an end. The Statement of the Defence Estimates 1978, published on 15 
February, stated the government’s determination to increase defence expenditure by 3% 
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in 1979/80 compared with the previous year, and a further 3% in the next financial 
year.
8
 This naturally reflected the agreement concluded at the NATO summit in May 
1977 that the Alliance members should aim for a 3% annual increase in defence 
expenditure.
9
 Importantly, Britain was the first European country to follow this target, 
an indicated of its attempt to enhance its presence in the Alliance, particularly in the 
eyes of the Americans.
10
 This move was also recognised in the government as a 
significant factor in the maintenance of Anglo-American relations. When the draft of 
the Statement was discussed in the Cabinet meeting on 2 February, it was pointed out 
that the defence budget increases ‘would have a very valuable effect on our relations 
with the United States not only in the defence field but also more generally’.
11
 If Jay’s 
analysis was right – 1978 would be the year in which Carter used his statesmanship to 
lead the Alliance – the British would back him on the basis of their regained confidence 
on defence spending. 
 In November 1977, Callaghan had received a message from Brezhnev on ERW. On 6 
January 1978, a second message arrived.
12
 This time, Brezhnev sent his letter to all 
countries which participated in the CSCE.
13
 It was clearly a sign of the acceleration of 
Soviet’s anti-ERW campaign. Facing these new tactics, an early response from the 
Alliance became even more imminent as a counter against Soviet propaganda before it 
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stirred up public opinion in the West.
14
 Nevertheless, while the Germans pushed for 
prompt intra-Alliance consultation, the British were still reluctant. Owen argued that 
‘(m)inisterial discussion may be necessary before very long but […] the issue can and 
should still be played long and we should not be forced to react to Brezhnev. If possible 
we should wait for up-dated information about American and German attitudes’.
15
 On 
one hand, this position represented the FCO’s view which was mentioned in last chapter. 
But on the other hand, it reflected Owen’s personal doubt about ERW (which will be 
considered later in this chapter). While Callaghan assented to this cautious approach,
16
 
Mulley worried about the price of that attitude. ‘(T)here is a risk’, he argued, ‘the longer 
NATO remains undecided […] the greater will be the feeling that the Alliance lacks 
confidence in the role of the theatre nuclear force as a whole’
17
. Like Callaghan and 
Owen, Mulley thought that Britain should not precede the Germans. But given their 
eagerness for the Alliance consultation and the fear for the weaker image of the Alliance 
created by procrastinated decision over the TNF modernisation, he argued that Britain 
should lead the discussion with the Germans and the Americans for an early conclusion 
beyond the discussion on Brezhnev’s message.
18
 Though not clearly expressed, there 
was the consideration that a leading British role in intra-Alliance consultation could 
contribute to the maintenance of its presence. Nevertheless, concern about public 
opinion at home exceeded government anxiety about Britain’s presence at this point. 
Policymakers in London wanted the Americans and the Germans to go ahead of them to 
avoid domestic and international criticisms by leading the discussion by themselves. 
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While the British remained indecisive, thoughts from Washington and Bonn 
emerged. On 19 January, Jürgen Ruhfus, Schmidt’s foreign policy and security adviser, 
told Wright that since the development and deployment of ERW was ‘still a very 
sensitive problem within the SPD’, it was desirable ‘to gain time’ for West Germany. In 
this sense, the situation for the FRG government was more or less same as the British 
government. Yet, Ruhfus confirmed that ‘the FRG would be very ready, when the time 
came to take its full responsibility’.
19
 Similarly, on the same day in Washington, David 
C. Gompert, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Politico Military Affairs at the State 
Department, indicated a plan for an American team to visit Bonn and London on 30 and 
31 January respectively to talk about SALT and related arms control issues including 
ERW. Gompert continued that ‘the absence of a decision on E.R.W. was becoming 
increasingly awkward’.
20
 This was the fear which Mulley expressed in London. But 
now the Americans decided to take one step forward to achieve a breakthrough. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, at the end of November 1977 Carter proposed 
in his letter to Schmidt a high level consultation among the four major allies under the 
West German initiative. However, France had refused to participate in a new 
multilateral meeting of this kind except via bilateral talks, because of their own 
independent nuclear defence policy.
21
 Facing this negative response, the Germans 
flinched from holding new tripartite talks without France. Klaus Blech, the head of the 
Planning Staff at the Auswärtiges Amt, told Bullard that this would harm the 
Franco-German relationship even though they did not need to ‘follow all French 
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. Given this situation, the Americans decided to send a ‘high level team’ by 
themselves to discuss matters with the three major European allies at bilateral level.
23
 
The despatch of this team indicated that Carter had now lost his patience and had taken 
the initiative instead of waiting for the Europeans’ spontaneous support. 
For the British, who were receptive to the Carter administration’s policies, the visit 
of the US officials was a good opportunity to learn more about what the Americans 
envisaged on nuclear issues in the context of European security before making a final 
decision on their own approach. At this stage, the Americans had elaborated upon the 
question of the handling of ‘grey area’ or non-central nuclear systems in future SALT 
negotiations. But, further to the statements made by Vance and Brown during the NATO 
ministerial meeting of the previous December, Carter remarked in his 6 January speech 
at the NAC during his visit to NATO that, 'theatre nuclear weapons would have to come 
under discussion with the Russians immediately after the conclusion of SALT II'. He 
stressed that theatre nuclear systems were a concern for the Alliance but the US ‘had not 
yet had even one minute of discussion with the Soviets on those systems’.
24
 
Consequently, the Americans would intensify Alliance consultations during the period 
leading up to SALT II.   
While American and German policymakers began to move gradually towards the 
inclusion of grey area nuclear systems into arms control, there was still no firm view in 
London either at official or political levels. GEN 63, the Official Group on International 
Aspects of Nuclear Defence, had been studying this issue since May 1977. However, 
the Group’s analysis submitted to Hunt in December 1977 was inconclusive. On the one 
                                                 
22
 TNA/FCO46/1797, Bullard to Hibbert, FRG/France, 6 January 1978. 
23
 TNA/FCO46/1797, Wilberforce to Moberly, Anglo-US Talks on SALT, 19 January 1978.   
24
 NATOA/C-R(77)51, Summary Record of a Meeting of the Council held at the NATO Headquarters, 
Brussels, on Friday, 6th January, 1978 at 4.25 pm. 
193 
 
hand, it concluded that from the political point of view it was beneficial to include 
non-central systems into the arms control negotiations. But on the other hand, military 
factors indicated that inclusion was highly disadvantageous.
25
 On 17 January, two days 
before the Americans announced their plan to visit London at the end of January, the 
Permanent Secretaries of the Treasury, the FCO, and the MOD, and the Chief of 
Defence Staff held a meeting to discuss the paper under Hunt’s chairmanship. In the 
discussion it was argued that the analysis needed to be revised to offer a judgement 
rather than a list of questions to enable ministers to make a decision. Nevertheless, it 
was also pointed out that a judgement required sufficient information and thus it was 
necessary first to know what the Americans thought about this issue.
26
 The GEN 63 
group met again on 20 January. It approved the conclusion of the Permanent Secretaries’ 
meeting on the re-drafting of the paper, but it was again argued that the arrival of the US 
team was a timely opportunity to comprehend American views on the arms control 
negotiations and the inclusion of the grey area.
27
 This judgement implies that officials 
were indecisive without fuller information on US thinking and thus the arrival of the 
American team was timely as Ministers urgently required their recommendation.  
Compared to the grey area issue, British policymakers’ views were relatively solid 
on ERW. At least at official level there was recognition of the importance of ERW’s 
value even if the Americans’ stance was not fully clear. The problem was at the political 
level in the form of Owen’s criticism. On 27 January Owen and principal FCO officials 
discussed this issue ahead of the forthcoming meeting with the American team. The 
main agenda was of course SALT and ERW. In principal Owen was highly sceptical 
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about the American attitude towards the arms control negotiations, arguing strongly that 
Britain should oppose any change in the American position on non-circumvention, FBS, 
SALT III, and cruise missiles. His fear was that American compromises would erode 
Britain’s future security, particularly its nuclear deterrent. In this context, the American 
compromise over non-circumvention would prevent Britain’s purchase of Trident 
missiles as a potential successor to the Polaris forces. Furthermore, any possible 
US-Soviet bilateral negotiation on FBS, non-central systems in SALT III and cruise 
missiles in SALT II and III would restrict Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent. If the 
SALT negotiation came to a bottleneck, ‘the Americans could not be trusted to protect 
UK interests adequately’. Particular among Owen’s concerns was American handling of 
cruise missiles. He remarked that the Americans’ consultation ‘on fundamental issues in 
SALT, especially on cruise missiles’ was not sufficient and they had ‘mishandled the 
issue’. Nevertheless, he continued that ‘for us to say so publicly at this stage would 
severely damage Anglo-American relations’. Although he had doubts about the US line 
on arms control negotiations, the maintenance of a good Anglo-American relationship 




Owen’s scepticism was more fundamental on the ERQ as there was the question of 
its impact on the nuclear threshold. He said that it ‘would foster the impression that 
soldiers on the battlefield might actually be authorised one day to use nuclear weapons 
for purely military purposes against specific military targets’.
29
 In addition, he 
considered that Britain’s support could divide the Alliance in which several countries 
would object to the development of ERWs. FCO officials tried to persuade their 
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reluctant Foreign Secretary to think again by arguing that the development of ERWs 
would not necessarily loosen Alliance unity; in fact, the officials stressed that the Soviet 
propaganda campaign could actually induce Alliance support for ERWs. Nevertheless, 
Owen remained stubborn. He was still ‘firmly opposed to supporting the production of 
ERWs’ and thought that Britain’s support would bring ‘a tremendous row’ before the 
UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSD). His compromise at this point was to 
minimise Britain’s commitment and to protract the discussion until the US took an 
initiative. He told officials that ‘We should not get out in front, but should play it long. 
A decision would have to be taken one day; but it was conceivable that if it was left it 
could be taken out of our hands’.
30
 In addition to the indecisiveness of the officials, 
ministers’ views were still divided on nuclear issues, particularly on ERW. Given this 
divergence the British government was unable to establish a clear attitude in comparison 
with the Americans and the Germans.  
The American team arrived in London on 31 January for the first full-scale bilateral 
official level meeting since ERW had become the centrepiece of the intra-Alliance 
dispute. Needless to say the main purpose of the British side was to determine American 
views. The American team also seemed to have a clear but different objective: to 
mitigate the Europeans’ concern about the development of arms control. The lead 
American delegate, Aaron, and other officials answered frankly the various questions 
which British officials put to them. Importantly, they pointed out that the new Soviet 
longer-range theatre nuclear weapon systems, the SS-20 and the Backfire bomber, were 
not new threats to Western security. But ‘they gave rise to political questions about the 
response which the West should be making, both in NATO and through arms control, to 





the modernisation of Soviet systems directed against Western Europe’. They continued 
that, these new Soviet systems ‘should be seen, not as a new threat, but as qualitative 
improvements of systems which the Warsaw Pact had possessed for a long time’. 
Therefore, the Soviet preponderance in theatre nuclear systems with a range of over 
1,000km could be ‘swamped’ by the overall Western advantage in strategic nuclear 
systems, such as the US strategic nuclear forces. Aaron re-assured the British that ‘the 
overall balance of nuclear forces was satisfactory and the Americans could certainly 
maintain it’. Moreover, he emphasised that the Germans were less concerned as a result 
of the bilateral talks held with them the previous day.
31
 The Americans also underlined 
that the discussions on non-circumvention would not affect the traditional 
Anglo-American cooperation in nuclear field.  
It was significant that the British and US officials almost entirely agreed on these 
points. Moberly responded by saying that the British had ‘never shared the German’s 
anxiety about imbalance in medium-range systems’. New Soviet TNF had the ‘political 
and psychological effect of making the strategic situation seem unsatisfactory to 
European eyes’ and they were ‘politically important as evidence of Soviet efforts to 
modernise their capability in an area where NATO had not undertaken modernisation’. 
Nevertheless, the Americans did not have a firm position on including grey area nuclear 
systems in the forthcoming SALT III negotiations. Aaron remarked that they envisaged 
that in the Statement of Principles in SALT II they could keep the questions open about 
their attitude on grey area and cruise missiles. Consequently the Americans wanted to 
discuss this issue with NATO allies by mid-February.
32
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In a nutshell, the American stance can be understood in following way: SS-20s and 
Backfire bombers were not a serious threat to the security of Western Europe. The 
imbalance in the grey area could be covered by the predominance in the West’s strategic 
nuclear systems. Grey area issues would be discussed in SALT III, but the Americans 
envisaged finding a way through negotiations without harming the equilibrium in 
European military balance. Therefore, the danger was not as serious as the Germans 
feared and SALT II did not create de-stabilisation in European security. The 
fundamental aim of the American team was to convince the British and Germans at least 
of the feasibility of the American lines and gain their support for SALT II.  
There remained the question of how the US contemplated the future of ERW and in 
their discussions with British officials, the lead American official, Aaron, made it clear 
that the decision on ERW production was Washington’s and Carter was ready for it if 
the Alliance supported it. Furthermore, he confirmed that the US preference was a 
trade-off between ERW and SS-20 and re-assured the British that ERW did not lower 
the nuclear threshold. Moreover, the Americans believed that the coupling of these two 
issues would provide a sound political basis for countering Soviet propaganda. But the 
Americans wished to end discussion and make a prompt move before the UNSSD in 
May to avoid any negative political impact and because of the ERW’s tight production 
programme. Sir Anthony Duff, Deputy to the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, 
wanted to be sure of exactly what the Americans were proposing and asked Aaron and 
his team if the US government was now moving towards ‘a substantial decision on an 
arms control initiative with ERWs’. Aaron confirmed that it was and added that if 
Britain and West Germany supported the US position, then other allies would follow.
33
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After this bilateral talk, the FCO’s telegram to related embassies reported that the 
discussion had ‘somewhat altered the picture’
34
. It should be noted that in this bilateral 
meeting it was revealed that while the Americans were somewhat reluctant to discuss 
the grey area problem, they were keen to make the ERW–SS-20 trade-off. This gap 
between their enthusiasms for these two tactics indicates that the Carter administration 
was concentrating on the ERW issue. Discussion on the grey area with the Russians 
would put another source of conflict to the already entangled and protracted SALT II 
talks. In contrast, since ERW was not a part of SALT II negotiation, the ERW–SS-20 
deal could be sought outside of the negotiation. In this sense, in theory, the trade-off was 
a useful alternative which could limit the Soviet medium-range nuclear systems 
separately from the ongoing SALT II talks. Similarly for the British government, the 
ERW–SS-20 deal could be a convenient option. As the subsequent chapter examines in 
detail, inclusion of the grey area into arms control negotiation would involve the risk of 
putting Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent on the negotiation table as a part of the 
West’s medium-range nuclear weapons. In contrast, the ERW–SS-20 option would be 
able to lift the Soviet nuclear threat without harming Britain’s own nuclear deterrent. 
In addition to the American thoughts, British policymakers were interested in the 
German response. Aaron explained that West Germany’s opinion was ‘moving in the 
right direction’. Given this information the FCO instructed Wright to gauge German 
thinking about the Americans’ ‘fairly strong lead’.
35
 Wright reported divided views in 
the German government. On the one hand, the Chancellor’s Office believed that the 
decision of production was a matter of the Americans alone and discussions on 
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deployment should be avoided by including this problem in East-West negotiations such 
as on the MBFR. On the other hand, Genscher and the Auswärtiges Amt thought that 
the decisions of production and deployment should be decided by the Alliance not to 
give the Soviets further freedom for manoeuvre, and the Ministry of Defence was 
divided between those two views.
36
 The prudent attitude of Chancellor’s Office 
reflected Schmidt’s difficult position in the SPD. Facing the severe anti-ERW 
movement in the party as well as in public opinion, it was not easy for him to support 
openly the deployment of ERW on German soil. 
However, at this point the West German government had reached a final decision 
behind the scenes. On 20 January, it decided to support the deployment of ERW should 
the arms control negotiation fail in two years’ time, and if at least one other European 
ally would agree to its deployment. This decision was secretly transmitted to 
Washington, but not to London. This diplomacy was designed to avoid any impression 
of a US-FRG lead in the Alliance discussions.
37
 Given the severity of the anti-ERW 
movement in the country, this seems to have been the maximum offer which Schmidt 
could make. Yet, West Germany’s supportive attitude did not necessarily mean that the 
Chancellor trusted the US President. Instead, lingering intra-Alliance discussions 
increased Schmidt’s distrust in Carter. When Schmidt met Mulley on 5 January in 
Aswan, Egypt, Schmidt revealed his dissatisfaction that the Americans were ‘not willing 
to show enough leadership and wanted always to be popular’.
38
 Needless to say, 
Schmidt was referring specifically to the Carter administration’s attitude towards ERW. 
His frustration was growing as he had made it clear several times that a final decision 
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on ERW rested in Washington. 
The British government recognised this change in West Germany’s attitude over two 
weeks later on 8 February when Wright visited the outgoing defence minister Georg 
Leber. Echoing Schmidt, Leber repeated West Germany’s position: the production of 
ERW was a matter for the Americans. He nevertheless added that the Europeans should 
make clear that they were ‘not against the deployment of the weapon in Europe’. ‘Not 
against’ sounded somewhat vague to Wright, but Leber was ‘completely confident’ that 
it was enough for Carter. He explained that the Germans thought that the Alliance 
should negotiate for ‘a reduction of the Soviet weapons by which the European felt 
especially threatened’. For the FRG government this claim referred to a reduction of 
tanks and SS-20s in return for non-deployment of ERW. Leber stressed that the allies 
should deliver this message to the NATO ministerial meeting in May and assured 
Mulley that he, Schmidt and Genscher shared this view.
39
 Leber’s remark implied that 
the German ministers believed that their ‘not against’ attitude would be enough to push 
Carter to demonstrate a leadership and unite the Alliance towards the production and 
deployment of ERW. This approach, especially the ‘not against’ phrase, was as far as the 
government could go in West Germany given the tense domestic political situation. 
As the US finally began to take a lead, West Germany clarified its attitude. Yet 
Britain still did not follow suit. One reason was Owen’s reluctance. Hearing about the 
divided visions in the West German government, he commented ‘(p)lay it long’.
40
 
Reflecting this, the FCO repeatedly instructed the UK delegation to NATO not to 
commit actively in the discussion on the Brezhnev letter.
41
 Of course the source of this 
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prudent attitude was Owen’s distrust of ERW. He repeated his concern to Vance when 
they met in New York on 12 February. In their conversation it emerged that Vance was 
also reluctant to proceed with the ERW programme.
42
 But Vance’s pessimism was not 
part of the mainstream in the Carter administration. The Americans decided to go ahead 
with their idea of the combination of SALT II and ERW and to offer the idea at the NAC 
without seeking final answers from the allies on these plans.
43
  
On 20 February, the US embassies in London and Bonn passed on detailed advance 
explanation to the British and West German government for the NAC discussion. On the 
non-circumvention clause in SALT II, the Americans would table fall-back language, 
which the allies had already approved, in case negotiations faltered. Also on the issue of 
the Statement of Principles for SALT II, they preferred to ‘agree as many principles as 
possible with the Russians for inclusion in formal Statement’ and to prepare a separate 
unilateral statement for any points which could not be agreed. By doing so the 
Americans thought this method would clarify the balance between the ‘obligations 
regarding theatre systems’ between US and Soviet ‘without attempting to specify in 
detail the negotiating position the US might adopt’.  
However, the main purpose of the consultation for them was to gain an early 
agreement on ERW ‘without undue further delay’. The US embassy in London informed 
the FCO that the Alliance ‘should state its intentions on ERWs well before the May 
summit and the UN Special Session on Disarmament’. The Americans were ‘concerned 
that to delay action until the middle of the year or later would give the Soviet 
propaganda campaign a free run, allow the one-sided Soviet proposal for mutual 
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renunciation of the weapon to dominate public discussion of the arms control aspects, 
and allow Alliance divisions to fester.
44
  
 With this consideration, the US government raised the following three steps; first, an 
American announcement of their decision on the production of ERW and its 
development over the next two years; secondly, a statement of their readiness for a 
balanced arms control in Europe, namely the trade-off between ERW and SS-20; and 
thirdly, a parallel statement by the Alliance which supported ERW with the acceptance 
of its deployment to Europe while affirming the American approach to arms control.
45
 
This advance notice was obviously designed to seek support from Britain and West 
Germany for their plan. Similarly, it was obvious that the Americans gave priority to the 
ERW–SS-20 deal rather than the ERW–Soviet tank option which West Germany 
preferred. 
Since the Americans announced the specific date for Alliance consultation in the 
NAC, the British needed to determine their attitude quickly or be left behind. The MOD 
was particularly eager for an early decision. However, there remained the barrier of 
Owen’s stubbornness.
46
 To persuade Owen, Mulley sent him a minute on 17 February 
to propose a bilateral meeting. In this minute he wrote that since the American and 
German attitudes were clear, the British government ‘ought now to address the 
substance of the issue’.
47
 Mulley enclosed a draft paper prepared by MOD officials 
with the help of FCO colleagues advising DOP ministers on what Britain’s attitude 
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should be at this stage.
48
 The paper repeated the advantages of ERW and stressed that 
its production would be ‘essential’ in the light of the arms control. Officials were 
pragmatic about superpower negotiations. They argued that while it was still too early to 
discuss the precise contents of the arms control package which the Americans would put 
on the negotiation table, and because the Soviet reaction was uncertain, the best 
formulation would be an offer phrased ‘in very general terms initially, so as to leave 
room for manoeuvre’.
49
 This was a somewhat vague proposal compared with those of 
the US (ERW–SS-20) and West Germany (ERW–Soviet tanks), but was versatile on two 
points. First, this idea could be a way to mitigate criticism from public opinion. If the 
Russians would not agree, the development and deployment of ERW would be given 
more justifiability. Secondly, this logic could persuade Owen. If ERW could contribute 
to general disarmament logically, he might soften his attitude.  
There is no evidence in British primary sources that Callaghan himself persuaded 
Owen to accept the FCO-MOD line. But it is certain that at least he did not oppose the 
American line. When Callaghan saw Jay on 1 February, they discussed the ERW issue. 
Callaghan told the ambassador that he was now ‘not so worried about this issue’. He 
added that he was ready to ‘ride it out politically if the Americans could make a good 
case and if President Carter took a definite decision in favour of ERWs’.
50
 Moreover, 
on the American proposal for Alliance consultation, he commented that the US initiative 
was ‘one which can be sustained’.
51
 Now things were going in a favourable direction 
for the British. They were ready to follow the American initiative, but it was necessary 
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to make Britain’s attitude clear soon. Britain’s idea – an ERW deal in the wider context 
of disarmament – became public in Callaghan’s remarks in the House of Commons on 
21 February. It seems that by outlining Britain’s attitude before gaining Owen’s consent, 
the Prime Minister expected the Foreign Secretary acquiesce in it. In his remarks 
Callaghan outlined the relationship between ERW and other weapon systems as well as 
SS-20: 
 
The neutron bomb and its serious effects are now being used by the Soviet Union as a 
propaganda cover to prevent discussion of some of the other serious weapons being 
developed. I want to ensure that this is on the record. Mr. Brezhnev can help in this matter 
if, instead of focusing propaganda on the neutron bomb, he will enter into serious 
discussions at the United Nations or elsewhere on how we are to deal with some of the 
other weapons that are now being developed and on which research is taking place. […] 
SS-20 is a more dangerous weapon than the neutron bomb. That is why I do not want to 





The Soviet Union responded swiftly to this. On the next day, Pravda reported that 
Callaghan ‘resorted to attacks on the Soviet Union’ because of the lack of support for 
the deployment of ERW.
53
 Moreover, there was an anti-ERW movement in the Soviet 
Union. For example, the Soviet Mine Workers Union approached the National Union of 
Miners to voice together against the development of ERW.
54
 As ministers feared, the 
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Soviet Union were intending to penetrate British public opinion by taking advantage of 
the dispute over ERW. The Soviet propaganda campaign was particularly unfavourable 
for the Labour government whose support was largely dependent on trade unions. 
Moreover, it was still difficult to create a consensus among ministers on ERW as long as 
Owen maintained his personal scepticism. Moreover, as will become clear in the next 
chapter, there was a further complication for Britain’s policy towards the complexity of 
arms control. The British had yet to reach a conclusion on the relationship between the 
grey area and arms control negotiations, as the state of officials deliberations in GEN 63 
showed. Under these circumstances, it was impossible for the British to be a position to 
respond to the US proposal by the time of the NAC of 24 February.
55
   
The British government had not made up its mind, but the NAC on 24 February 
would be the second important step in the intra-Alliance consultation on arms control 
and the development of ERW. Prior to those discussions, the British were now aware of 
the American position. The Americans told the British and West Germans about SALT II 
developments, outlining their future approach. They forcefully emphasised that SALT II 
would not limit the US nuclear capability to counter the Soviet attack which would 
grow regardless of SALT negotiations. Explaining the Carter administration’s thinking, 
the American official Warnke said that hopes were for an agreement with Soviet Union 
before the UNSSD, or by the end of May. Consequently, there was little time to reach an 
Alliance position. The American briefing received general approval by the allies, but 
Killick reported that’(o)n grey area systems I was not alone in thinking that he [Warnke] 
was rather evasive’.
56
 As next chapter reveals, the Americans still did not have a firm 
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view at this point on how to deal with the grey area and TNF modernisation. Clearly, 
time pressure forced the delegations to reach a hasty conclusion, even if they were not 
fully convinced about the Carter administration’s line on grey area issues. In the next 
Council meeting on 28 February, the FRG representative argued strongly that the 
Alliance should avoid the negative impact of discussions lingering on up to the NATO 
summit and the UNSSD in May. For this reason, the Germans, with the powerful 
support of the Americans, suggested pre-Easter discussions and agreement was reached 
on further consultation on 20 and 22 March.
57
  
As the Soviet anti-ERW propaganda campaign gathered strength, the need for the 
Alliance to respond to it promptly increased and American initiatives were a product of 
their concerns about that pressure. At this point, the British could not respond as quickly 
as the Americans or the West Germans. While Callaghan had made his position clear in 
his House of Commons speech, the government was hampered by inner-party problems 
and domestic politics. And the lack of consensus in Britain gave the Soviets room for 
further propaganda about the divisions in the West. 
 
 
2. Carter’s Decision on the ‘Deferment’ of ERW Development and 
Anglo-American Collaboration   
 
Now a consensus had to be forged at least among the key ministers by some means or 
other to catch up with the Americans and the Germans. Ultimately, that became possible 
when Owen ceased to oppose the production and deployment of ERW. The Foreign 
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Secretary new that his position would have to change now that the Prime Minister’s 
position had of course become clear in his statement to the House of Commons on 21 
February. Owen explained in his memoirs that since Callaghan supported Mulley, he 
decided to assent even if he doubted fundamentally the wisdom of the deployment of 
tactical nuclear weapons.
58
 In a tête-à-tête meeting with Mulley on 2 March, he no 
longer persisted with his original conviction. At the end of their discussion, the two 
ministers agreed the following two points. First, the production of ERW should be 
approved only when global disarmament could not been performed, and secondly, the 
trade-off should not be confined between ERW and SS-20, but be widened to ‘cover 
tanks and, what followed logically, elements of the MBFR negotiations’. On the second 
point, they agreed that the question of ERW would be included in their overall attitude 
towards disarmament in the run-up to UNSSD. Their aim was to distract domestic 
criticisms against governmental approval of the new weapon’s deployment.
59
 It was 
also hoped that by not confining the trade-off specifically, political pressure would be 
placed on the Soviets to reduce further their armaments as a whole. This agreement was 
in line with what Callaghan had stated and the compromise suggested by Owen enabled 
the key ministers to reach agreement on Britain’s attitude towards ERW.  
It is important to note that this general consensus in the British government differed 
from the views of the US and West Germany. As a result, a new Anglo-American-West 
German position would have to be agreed before the NAC in March. For this purpose, a 
British delegation of FCO and MOD officials visited Bonn on 9 March to explain 
Britain’s approach. In a three-hour meeting, the main discussion revolved around 
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whether the Alliance should set their approach to the quid-pro-quo in a direct ERW–
SS-20 or an ERW–Soviet tank deal, or in some other kind of terms. The talks were 
inconclusive: the Germans still preferred a specific offer, either the SS-20 or tanks 
option outside the context of the MBFR. They thought such a deal would be easily 
understood by the public because of the original military characteristics of ERW. 
Furthermore, it would avoid the Soviet’s diversionary counter offers shown in the 




With this German response in mind, the British and the Americans worked very 
closely in preparation for the NATO statement. Since remaining time was so limited, 
discussions had to be concluded fairly quickly. But Americans’ preference was 
unchanged; Gelb repeated that the ERW–SS-20 trade-off made ‘good sense’ and that 
‘(t)here was no need’ for symmetry. He then pointed out that the less specified proposal 
would be abused by the Russians who would seek to involve other factors in the theatre 
nuclear balance which ‘NATO might not want to get into quickly, if at all’. The telegram 
from Washington embassy reported Gelb’s comment as follows: 
 
An important psychological point was that ERW deployment was the crucial first step in 
theatre nuclear modernisation. This fact was largely ignored. We should not [take a] 
defensive position about ERW deployment, while allowing the Russians to proceed 
unchecked with their modernization programme. The position of the Alliance on this issue 
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Given this recognition, a trade-off specifically targeted against SS-20 was essential for 
the Americans. Britain, the US and West Germany all had their own idea on the usage of 
ERW as a bargaining chip. As long as the US government had such firm thoughts it was 
difficult to make the Americans alter their decision. Yet, despite the difference of views, 
Britain and the US collaborated closely to prepare the draft NATO statement for the 
ERW deal which was to be released after the NAC on 22 March.
62
 Their common 
purpose was to draw the Alliance decision well before the UNSSD and the NATO 
summit to counter the Soviet pressure. Over the next few days, they worked together 
exclusively for the making of the draft statement which underwrote the Alliance’s 
decision, but it was the British who played a more substantial role in the preparations.
63
 
In the end British and American views were combined in the final draft, but it was 
mainly based on the British proposals. That was because Britain’s wider approach was 
assumed to have the potential to contain the Germans’ ERW–Soviet tank deal as well as 
the American idea of an ERW–SS-20 deal even if the emphasis was on the latter. In 
Washington British officials worked hard as a bridge between the US and West 
Germany at the very last stage to secure an Alliance decision in time.  
Britain and the US then worked pari passu further to persuade the other NATO 
members. Their main target was apparently the Federal Republic. In this process, Gelb 
told the British that the Americans wished to transfer the agreement they had reached 
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together to the Germans.
64
 In the UK-FRG bilateral talks, the British argued that 
German indecision at the final stage might have ‘an adverse effect’ on the countries who 
were still opposing or waving over the issue; they added that if the Germans could go 
along with the British and the Americans the prospects for Alliance consensus ‘would 
be greatly improved’.
65
 The indecision in Britain’s recent position had disappeared and 
it was clear that the Americans had begun to depend on the British to use their 
diplomatic skills and good relationship with the Germans to persuade them of the 
Anglo-American line. 
The Germans still wanted to include the ERW–Soviet tanks deal in the statement, 
but there were signs of conciliation in their attitude. On 15 March Genscher told Owen 
that the main objective was to reach a decision and if the Americans had a majority, the 
Germans would follow them. Moreover, if the US, Britain, and West Germany stuck 
together on a common line ‘the Benelux countries would go along with a decision’.
66
 In 
addition to their diplomacy with the Germans, the US State Department wanted the 
British to support American efforts to induce opposed or waving countries – Norway, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, and Belgium – to accept the draft statement.
67
 Although 
things did not go as smoothly as Britain and the US expected, the State Department 
foresaw that the US-UK-FRG collaboration could be a spearhead to find a way out of 
the difficulties by the NAC. Quite importantly, at the very last stage of the preparation 
for the NATO statement, the Germans accepted the UK-US line. Gelb told Jay behind 
the scenes that on 19 March the Americans received a high level message from the 
Germans which confirmed that they would accept the SS-20 option once the discussion 
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in the NAC started.
68
  
Meanwhile in London, the DOP took place on 21 March to discuss Britain’s attitude 
towards the ERW issue. There was a general consensus among the participants to 
support the Americans. If anything, the main topic was the appropriateness of the ERW–
SS-20 deal. It was argued that as SS-20 had been already deployed it was unlikely that 
the Soviets would respond positively to the offer. Yet it was also unlikely that any 
success could be anticipated if an ERW–Soviet tanks deal was included in the MBFR 
negotiations as there had been little development there. Thus, the DOP’s original idea of 
a link between ERW and broader disarmament seemed more realistic. As such, the 
committee’s conclusion underwrote the Anglo-American draft statement – approval of 
the development of ERW and its deployment to Europe – subject to the prospect of arms 
control discussions with the Soviets. In terms of the details of the deal, a broader 
approach was still preferable (i.e. both the SS-20 and tanks options), but the DOP 




At last, the British government had reached a policy position on ERW. Alliance 
consultation was to follow shortly. Nevertheless, the situation had changed drastically 
before the DOP was held. On 20 March, the day that the first NAC meeting was 
scheduled, the US suddenly requested its postponement until after Easter.
70
 The official 
explanation was preoccupation with the Middle East,
71
 but strangely no further 
information on this move was given to the allies. Nevertheless, the British had been 
informed. On the same day, Gelb told Jay that while the basic US intention was 
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unchanged, he believed that Carter ‘wanted to see every i dotted and t crossed before 
proceeding’.
72
 But on the following day, 21 March, Gelb asked Jay to visit him again in 
the strictest confidence. In this meeting, Gelb said that considering Britain’s help on the 
ERW issue the British ‘should know where matters stood here [Washington] before the 
Prime Minister arrived’ on 23 March, to talk about financial policy with Carter. Gelb 
explained that, although Congress supported the production of ERW, Carter was still 
anxious about public reaction in the US. Carter therefore ‘wanted to be absolutely sure 
that he could count on continuing support from the other heads of government’ and 
hoped to talk to Callaghan when he visited Washington two days later. But again, Gelb 
repeated that ‘a change of policy on ERW would be very hard to explain to Congress 
where a decision to go ahead with production would be popular’.
73
 There was evidence 
to support Gelb’s remarks. Four days previously, on 17 March, Carter made a speech at 
Wake Forest University in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, in which he had warned of 
the Soviet Union’s excessive armament efforts ‘beyond a level necessary for defence’. 
Stressing the principle that European security was vital to that of the US, he reiterated 
his continuing commitment to arms control and disarmament. Moreover, he undertook 
to ‘match, together with our allies and friends any threatening power through a 
combination of military forces, political efforts and economic programmes’. Moreover, 
he confirmed his administration’s determination to commit to European defence by 
declaring that ‘(w)e are significantly strengthening U.S. forces stationed in Western 
Europe’.
74
 What was noticeable about Carter’s speech was that the word ‘détente’ did 
not feature in it. While Carter did not deny his hope for successful arms control 
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negotiations, his tone towards the Soviet attitude had hardened and he showed more 
readiness to strengthen America’s contribution to European security. This speech 
implied a change in Carter’s foreign policy from détente to confrontation.
 
 
Nevertheless, in terms of ERW, and despite Gelb’s recent re-affirmation, Carter had 
already made up his mind to cancel its production. According to Vance and Brzezinski, 
the final arrangements for the NATO meetings had been completed on 18 March based 
on US-UK-FRG consultation.
75
 Nevertheless, after being informed this decision, Carter 
instructed Vance, Brown and Brzezinski from Georgia, where he was staying for 
vacation, to stop the procedure until his return to Washington.
76
 As a result, the 
administration had to present a diplomatic excuse to America’s allies, hence their 
supposed preoccupation with the Middle East.
77
 Having returned to Washington, Carter 
discussed this issue for one and half hours on 20 March with Vance, Brown, and 
Brzezinski. Brzezinski later recalled that Carter did not want to commit on this now 
critical issue. He was ‘clearly very displeased’ by the fact that the decision-making 
process had been ‘moving forward and that we were about to make a key decision’.
78
 
Brzezinski observed that Carter wished that ‘the whole issue would simply collapse’ 
before he was obliged to make the final decision. Carter came under real pressure from 
his three aides not to stop the procedure at this point.
79
 Vance wrote in his memoirs 
that: 
 
Brown, Brzezinski and I argued strenuously that it was imperative for the cohesion of the 
alliance and for his political standing that he goes ahead as planned. His standing as a 
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leader of NATO, both in Europe and at home, was at stake. Allied leaders had gone out on 
very shaky political limbs to support the March 18 scenario on the understanding that they 
were following his lead. Although the president was moved by the strength of our 




      
Carter saw things differently. He recalled that the US was ‘in an absurd position – to 
proceed with the project alone, while insisting fruitlessly on the deployment of neutron 
weapons by our NATO allies’.
81
 It seemed to Carter unfair to proceed with the 
development of ERW before the European allies showed their wholehearted support for 
his decision. While Callaghan and Schmidt had given Carter support, their positions 
were acute in their own nations. Nevertheless, for Schmidt, and for Callaghan to a lesser 
extent, the matter was logically one for the US government, and on this premise they 
had expressed their support for the American three-step proposal which was tabled at 
the NAC on 24 February. It is true that to some extent this attitude was shaped due to 
the domestic criticisms against ERW in both countries as well as within their own 
parties. However, while Callaghan carefully waited to make Britain’s attitude clear, the 
ERW problem was much more imminent for Schmidt. Given Germany’s geopolitical 
position, the East-West military imbalance was far more serious for him than for 
Callaghan. Moreover, he was particularly concerned about the Carter administration’s 
détente policy in which the so-called ‘Eurostrategic’ balance seemed to be ignored. 
Hence, as Vance rightly recalled, the ERW issue was a matter of the US leadership 
rather than that of European security. Carter’s decision was to give West Germany and 
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the Alliance as a whole impetus to overcome the difficulties in countering the new threat 
from the East.
82
    
For Carter, it was a tough decision. On the one hand, he was a protagonist of nuclear 
disarmament: he had stated his hope for more drastic reductions in nuclear weapons in 
his inauguration speech. On the other hand, as Vance, Brown and Brzezinski pointed out, 
the ERW problem was not so much a simple nuclear issue as a touchstone for US 
leadership in the Alliance. If the President changed his mind at the very last stage in 
Alliance consultations, the consistency of the US defence policy on European security 
and its credibility would be seriously doubted, and Carter’s leadership would be 
severely damaged. In other words, it was a choice for him between his own idealism 
and political realism and, at this final moment, Carter chose the former. 
The President’s decision created consternation in the Alliance. Killick reported a 
growing pessimism among the delegations in Brussels. They thought that if the Alliance 
followed the American request, discussions would not be able to take place for the next 
two weeks. ‘The loss of time’, he added, ‘which will bring UNSSD nearer and do 
nothing to diminish domestic opposition, as well as intensify the Soviet propaganda 
campaign, will make the achievement of a settlement of the issue on the basis of a clear 
Alliance statement a good deal more difficult if not indeed an unrealistic hope’.
83
 In 
Bonn, there was more anger than understanding. While Genscher was furious at the 
‘cavalier treatment of the Alliance by the Americans’, the Auswärtiges Amt thought the 
Carter administration’s attitude was ‘typical of recent American diplomatic style’.
84
 
Without doubt this reflected their dissatisfaction and disappointment with Carter’s 
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decision which completely overturned the result of protracted intra-Alliance 
consultation. Understandably, Bonn was anxious that the delay would damage Alliance 
consensus and increase the chances of Soviet propaganda. The West German 
government was particularly eager for an early decision considering the impact of delay 
on public opinion; Schmidt had spent much time already trying to appease the West 
German people.
85
 Moreover, what is important is that Carter’s decision was made 
immediately after Schmidt and his government had accepted the American proposal. 
Schmidt faced severe domestic opposition against ERW, a fact that Cater obviously 
understood. It was natural for the West Germans to assume that the Americans would 
welcome their decision even if their support was not as open and wholehearted as they 
anticipated. The effect, then, of Carter’s late announcement was to pull the ladder away 
from under Schmidt having so far asked him to climb it. 
In the middle of this situation, Callaghan arrived in Washington on 22 March. This 
long-planned visit was timely as it gave Carter and other key policymakers in 
Washington opportunity to consult with the British about this already hopelessly 
entangled problem. In their private talk on 23 March, Carter told Callaghan that he was 
‘leaning against’ the production of the weapon. He wrote in his diary about this meeting 
that: 
 
[Callaghan] said they were willing to support me if we decided to stop it or reduce it. It 
would not be deployed in Great Britain. He said it would be the greatest relief in the world 
if we announced that we were not going to go ahead with it; that it would be a very difficult 
political issue for him to handle in Great Britain.
86
 








Oddly enough, Callaghan interpreted this meeting quite differently. He explained later 
in the restricted ministerial meeting on 3 April that he had told Carter that ‘he would 
defend a decision to go ahead with production of ERW if the United States Government 
considered this weapon was a major requirement’. Yet, ‘this was not his [Carter’s] 
view’.
87
 It was true that Callaghan and the other three ministers worried about the 
anti-ERW movement in Britain, but they had agreed to support the American threefold 
proposal in the DOP on 21 March, only two days before the Callaghan-Carter meeting. 
It is not absolutely clear from the available sources whether Callaghan instinctively 
preferred ERW cancellation. But judging from the archival records, Carter’s description 
seems too harsh a representation of the Prime Minister’s position and reads more like 
self-vindication. The fact is that the British had since mid-February helped the Carter 
administration’s efforts to gain a consensus in the Alliance for its three-step plan for 
ERW. Now, everything had changed. 
However, whether or not Callaghan felt relieved by Carter’s decision, the problem at 
this point was that the US President seemed to have ignored the long intra-Alliance 
discussions that had produced Alliance consensus on the opposite policy. Moreover, his 
decision left disparity in the East-West military balance, particularly in theatre nuclear 
systems. For this reason, West Germany’s anger was justifiable. Like Schmidt, 
Callaghan regarded the decision as a matter for the US President to take, but quite 
contrary to the Germans, the British government remained supportive of the Carter 
administration. Callaghan was not only the first Alliance leader who was informed of 
Carter’s decision, but also deeply committed to the handling of the issue in the 
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aftermath of the shock. On 28 March, while Carter was away on his visit to Latin 
America, Callaghan, Jay, Mondale, and Aaron met at the White House to discuss how to 
minimise the damage to the Alliance. The main concern was how the administration 
should inform Schmidt of the decision. It was Callaghan who led the discussion. For 
him, ‘tactical handling of the negative American decision’ was very important and the 
key was the maintenance of US leadership. His advice was that it should not seem that 
the administration had been forced to make that decision reluctantly under Soviet 
pressure. In addition, while the Americans thought that Schmidt should be given the 
sense that he had been ‘genuinely consulted,’ and left some flexibility in case he had 
fundamental objections to events, Callaghan countered by saying that Schmidt had 
always argued that the US should take a lead thus he would feel rather relieved by 
Carter’s decision.
88
 Callaghan, Mondale and their officials did not want the impression 
to be given to NATO allies that the Americans and British had pulled strings behind the 
scenes, but nevertheless their discussion revolved around how the Prime Minister would 
defend the President’s new position. The result was that US Deputy Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher would be sent in strict secrecy to West Germany and the UK to 
inform both governments of Carter’s decision.
89
 The real aim, of course, was to 
convince the Chancellor to support the President. 
Christopher first met Schmidt in Hamburg on 30 March. Hans Hellmuth Ruete, the 
German Ambassador, communicated the details of their talk to London on Schmidt’s 
instruction. According to this record, Christopher explained that given the divisions 
within the Alliance, and the issue of tense public opinion, Carter was ‘leaning strongly 
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against’ the production of ERWs. The President did not envisage that an ERW deal 
would be a successful bargaining tool and European security could be maintained by the 
modernisation of existing conventional forces. Christopher added that Callaghan 
supported Carter’s decision. In response to this explanation, Schmidt repeated West 
Germany’s position that the decision must be a matter for Carter exclusively. This was 
what Schmidt had long argued, as Callaghan had predicted. Yet Schmidt did not conceal 
his surprise. Referring to the American threefold idea of February, he pointing out that 
West Germany, the US and Britain had been in ‘complete agreement’ on the proposal 
which was to be taken in NATO. He emphasised again his serious concern over the 
threat to Europe caused by SS-20s and Backfire bombers.
90
 The Chancellor did not 
express his disappointment over the meeting but just pointed out how much his country 
had cooperated with the US on this issue. But this calmness itself seemed to explain his 
discouragement and anger. On 4 April Genscher flew to Washington, two days earlier 
than scheduled, for last minute persuasion, but Carter’s decision was already ‘final’.
91
  
Next day in London, Christopher met Owen in a much friendlier atmosphere, not 
least because the Foreign Secretary already knew everything. The American official’s 
visit to London was purely a smokescreen to conceal Anglo-American collaboration. 
For public consumption, Owen declared to Christopher the British government ‘would 
do all we could to support his [Carter’s] decision’.
92
 The record of the meeting reveals 
more about the close cooperation between the UK and US governments. They discussed 
in detail the German reaction and the manner of public presentation of the decision. 
They agreed that any impression of disagreement in the Alliance must be avoided and 
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that it would be advantageous to keep the ERW option open.
93
 It meant that if there was 
no progress in arms control negotiations, SALT, MBFR, and CTB, the ERW option 
might be revived. Given Carter’s deep hesitation about going ahead with ERW, the 
revival of its development was not actually practical politics. But in the tactical context, 
this could be an effective way to put pressure on the Soviets to stop its military 
build-up. 
Carter’s decision was discussed again in the restricted British ministerial meeting on 
3 April, two days after Christopher’s visit. In the discussion it was pointed out that 
Carter’s reversal had shown ‘considerable incompetence in [the] handling of this issue’ 
and would represent a ‘substantial propaganda victory’ for the Soviets. Nevertheless, the 
ministers approved Carter’s decision.
94
 Three days later, the issue was put to the 
Cabinet. Owen explained the reason for approval by stressing that in light of the 
conclusion of SALT II, CTB, and the forthcoming UNSSD, arms control was superior 
to Alliance armament to prevent the deterioration of the US-Soviet relations. Supporting 
Owen, Callaghan added that in fact ‘(t)here was no doubt that this question had been 
mishandled by the United States Administration, possibly through inexperience’. 
However, it is notable that he went on to say that ‘(i)t was important we should not 
make President Carter’s position more difficult as the Germans had done, and so far the 
President accepted that we were genuinely trying to be helpful’.
95
 For Callaghan, the 
priority was not what Carter’s reversal had done to policy, but what heightened 
criticism of him might do to levels of trust in him and, eventually, the unity of the 
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Alliance. Callaghan’s dissatisfaction with European allies’ unhelpful and critical 
attitudes was clear in the next Cabinet meeting on 13 April. His criticism of West 
Germany’s attitude was:  
 
It would be quite wrong to regard President Carter as an indecisive man. He was a man of 
principle who was however the first to admit that he lacked experience. His Administration 
was moreover not well articulated, with the result that different officials tended to advocate 
their own views. Our role was not to voice criticism but to give the President the fullest 




The difference in the responses between Britain and West Germany was conspicuous. 
Schmidt reacted calmly to Christopher, but his comments sounded disapproving and 
showed with no doubt his deepened concern about the ‘Eurostrategic’ disparity and 
dislike towards Carter’s policy on European security. It is hard to assume that Callaghan 
and Owen did not have the same kind of concerns. The East-West military imbalance 
was also the centre of Cold War defence anxieties in the British government. But 
Callaghan’s government kept these concerns to itself and worked very closely with the 
Carter administration to maintain unity under American leadership and minimise the 
political damage caused by the decision. 
On 7 April, a week after Christopher’s visit to London, Carter officially announced 
his decision. In an official statement he said that ‘(t)he ultimate decision […] will be 
made later, and will be influenced by the degree to which the Soviet Union shows 
restraint in its conventional and nuclear arms programs and force deployments affecting 
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the security of the United States and Western Europe’.
97
 At least the statement reflected 
the agreement in London between Owen and Christopher. But it was filled with obscure 
wording and did not contain a concrete figure which defined ‘the degree to which the 
Soviet Union shows restraint in its conventional and nuclear arms programs and force 
deployments’. This meant the final decision was dependent on the President’s 
judgement. If so, as long as Carter was against ERW there was no likelihood of its 
future production. It can be said that at this point that ERW was dead. On the same day, 
No.10 issued a statement which strongly supported Carter’s decision.
98
 Callaghan also 
a letter to assure Carter that in the European Council meeting, which began exactly on 
the same day, he would do his best to convince other allies that the European response 
should be one which could contribute to the unity of the Alliance.
99
 Actually in his 
private message to Callaghan to inform him of his decision, Carter had asked Callaghan 
to express his support at a ‘suitable opportunity’.
100
 Britain’s supportive statement and 
Callaghan’s effort in the European Council were purely designed to maintain good 
relations with Carter and hold the Alliance together in light of changes in American 
policy. The West German government also issued a statement on the same day. The text 
was rather neutral; it welcomed Carter’s confirmation of the American commitment to 
European security, but at the same time it stressed the importance of continuous arms 
control given the disparity created by Soviet tanks and medium-range nuclear 
systems.
101
 The difference between the statements from Britain and West Germany was 
notable. 
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During the ERW dispute, Britain’s role moved from a spectator to active mediator. 
The British attitude began to change slowly, stimulated by the American initiative and 
the Germans’ demand for an early decision. Regardless of his own thoughts about 
Carter’s volte-face decision, Callaghan’s faith in Anglo-American relations was 
unshaken. Since the NAC on 24 February the British government had supported the US 
administration’s three-step approach while persuading the stubborn Owen in the 
government and West Germany in the Alliance. Furthermore, once Carter decided to 
cancel this approach, the British had remained supportive to minimise the possible 
chaos caused by that sudden decision. In this regard, the Anglo-American ‘special 
relationship’ defended the Alliance from further damage. Doubtlessly, this consistent 
support of the British government increased the Carter administration’s reliance on 
Britain in its policy making and implementation. David Anderson, Special Assistant to 
Vance, told Brian L. Crowe, the head of the FCO Planning Staff, that when 
US-European relations were ‘in a bad state’ Callaghan’s role was decisive, whilst 
Schmidt openly showed his impatience with Carter. Anderson added that with regards to 
Carter’s decision for the postponement of ERW development and deployment, Britain’s 
reaction was a ‘major factor’.
102
 Besides, the US Defense Secretary Harold Brown told 
Callaghan that Carter thought Callaghan’s attitude was ‘extremely helpful’.
103
 
Underwriting these remarks, Jay recalled that the Carter administration was keen on 
Callaghan’s ‘astute political brain’, and highly valued Callaghan’s support and advice. 
Moreover, the Americans thought that Callaghan’s good relationship with Schmidt 
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could help pull the Chancellor around.
104
 Britain’s contribution under the 
Anglo-American cooperation, or more precisely the close Callaghan-Carter partnership, 
helped the Carter administration restore the Alliance solidarity, and this consequently 
saved the Alliance from internal disunity, at a moment when the President had 
jeopardised both.  
 
 
3. Washington NATO Summit: Britain the Mediator 
 
No matter how hard Britain and the US worked, it was apparent that Alliance stability 
was seriously shaken by the turmoil caused by Carter’s decision. Nevertheless there was 
no time to waste for the recovery of unity in the face of growing pressure due to Soviet 
military expansion. At the same time, it was urgent for the Carter administration to 
restore its credibility as the leader of the Alliance. The forthcoming Washington NATO 
ministerial meeting in May was important for the achievement of these objectives. In 
the previous NATO ministerial meeting held in London last May, the allies agreed to 
launch the Long-Term Defence Programme (LTDP) and to carry out the studies by a 
deadline of the next ministerial meeting. As this was bound to occupy a central place at 
the summit, its successful conclusion was crucial to give fresh impetus and direction to 
defence planning in the Alliance. 
As the NATO summit approached, the Carter administration made demands on 
America’s allies. As early as January, Mulley reported to Callaghan that the Americans 
‘had ambitious ideas for obtaining firm commitments from member nations’. However, 
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he pointed out that ‘it will be impracticable in most cases to go beyond agreement in 
principle’. Not only were the ideas unaffordable, he explained, but also impractical in 
light of the time available for consideration before the summit. Thus Britain’s aim was, 
he continued, to convince the Americans of the ‘realities’, and to ‘avoid an awkward 
gap at the Summit meeting between American aspirations and what is practicable’.
105
 If 
the Americans wanted the allies to make further contributions, additional burdens would 
inevitably fall their defence expenditures. This would put Britain in another painful 
position in the Alliance. In his reply to Mulley, Callaghan stressed that there should be 
no decisions which might go beyond the 3% increase in the defence expenditures for 
1979/80 and 1980/81 as agreed at the London NATO summit in May 1977.
106
 Beyond 
this potentially difficult American-made problem, the British were also concerned that 
the Carter administration had no clear notion about the handling of the summit.
107
 As 
the Alliance was also sensitive about perceived lack of consultation with the Carter 
administration, this would be yet more evidence, potentially, of American distance. Jay 
expressed Britain’s concerns to Brown on 31 March. He gave two reasons; first, there 
was little time left between the conclusion of the LTDP at the DPC in mid-April and the 
NATO summit in which the heads of government would discuss it at the end of May. 
Secondly, the British did not wish to be confronted with ‘any surprise U.S. initiatives at 
the summit’.
108
 Jay’s intent was to remind Brown that Britain preferred realistic and 
practical approaches to any new ambitious proposals which required the allies to do 
more than increase defence expenditures by 3%.  
The Carter administration had its own reason to push its allies hard. Congressional 
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pressure had influenced its diplomacy. As Jay told Brown, although Congress ‘would 
not try to reduce US forces in Europe, they would not support administration efforts to 
build them up’. He went on to say that ‘Congress should not be given any justification 
for claiming that the European allies were not doing enough’.
109
 For the Carter 
administration, Britain was amongst all NATO allies the most reliable and also showed 
the most helpful attitude towards burden sharing for European security. The 
administration’s trust was clear when the US Defense Secretary Brown visited London 
on 17 April. Opening his meeting with Callaghan, Brown congratulated Britain’s 
‘constructive role’ in NATO, particularly its decision to increase defence expenditure by 
3%. Then Brown emphasised what the US government wanted out of the NATO summit. 
In addition to the conclusion of the LTDP with the approval of the heads of government, 
the administration strongly hoped that the summit would secure ‘a commitment by 
Heads of Government to the principle of a common approach, rather than taking each 
individual issue in isolation’.
110
 Responding favourably to this idea, Callaghan 
proposed that NATO allies would issue ‘some kind of statement’ at its summit. Carter 
strongly welcomed this idea in his telephone conversation with Callaghan on the same 
day. Carter told Callaghan that ‘a strong ultimate communiqué or commitment, more 
than just the routine requirement of protocol, is very important’.
111
 Further to his 
remarks in London, Brown made ‘an emphatic plea’ at the NPG in Frederikshavn, 
Denmark, held immediately after his visit to London. He asked NATO defence ministers’ 
for their support for the achievement of the LTDP as a component of the summit, and 
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for their attendance at the summit to make the meeting as a special one.
112
 Evidently 
the Carter administration was eager for a more visible and sensational success in the 
NATO summit especially after the fiasco of the ERW consultation. At a glance it seems 
curious that the British supported the American initiative and proposed a special 
statement although they were concerned about the Americans’ self-willed action earlier 
that year. However, it is possible to say that in the aftermath of the ERW debacle the 
British also wanted more than ever something which could re-confirm Alliance unity 
under American leadership. As long as this statement would not further budgetary 
burdens from the allies, they should happily accept it. 
During this period, the US-Soviet SALT negotiations failed to resolve all remaining 
problems. Immediately after Carter’s ERW postponement announcement, Vance flew to 
Moscow in April and then to Geneva in May although Carter’s decision did not seem to 
have any impact on negotiations. In addition, the military conflicts outside of Europe 
and the Soviet Union’s commitment to them, particularly in Africa, deepened 
uncertainty surrounding future talks.
113
 However, Callaghan’s conviction about US 
leadership was unwavering. On 17 April he told Brown that he thought the feeling in 
Europe that it ‘should organise itself against the US’ was ‘disgraceful’.
114
 On the same 
day in a telephone conversation with Carter, he reassured the President that when faced 
with criticism of the US, he always said ‘don’t forget the defence side when you are 




   For the Carter administration, the key was West Germany’s attitude. That was clear 
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from Brown’s request to Mulley for his personal help, and Callaghan’s, ‘to obtain 
positive German support for the LTDP’: 
 
After many years in which the Americans had been the odd man out in the Alliance and the 
Germans had been most co-operative in wanting joint procurement and joint operational 
planning, the US had been brought around, subject only to some Congressional foot 




The deepening of Schmidt’s distrust in Carter’s policy and the deterioration of 
US-German relations increased the American reliance on Britain’s role as a mediator in 
the Alliance. After the ERW debacle especially, US-FRG relations suffered from 
unprecedented awkwardness. This situation was far from ideal for the Carter 
administration which relied on good relations with West Germany not only for the 
success of the forthcoming NATO summit but also for the solidarity of the Alliance in a 
broader context. Here, Britain’s diplomacy became central.  
In late April, the regular six-monthly Anglo-German summit offered opportunity to 
judge what Schmidt thought about Carter’s policy towards European security.
117
 The 
Chancellor was eloquent and candid. The records of meetings held at Chequers indicate 
his deep misgivings towards Carter. In a meeting on 23
rd
, he openly criticised the 
President’s attitude, including towards the management of US-Soviet relations, and 
argued that Carter’s diplomacy could not stop the Soviets and that American influence 
was diminishing in Europe. Callaghan tried to mitigate Schmidt’s discontent, enquiring 
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further about the Chancellor’s scepticism towards US policy. Schmidt replied that he 
was ‘only sceptical about the present office holders’. Without doubt, he meant Carter. 
Callaghan said his German counterpart should not ‘underestimate President Carter: he 
ought to engage with him [Carter] on defence issues’. The Prime Minister intended to 
persuade the Chancellor to help the President on European security by emphasising 
Carter’s personal ability as a leader. For this purpose, he went on to say that Britain and 
West Germany should give ‘a fair wind’ to the LTDP and show the US that they 
regarded the US commitment as vital. Schmidt seemed to agree, at least on the surface. 
But the record of meeting reveals the extent of the Chancellor’s dissatisfaction: 
   
His despair was that the United States was not now leading. Their leadership was neither 
continuing nor predictable and this created instability. West Germany depended on the 
United States much more than the UK did. Without the United States Berlin would go and 




The British had of course recognised the deterioration in US-German relations.
119
 Yet it 
seems that the severity of Schmidt’s doubts went beyond their expectation. Callaghan 
and Schmidt met again in the afternoon on 23 April and were joined by Owen and 
Genscher. Sharp differences in views on Carter’s foreign policy arose again; Schmidt 
explained his concern that the superpowers would conclude the SALT II negotiations 
over the heads of the Europeans, ignoring the SS-20 and the Backfire bomber.
120
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Nevertheless, Callaghan and Owen managed to persuade their German allies of the need 
for a show of Alliance solidarity at a successful NATO summit. In addition, they agreed 
to raise the MBFR talks to the level of foreign ministers.
121
 Owen had first raised this 
idea on 3 April as the MBFR negotiations progressed at snail’s pace. It was now vital 
after the failure of the ERW programme had created yet further stagnation, not least to 
raise the political pressure on the Soviets and secure a new component in western 
détente policy running up to the UNSSD.
122
 
In the meantime, preparation for the LTDP was under way. Hunt’s minute to 
Callaghan dated 28 April reveals how the British government saw the Carter 
administration’s diplomacy at this point. Hunt observed that the ambitious Carter 
administration was not satisfied with the LTDP taskforces’ studies which reflected 
members’ existing national defence programmes and their reluctance to approve plans 
which would increase defence expenditures beyond 3%. As mentioned above, although 
the British government had succeeded in increasing the UK defence budget, Britain’s 
situation was more serious than other European allies. Hunt also saw another problem in 
the Carter administration’s ambiguous thinking on the summit. Thus it was necessary 
for the British government to keep close contact with the US administration, gauge its 
thoughts and persuade the Americans not to weaken Alliance unity further with any 
increased defence requirements. Hunt argued that the failure of the NATO summit 
would be a ‘serious blow,’ particularly for the administration since it would enhance 
Congressional doubts about European allies’ defence contributions.
123
  
With their early approval of the 3% increase in defence expenditures, the British 
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were in fact one step ahead of their European allies. At the DOP meeting held on 3 May, 
ministers generally agreed that the British government should support the broad 
objectives of the LTDP. However, there was general agreement among them that there 
was a ‘clear risk’ of an arms race which would be harmful politically, economically and 
militarily. Consequently, ministers decided to take a dual approach in which NATO 
would improve its military capability such as under the LTDP on the one hand, and lead 
arms control negotiations on the other.
124
 This inventive and active approach reflected 
contrasted with the constrained British position of the recent past. The difference was 
caused by improvements in the economy which produced greater room for movement. 
Close intra-Alliance cooperation was essential for the approval of the LTDP and for 
Alliance solidarity. It was particularly necessary among the four major countries, but the 
preparations did not go smoothly. The main problem was Franco-American. The Carter 
administration wished to make the summit an exhibition of Carter’s political leadership; 
the French did not. For them, any reference to the LTDP in the communiqué was an 
invasion of the independent defence policy of France.
125
 This divergence caused 
dispute over the format of the communiqué; the Americans wanted one single 
communiqué which included the LTDP, but the French wanted two entirely separate 
communiqués; the first, which they would sign, would exclude reference to the LTDP.
126
 
Writing about this threatening dispute, William J. A. Wilberforce, the Head of Defence 
Department, wrote that this French idea ‘would publicly devalue the LTDP, and thus 
prejudice what is for the United States a central objective of the summit, and one which 
has been endorsed by the Prime Minister and by Chancellor Schmidt’. Nevertheless, the 
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British could not lead on this Franco-American division. Wilberforce warned that 
Britain should not either be ahead of the Americans or support them until ‘they 
themselves decide to abandon the idea of an integral communiqué’.
127
 Alliance 
solidarity was the first priority for the British. 
American diplomacy then worsened the situation. On 5 May, Luns told British, 
Canadian, Italian and West German NATO representatives about a new US proposal to 
issue a ‘solemn declaration’ rather than a communiqué at the end of the Washington 
summit.
128
 The Americans envisaged that this document would be an alternative to a 
single communiqué, but the four NATO representatives all thought it ‘impossibly late to 
agree a draft’. Moreover, the plan would certainly bring acute French opposition as any 
Alliance statement which implied constraints on the independence of France created 
opposition in Paris. The prospect of difficulty over the communiqué had already 
hardened French attitudes towards Alliance consultation and the role of the Alliance in 
East-West negotiations. NATO representatives therefore thought that the US proposal 
should be ‘discouraged straight away’ before the Carter administration started drafting it. 
In addition, Turkey would demand words on defence cooperation which would be 
opposed by Greece. The main concern of the representatives was to avoid the idea of a 




Callaghan shared the same anxiety as he had told Brown in April and thus Britain’s 
support for the US government was all the more necessary. However, the problem rested 
in the details and the presentation. On the day after the representatives discussed the 
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American proposal in Brussels, Jay met Robert Hunter, an NSC staffer, in Washington. 
He described the dangers for Carter of ‘appearing to proceed in such an impulsive way’ 
and outlined British apprehensions about the damage to the reputation of the US should 
it fail. A further blow to American credibility would be fatal at this point. Hunter 
explained that the administration’s general idea was that ‘the Alliance could do 
something special “to show we are together”’ by issuing a statement which would be 
‘little more than platitudes, but put more into the present context’. He thanked Jay 
warmly for this ‘very helpful advice’ and promised to consult Brzezinski.
130
 In the late 
afternoon, they met again. Hunter told Jay that Brzezinski had decided to send an 
explanatory message only to four NATO heads of government – Callaghan, Schmidt, 
Giscard and Trudeau – to minimise the danger of leak. The Americans wanted a ‘solemn 
declaration’ at the NATO summit because the lesson they had drawn from the ERW 
dispute had been different to that of the Europeans. A declaration would indicate that the 
unity of the Alliance was strong and that so was its faith in American leadership.
131
 
That was necessary because recent American diplomacy had raised questions about the 
power of the US. The coup d’état in Afghanistan in April and the conflicts in Shaba 
sparked in May, and the human rights issues, all sharpened the debates in the US on the 
Carter administration’s handling of the US-Soviet relationship. Even the 
administration’s success in the Panama Canal Treaties and Middle East peace 
negotiations had not increased the public confidence in Carter’s foreign policy.
132
 
Skilful American management of the NATO summit was thus vital. 
On the following day, 6 May, Carter accordingly sent a draft text to the four heads of 
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the government. He wrote that in the NATO summit the Alliance should aim to promote 
the LTDP and to improve ‘public understanding of the Alliance’s cohesion, confidence, 
and political purpose’. He therefore raised the idea of a ‘concise declaration’ beyond the 
standard communiqué.
133
 Naturally Callaghan and Owen welcomed Carter’s idea.
134
 
Callaghan told Hunt that Britain should make its attitude clear ‘in the face of Soviet 
adventurism outside the NATO area’. Owen also commented that he was in favour of an 
‘imaginative and forceful declaration’ and the idea would make the statement ‘more 
interesting and give a better balance with UNSSD in progress’. But both of them 
thought the draft required revision if it was to be accepted by NATO allies.
135
 After 
receiving Callaghan’s comments, Carter sent a revised draft declaration to the other 
NATO member states which reflected the Prime Minister’s contribution.
136
  
Despite this preliminary Anglo-American tactical diplomacy, things did not go as 
well as hoped. The pressure points would be the French and Turkish responses, but 
particularly that from Paris.
137
 On 12 and 17 May, Carter’s proposal was discussed by 
NATO permanent representatives in Brussels. While the majority of them supported the 
idea in principle, it was ultimately withdrawn because of the objections of France and 
Turkey. Those two countries’ representatives said that they did not object to the 
statement in principle, but given the shortage of time thought it better to issue this kind 
of statement the following year to mark the thirtieth anniversary of NATO. 
Consequently, representatives agreed that further consideration of the idea would be 
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 While it was true that the Carter administration had left little time to 
secure agreement to its idea of a solemn declaration, the French had deftly maximised 
this excuse to bury Carter’s proposal.  
Without anything solemn on the books, the only other proposal to enhance the 
NATO summit was Britain’s proposal for a foreign ministers’ meeting on the MBFR and 
a more active NATO role in disarmament negotiations. Owen wrote Vance on 6 May to 
propose the idea.
139
 Vance reacted favourably, but he clearly wanted Britain to take a 
lead.
140
 Here again, the legacy of the ERW issue was obvious as the Carter 
administration would rely once more on Britain’s diplomatic skill. Mulley proposed 
Britain’s idea in the DPC on 18 May and asked his fellow defence ministers to support 
it at the summit meeting.
141
 These British efforts brought much American appreciation. 
At the DPC meeting, Brown expressed the Carter administration’s gratitude to Mulley 
for Britain’s helpfulness in persuading the West German government to take a positive 




On 30 and 31 May 1978, NATO heads of government gathered in Washington for 
the long-awaited summit meeting. From the outset Carter gave repeated assurances of 
the US commitment to European defence and the unity of the Alliance. At the opening 
ceremony he remarked that ‘(a)s an American, I am proud that the commitment of the 
United States to the security, independence and prosperity of Europe is as strong as ever. 
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We are part of you and you of us’.
143
 Similarly, in the discussion on the LTDP next day, 
he stated that the top priority of the US defence policy should be given to NATO, 
particularly the reinforcement of its conventional forces. But here again he reiterated his 
administration’s attachment to European defence and added that: 
 
Arms control can make deterrence more stable and perhaps less burdensome, but it will not, 
in the foreseeable future, eliminate the need for nuclear forces. For years, the Alliance has 
relied principally on American strategic forces for deterring nuclear attack by the Warsaw 
Pact countries or the Soviet Union on Europe. The coupling of American strategic nuclear 
forces to Europe is critical. It means that an attack on Europe would have the full 
consequences of an attack on the US. Let there be no misunderstanding about this. The 





This statement showed Carter’s determination to commit to European nuclear 
deterrence. As his preferred NATO statement was no longer possible, it became even 
more important for him to state his convictions after the ERW dispute had shaken 
NATO allies in their reliance on the US leadership under Carter. Overall the other heads 
of government responded favourably, even if Schmidt did not make any special 
comment on Carter’s statement.
145
 
At the same time, Carter’s LTDP proposal was approved after Turkey softened its 
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attitude. This success enabled Carter to retrieve his severely damaged image as the 
leader of the Alliance. The British proposals were also included in the communiqué.
146
 
Killick reported from Brussels that Britain’s initiative contributed to new stabilisation of 
the Alliance where defence and arms control were put on an equal status. That progress 
in Alliance policy was also expected to contribute to the UNSSD by indicating the 
efforts by the Alliance to seek arms control and disarmament.
147
 In his statement, 
Callaghan welcomed Carter’s attempt to show unity in the transatlantic relationship at a 
time when Soviet military capability was growing in and outside Europe. Likewise, the 
Prime Minister affirmed his government’s support for the LTDP and emphasised the 
major contribution it had made to the conventional forces of the Alliance by agreeing to 
the 3% increase in its defence budget.
148
  
Importantly for the Americans and the British, Schmidt thought that the NATO 
summit was a success. Carter’s speech was clearly intended to ease European anxieties, 
especially the Chancellor’s. In the first plenary session on 30 May, Schmidt spoke of his 
meetings with Brezhnev earlier in the month and the contribution they made to 
improved East-West relation. He nevertheless pointed to the continuing risks of the 
deployment of Soviet medium-range systems, SS-20 and Backfire bomber, a Cold War 
imbalance in European security which had not been corrected in SALT II.
149
 But his 
meeting with Carter in the margin of the summit meetings went off ‘excellently’.
150
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Improvement in US-German relations was more clearly shown through Carter’s visit to 
Germany in July. Wright reported that Carter’s visit improved his personal relationship 
with Schmidt and narrowed the differences in policy except on human rights issues. In 
the Market Square in Bonn Carter exclaimed to his German audience that ‘your security 
is ours, and ours is yours’.
151
 The US-German relationship was repaired, or at least held 
together before the point of no return, and further deterioration was avoided. This 
outcome would not have been possible without the success of the Washington NATO 
summit. Critical to that event was preparatory Anglo-American cooperation and then 
Britain’s support for the Carter administration’s policies. Thus the unity of the Alliance 
was preserved beyond the ERW fiasco.  
It was at this point that Carter’s attitude towards arms control began to change. In his 
remarks to the NATO summit on 31 May, he put more emphasis on American 
commitment to European defence, especially its strategic nuclear deterrent. Killick drew 
attention to the contrast between this statement and those made by Carter earlier in his 
presidency when he had argued for the abolition of nuclear weapons.
152
 This evolution 
in the president’s thinking was patent a week after the summit when on 7 June he made 
the commencement address at the US Naval College in Annapolis, Maryland. Revealing 
his understanding of US-Soviet relations, Carter said that while superpower détente was 
‘central to world peace,’ it had to ‘be broadly defined and truly reciprocal’. What was 
notable was his criticism of the Soviet Union. He described Moscow’s détente policy as 
‘a continuing aggressive struggle for political advantage and increased influence in a 
variety of ways’. He then gave examples: the Soviet use of ‘proxy forces to achieve 
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their purposes’ in Korea, Angola and Ethiopia; the abuse of basic human rights in their 
own country which violated the Helsinki Final Act; and the export of ‘a totalitarian and 
repressive form of government’. Speaking to the Navy graduating class but also the 
world, Carter therefore offered reassurances that the US and its allies were open to 
détente, they also had to be ready to ‘meet any foreseeable challenge to our security 
from either strategic nuclear forces or front conventional forces’. His message was 
clear: ‘(t)he Soviet Union can choose either confrontation or cooperation. The United 
States is adequately prepared to meet either choice.’
153
 
The speech was a fusion of two drafts written separately by Vance and Brzezinski. 
Vance recalled that while his draft emphasised the complexity of US-Russian relations 
and argued for a de-intensification of political tensions, Brzezinski suggested more 
confrontational language.
154
 In retrospect, Brzezinski claimed that the speech was 
largely Carter’s work and that the president had inserted the phrase ‘cooperation or 
confrontation’. For Carter, it was ‘tough, but well balanced’ and, moreover, if it was 
seen as ‘tough at home and the Soviets consider it mild, that’s perfect’.
155
 Although 
Carter still wished to balance Vance’s prudence and Brzezinski’s aggression, 
particularly his the linkage he suggested between the SALT negotiations and the 
so-called ‘Horn of Africa’, the president’s thinking was clearly tilted towards 
Brzezinski’s hawkish view. As Glad rightly pointed out, the main reason of this shift 




Nevertheless, regardless of the strength of Carter’s statement, there was growing 
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concern among European allies about the capabilities of his administration. On 16 May, 
EC ambassadors in Washington surveyed Carter’s policies towards Europe and agreed 
that while they were acceptable, it was not clear that the US government had the 
competence to carry out them. The ERW fiasco had raised a big questions mark, not 




At the end of June, Jay sent to London a despatch analysing Carter’s leadership 
titled ‘Mr. Carter: Capax Imperii?’. While Jay’s judgement remained open, he was less 
optimistic than he had been in his despatch of the previous November. He still believed 
that Carter had the characteristics of a statesman but lacked the skill to demonstrate 
them. There were two reasons for that in Jay’s estimation. First was the president’s 
inability to present a clear overall philosophy or to translate it into effective political 
action. Secondly, Jay depicted a lack of imagination about others’ perceptions in his 
handling of issues. Furthermore, the ERW affair was an example of the problems caused 
by the inadequacies of his political management rather than his vulnerability to Soviet 
pressure or vacillating attitude.
158
 On Jay’s despatch, Melhuish commented that it was 
‘surprising’ that the ambassador did not mention human rights, nuclear non-proliferation, 
or disarmament. These had been vital issues for Carter on entering office but the world 
had ‘not heard so much about these subjects in recent months’.
159
 Melhuish was right; 
in Carter’s speech at the Naval Academy, the president referred to cooperation with the 
Soviet Union, but he spent as much time criticising Soviet expansionism. This omission 
seemed to herald an important change in Carter’s foreign policy and while there signs of 
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positive change in Carter’s approach to European security, doubts about his capability 
remained. The candid nature of Melhuish’s judgement represented the FCO view: 
 
Most commentators are not as generous as Mr Jay in giving Mr Carter the benefit of the 
doubt. I hope that he is right but I am beginning to wonder whether Mr Carter’s potential 
ability will always be significantly better than his actual performance.
160
   




Kenneth O. Morgan, Callaghan’s official biographer, gave the title ‘International Honest 
Broker’ to the chapter in his book which dealt with Callaghan’s role in international 
affairs during his premiership.
161
 In light of Callaghan’s role in transatlantic relations in 
the first half of 1978, Morgan chose well. As this chapter demonstrates, the Callaghan 
government’s consistent objective in European security was the maintenance of 
transatlantic solidarity under American leadership with Britain acting as a bridge 
between both sides of the Atlantic. Garthoff has rightly pointed out that the significance 
of the ERW dispute was not its influence on relations between the superpowers. The real 
importance was two-fold: its impact on the confidence of America’s allies in the 
integrity of the Alliance and American leadership, and the effect on the future defence 
policy of the Alliance on the grey area, a factor which is discussed in the next chapter.
162
  
Jay recollected that the ‘real villain’ of the ERW dispute was Schmidt. He pointed 
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out that it had been Schmidt’s unfriendly attitude which detached Germany from 
decision making by declaring that the final decision was a matter for Carter. 
Furthermore, Schmidt’s requirement that ERW should be deployed in at least one more 
European allied nation made the problem worse; it was also based on flawed 
understanding of NATO’s deterrent strategy.
163
 His criticism has a point; the somewhat 
vague attitudes in Britain and West Germany delayed the Carter administration’s 
decision. However, this chapter has illustrated that the main cause of tension was, to a 
large extent, the Carter administration’s inconsistent policy, particularly over the ERW 
affair.  
The credibility of Carter and his administration was already weak due to the lack of 
American leadership in intra-Alliance consultations. Now, due to ERW, Europeans had 
further, serious doubts about the US. For the administration, restoration of the solidarity 
of the Alliance was all the more important to counterbalance the weaknesses of earlier 
American diplomacy. Britain’s active help in the process of restoration of integrity was 
crucial during and after the crisis; the Callaghan government rapidly became the Carter 
administration’s most reliable ally. Yet this was not purely a tactical move on Britain’s 
behalf. Importantly, Britain’s role as a mediator was based on a strong belief that 
American leadership was vital for the Alliance. As he was a convinced Atlanticist, this 
was a natural choice for Callaghan, but also for his key ministers and Jay. Consequently, 
throughout the events considered here, the Prime Minister’s Office kept in close contact 
with the White House and Anglo-American diplomacy followed. Relations between 
London and Washington deepened, and Britain’s stock in the Carter administration rose, 
as a result of heightened tensions in the Alliance, the Callaghan government’s 
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Atlanticism, and the Carter administration’s trust in the British. 
In fact Britain often remained one step behind the Americans and the Germans 
because of domestic and political reasons. Nevertheless, as the Alliance worked towards 
its statement on the divisive ERW issue in mid-March, it was Britain’s diplomacy which 
was critical to successful consultation. In addition, amid the confusion caused by 
Carter’s cancellation of ERW production from the end of March to the beginning of 
April, it was British statecraft that stabilised the Alliance. It also enabled Alliance 
consultation leading to the success of the Washington NATO summit throughout May. 
The closeness of UK-US relations throughout these troubled events was in marked 
contrast to the awkward relationship between the US and West Germany. Schmidt and 
Genscher simply did not trust Carter’s skill as a statesman, even thought they remained 
wedded to good transatlantic relations. While bilateral relations were restored by the 
time of Carter’s visit to West Germany in July, this did not mean that Schmidt’s worries 
were completely removed. As the next chapter reveals, even if personal relations were 
improved, Schmidt’s and West Germany’s deep anxieties over ‘Eurostrategic’ problems 
remained. 
The failure of the Carter administration’s diplomacy over ERW led to instability in 
American foreign policy. The president’s remarks at the NATO summit are indicative of 
this fact. In the Face of lowered credibility and increased suspicion of the US and the 
president himself, the administration tried to underscore its reliability. The proposal for 
a NATO statement ended in failure, but it was an attempt to reassert US leadership and 
ultimately a sign of its impatience. In this context the success of the Washington NATO 
summit was indispensable for the Carter administration.   
Carter’s Annapolis speech was clearly symbolic of America’s new, hardened attitude 
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towards Soviet expansionism. Spring 1978 was thus a watershed in the Carter 
administration’s policy towards European security as it became more critical towards 
the Soviet Union and more active in its commitment to European defence. Nevertheless, 
anxieties about Carter’s leadership remained, or even deepened among the European 
allies and the British government. The question for European allies was whether the 
Carter administration was capable of dealing with European security with this new 
policy. For Callaghan, Owen and Jay, it was self-evident that Britain would need to help 
the US to avoid any further disturbance in the Alliance. However, for some officials in 
the FCO, the future of the ‘special relationship’ with the Carter administration did not 






The Guadeloupe Summit 
and the End of the Callaghan Government 
 






The ERW fiasco had exposed the Carter administration’s limited ability to lead the 
Alliance on European security just at the moment when NATO allies faced an 
increasing military threat from the East. As a result of Washington’s mishandling of 
ERW production, Carter’s personal credibility and American leadership suffered serious 
damage. Restoration of both was the urgent objective of the Carter administration, as 
was the maintenance of the integrity of the Atlantic Alliance which had obviously been 
weakened by the disputes of the first six months of 1978.  
This chapter examines how Britain’s role as mediator functioned after the ERW 
controversy had calmed down, focusing on the intra-Alliance discussions on the ‘grey 
area’ and the modernisation of theatre nuclear forces (TNF). These became the core 
issues in European security over 1978 and 1979. The grey area included all nuclear 
systems which ranged across Europe but were not included in the SALT II negotiations. 
Here was exactly the area in which the Soviets increased their military capability by the 
deployment of medium-range SS-20 nuclear missiles and the Tupolev strategic Backfire 
bombers. SALT II’s potential outcome amplified anxieties among European allies as 
this would solidify parity in intercontinental strategic nuclear weapons between the US 
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and the Soviet Union while leaving them with a nuclear imbalance. Of the allies, it had 
been West Germany’s Chancellor Helmut Schmidt who had rung the alarm about a 
crisis in the ‘Eurostrategic’ balance caused by the Carter administration’s neglect of 
grey area weaponry. Primary source-based studies on this subject have very recently 
appeared, and so far the intra-Alliance discussions on the grey area have been analysed 
in the context of the dispute between the US and West Germany, its relations with the 
quadripartite summit meeting at Guadeloupe in January 1979, and NATO’s ‘dual track 
decision’ made in December of the same year.
1
 Historians have to date not considered 
Britain’s role during the grey area discussions. This chapter concentrates first on the 
Alliance discussion on the grey area and the TNF modernisation from winter to summer 
1978. It then considers the period from September to December when the discussions 
among the Alliance’s principal allies, the US, Britain, West Germany and France, 
converged at the Guadeloupe summit. It suggests that the American and the German 
view moved closer in terms of the grey area and TNF modernisation by the time of the 
Guadeloupe summit. One effect of this new congruence was that Britain was left behind. 
In its final section, this chapter traces Britain’s defence policy after the Guadeloupe 
summit and its aftermath until spring 1979. Here, the dominant issues for London were 
the risk of isolation as the post-Guadeloupe US-FRG relationship developed.    
 
 
1. TNF Modernisation and the Grey Area 
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When the Alliance was considering the ERW issue throughout the winter and spring of 
1978, an important discussion was under way among officials in the High Level Group 
(HLG) in NATO. As described in the previous chapters, the HLG had its origin in Task 
Force 10, which was founded as the result of the agreement in the London NATO 
summit in May 1977. At the NPG meeting in October 1977 in Bari, Italy, Task Force 10 
was elevated to the ‘High Level Group’ under the chairmanship of an American official. 
By this upgrade, this working group became an important body which led the Alliance 
discussion on the future of the TNF.
2
 
Substantial discussions in the HLG started from its second meeting in Los Alamos, 
New Mexico, in February 1978. There, British, Norwegian and West German 
representatives took the initiative for an agreement on a longer range theatre nuclear 
force (LRTNF) option to avoid the ‘decoupling’ of US strategic nuclear forces. In 
contrast, the Americans preferred the option which emphasised the deployment of 
shorter range TNF which would not penetrate Soviet territory.
3
 Readman pointed out 
that this attitude reflected the Carter administration’s unpreparedness for anything other 
than the option that they preferred and, more fundamentally, that the Americans had not 
reached a single position.
4
 At the very last minute, the HLG reached a recommendation 
which stated that there was a case for modernisation and for some strengthening of the 
relatively scarce longer-range ‘in-theatre’ element although NATO possessed many 
theatre nuclear weapons. NATO defence ministers approved this recommendation on 
the deployment of LRTNF at the NPG at Frederikshavn, Denmark, in April 1978. This 
meant that the Europeans managed to overcome American reluctance towards 
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substantial TNF modernisation. Thereafter, the HLG’s work concentrated on developing 
common understanding of the strengthening of LRTNF and on its future options. These 
efforts did not seem to have American support. In fact, at the Washington NATO summit 
Carter promised a US commitment to the nuclear deterrent in Europe, but referred only 
to the idea of modernisation of nuclear weapons. His main emphasis was still on the 
reinforcement of conventional forces.
5
 Furthermore, senior officials in the White House 
and the State Department thought that Department of Defense officials went too far 
away from the current administration’s position on what Alliance needed.
6
 Thus even if 
a consensus was forged in the HLG, the prospect of the TNF modernisation was still 
bleak in spring 1978.  
It was the experience of the ERW fiasco which changed the Carter administration’s 
approach. Its already weakened credibility would be probably fatally damaged by 
further mishandling of European security. Continuation of such lukewarm attitudes 
towards the LRTNF could be a source of a further distrust among European allies. For 
this reason, following Brzezinski’s advice, Carter issued Presidential Review 
Memorandum (PRM) 38 on 22 June which directed the US government to study 
political and military aspects of possible increased LRTNF capabilities in Europe for 
strategic strikes on the Soviet Union and ‘possible inclusion in future arms control 
negotiation of long-range theatre nuclear systems’.
7
 As the previous chapter illustrated, 
British and West German officials shared a view in HLG discussions that given the lack 
of counter-attack capability against Soviet medium-range nuclear systems, it was urgent 
and necessary for the Alliance to modernise the TNF with longer range weapons. Thus, 
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they pushed reluctant American officials to accept the HLG’s recommendation. Key 
ministers in London also believed that the HLG plan was right and thus argued that 
Britain should actively commit to the discussion.
8
 These British and West German 
efforts were an important factor in converting the Carter administration to accept the 
need for a further commitment to TNF modernisation.  
However, the British and West German governments had different ideas about arms 
control in the grey area. Basically, the forthcoming SALT III talks were a US–Soviet 
bilateral negotiation. In contrast with the previous SALT and SALT II talks, it was 
highly likely that the next SALT talks would include grey area systems. As mentioned 
before, the grey area was roughly defined as all the nuclear systems in Europe not 
capable of intercontinental operation and not included in the ongoing SALT II talks. In 
other words, grey area meant all medium-range nuclear systems in Europe including the 
American forward-based systems (FBS) and Britain’s and France’s strategic nuclear 
forces on the NATO side, and the SS-20 and Backfire bomber on the Warsaw Pact side. 
The Soviets had argued that the SALT III negotiations should include the American FBS 
and nuclear weapons possessed by other NATO allies, namely the British and French 
nuclear deterrent. For this reason, the SALT III negotiations more directly affected 
European in-theatre security than any of the previous superpower talks.  
The British government thought from rather an early stage that inclusion of grey 
area systems in SALT III could disturb the European military balance. As the previous 
chapter made clear, a meeting of Whitehall Permanent Secretaries on 17 January 
decided to rewrite GEN 63’s study to reach a clear policy conclusion. The Cabinet 
Office led this revision, taking suggestions from the FCO, Treasury and MOD into 
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consideration, as well as the results of Anglo-American official level discussions on 31 
January and the NAC on 24 February. The draft revised paper stated that: 
 
It is however very doubtful whether we would succeed in imposing limitations on Soviet 
systems which would significantly reduce their capability to destroy Europe. Moreover, in 
return for any Soviet limitations, we might have to accept restraints on NATO systems 
which would seriously impair the Alliance’s military capability (including restraints on the 
UK nuclear Polaris force), might give rise to political uncertainty about the American 





For these three reasons, the paper concluded that ‘the balance of advantage for the 
United Kingdom’ was ‘the continued exclusion of grey area systems from arms control 
negotiations’. On the other hand, the report argued that all political actors were ‘in an 
evolving position, and we should not take up a wholly rigid position’.  
This redrafted paper was considered by Permanent Secretaries on 8 March. The 
discussion was complicated; it was pointed out that if Britain defined its position at this 
early stage where many uncertainties remained, it could not respond flexibly to the 
development of the future negotiations. Yet it was also argued that the paper underrated 
the seriousness of the European concerns about the Soviet IRBM/MRBM threat. The 
discussion then focused on the relations between the grey area negotiations and 
Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent in a wider context, or whether Britain should 
sacrifice its nuclear capability in order to secure a successful conclusion to SALT.
10
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However, there was a deep difference of view between the FCO and the MOD. 
Wilberforce wrote that the FCO was more flexible about the inclusion of grey area 
systems into arms control negotiations; it also urged ministers to keep doors open for 
various options in line with the American attitude. But the MOD regarded other options 
as too dangerous.
11
 The draft conclusion reflected the MOD’s view, but there was no 
real consensus. For this reason, the paper was submitted to the restricted ministerial 
meeting as Hunt’s personal minute on 15 March. Reflecting the discussion on 8 March, 
its wording was softened, but Hunt left the draft’s conclusion unchanged: ‘the balance 
of advantage for the United Kingdom may for the present lay in the continued exclusion 
of grey area systems from arms control negotiations’.
12
 On 3 April, at the restricted 
ministerial meeting, four ministers underwrote Hunt’s conclusion, but agreed that they 
should keep this decision under review in light of developing circumstances.
13
 
Callaghan publicly declared this view at the UNSSD; he said that while Britain 
understood the need to consider ways to control nuclear weapons outside SALT 
negotiations, there were problems at present in ‘the inequalities and asymmetries’.
14
 
West Germany’s view was rather different. Schmidt himself was a protagonist for 
the inclusion of the grey area into SALT III. Since his speech in London at the IISS in 
October 1977, he had repeatedly argued that while SALT had concentrated on the 
strategic balance between the US and the Soviet Union, nothing had been done on the 
nuclear balance in Europe (the ‘Eurostrategic’ balance) and the situation was being 
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exacerbated by the deployment of the SS-20s and Backfire bombers. When Callaghan 
and Schmidt met in London on 24 April, the Chancellor strongly argued his case, 
stressing that grey area systems were strategic for Europe even if not for the Americans, 
and if they were not included in arms control negotiations then the European military 
balance could shift towards the Soviet Union ‘in 10-15 years’.
15
 
The severity of such anxieties over the future of SALT negotiations led Schmidt to 
commit more directly to grey area talks with the Soviet Union. When Brezhnev visited 
Bonn in early May, soon after the Anglo-German summit, Schmidt raised the question 
of the grey area with Brezhnev. He expressed his concern about the disparities in forces 
and the build-up of tanks and medium-range missiles on the two sides of the iron curtain. 
Brezhnev’s answer was favourable: he said that ‘the Soviet Union is prepared to reduce 
all kinds of weapons by agreement between the states without damage to the security of 
the parties and on a basis of complete reciprocity’. Schmidt at least welcomed the 
Soviet leader’s remarks.
16
 His view was further clarified in a German TV interview 
soon after Brezhnev’s visit. He argued that the policy of peace should include ‘the 
essential prerequisite of a policy of equilibrium, balance between military forces’.
17
 
Schmidt’s active commitment continued. He told Warnke of his worries about the 




London was not happy with Schmidt’s attitude or that of West Germany. As Michael 
Quinlan, Deputy Secretary of the MOD, told Killick, the Germans ‘have for the present 
reached a conclusions different from our own on the basic question of whether it is in 
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the European interest to have “grey areas” in SALT III’.
19
 In addition to these 
apprehensions over the grey area, what particularly concerned the British was Schmidt’s 
new found activity on the international stage. Wilberforce pointed out that although 
Brezhnev’s response was ‘so general’ without concrete proposals, Schmidt was 
nevertheless going ahead without seeking agreement with the Americans and the British 
on the inclusion of the grey area into SALT III. He went on to say that Brezhnev’s 
reference to reciprocity was seen in London as ‘rather displeasing’.
20
 ‘Reciprocity’ 
implied the inclusion of Britain’s nuclear deterrent. Moreover, Schmidt’s concept of 
‘Eurostrategic’ balance was not supported in London. In his letter to Callaghan, Mulley 
wrote that the German anxieties about TNF disparities were psychological and political, 
and their search for parity in medium-range nuclear weapons was ‘practically 
impossible, politically divisive and militarily unnecessary’.
21
 In other words, London 
thought that Schmidt’s actions were motivated by faulty reasoning originating from 
West Germany’s domestic political situation. Moreover, they could endanger NATO 
nuclear forces. That is to say, if the ‘Eurostrategic’ balance was discussed separately 
from SALT negotiations, it would decouple theatre nuclear weapons in Europe from 
American strategic nuclear forces. This ‘decoupling’ would harm NATO’s flexible 
response strategy which was based on the triad of strategic and tactical/theatre nuclear 
weapons, and conventional forces. For these reasons Schmidt’s argument was regarded 
in London as potentially damaging to the interests of the Alliance and of Britain. 
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Moreover, officials were concerned about independent West Germany diplomacy. 
Anthony Figgis of the Defence Department wrote that he and his colleagues were rather 
surprised by the fact that Schmidt approached Brezhnev before gaining any agreement 
with the allies, particularly the US and Britain. Interestingly, he pointed out a significant 
change in West Germany’s attitude; previously the Germans had been circumspect and 
kept themselves away from decision-making by stating they were not a nuclear-weapon 
state.
22
 In addition to the dissatisfaction with Schmidt’s lack of consultation, the MOD 
was particularly discontent with the concept of ‘Eurostrategic’ balance itself. Desmond 
Bryars, Assistant Under Secretary of the MOD, criticised Schmidt by arguing that he 
seemed ‘to have a very weak grasp of the strategic as opposed to the political and 
presentational aspects of seeking to limit SS20 at this stage’. For him, the Chancellor 
seemed to argue the grey area solely from the political and psychological points of view, 
and this approach blurred his conception of the military reality. This concern enhanced 
the feeling in Whitehall that the German view would have to alter. Bryars went on to 
write that he was encouraged ‘by the apparent lack of response by the Chancellor to Mr. 
Warnke’s point that the West has insufficient bargaining chips to achieve a satisfactory 
deal at this stage’. He hoped ‘some further enlightenment might bring him rather closer 
to our own position than might have been expected’.
23
 Bryars’ comment shows that 
there was widespread anxiety in London that political and psychological motives had 
led the Germans to worry too much about the ‘Eurostrategic’ balance. Furthermore, 
Whitehall officials observed that West German behaviour was changing; the Bonn 
government had started to express its own opinion on European security more openly, 
mostly through Schmidt. British officials recognised Germany’s increasing influence 
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but feared that its position on the grey area, which the UK government did not share, 
might lead to the deterioration of the already fragile European military balance. 
The Carter administration had yet to reach a consensus on how to tackle this issue, 
but from the very beginning intra-Alliance consultation was regarded as critical to its 
decision making. On 15 May, Gelb revealed his personal thoughts to John A. Robinson, 
Minister at the British Embassy in Washington. The American said that given the 
difference of views between Britain and West Germany, it would be useful to have a 
series of working level bilateral meetings at least between the US, Britain, West 
Germany, and perhaps France, to ‘reconcile’ views. He added that he personally thought 
it was wrong to begin the negotiation on the grey area with Soviet Union before the 
Alliance had reached agreement.
24
 While the British welcomed the US proposal,
25
 they 
suspected that the Americans had not yet given serious consideration to the grey area 
problem.
26
 Clearly the Carter administration was very sensitive about not repeating its 
failure to develop Alliance consensus on ERW which was, to a large extent, created by 
lack of consultation with allies. Friction between allies over the grey area had to be 
avoided so as not to frustrate the restoration of American credibility.  
In London, Schmidt’s diplomacy prompted ministerial consideration of Britain’s 
position at the political level. Stimulated by Schmidt’s argument, Owen envisaged that 
arms control could be a bargaining card to limit Soviet medium-range weapons, telling 
Callaghan that: 
 
The Russians may be sufficiently concerned at the prospect of NATO improving its 
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long-range theatre nuclear capability […] to agree to discuss some form of arms control 
regime involving both Eastern and Western intermediate range nuclear capabilities in 
Europe. Some of Helmut Schmidt’s recent remarks suggest that the Germans are thinking 




However, Owen did find support among his colleagues. Mulley simply repeated the 
April ministerial meeting’s conclusion that: 
 
(G)iven the existing asymmetries, it is difficult to see how a “grey area” negotiation could 
help us unless we first take steps to develop and acquire the counters with which to bargain. 
[…] Although Chancellor Schmidt’s recent remarks make it necessary for us to review the 
position in conjunction with our allies, I should be most reluctant to engage in negotiations 





Mulley’s reply to Owen justified once again the decision of the April meeting that the 
grey area should be excluded from arms control negotiations. Nevertheless, Owen 
argued that this conclusion should not prevent officials from open-minded talks with 
other allies on this issue. He also suggested that the four ministers should have another 
restricted discussion as soon as the Germans had reached a conclusion.
29
 This 
Mulley-Owen dispute indicates that the MOD view was predominant in Whitehall. It 
was based on the presumption that the inclusion of the grey area into arms control 
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negotiations would limit the already weaker NATO TNF without making feasible any 
reductions on the Soviet’s overkill capability. For this reason Mulley argued for delay at 
least until NATO made its mind up on the LRTNF. 
The bilateral discussions with the US, West Germany and France were crucial to 
judge whether Britain’s attitude needed to be reviewed again. The first UK–FRG 
discussion took place on 19 June. While the British side raised their concerns, Jürgen 
Ruhfus, who led the German team, emphasised that it was necessary for the Alliance to 
analyse and consult on the grey area before the final decision was made. At the same 
time, he stressed the psychological and political importance of the increasing threat 
presented by Soviet theatre nuclear weapons, arguing that ‘there were risks that the 
Russians might one day use their nuclear predominance in Europe to blackmail the 
West’. Clear divergence of opinion existed between the British and the Germans. But 
importantly, British officials observed through these talks that despite Schmidt’s firm 
intent to support the inclusion of the grey area in SALT III, the Germans had in fact yet 
to reach a final decision.
30
 Schmidt forceful public statements about the ‘Eurostrategic’ 
imbalance did not represent widespread consensus in the West German government.    
Three days later, on 22 June, the first UK–US talks were held. The Americans 
declared at the beginning of discussions that they were open-minded about their attitude 
towards arms control, and that they had no firm position about their approach to SALT 
III. They were even sympathetic to Britain’s position, and confirmed that they were 
going to issue a unilateral statement if the Soviets pressed for inclusion of the FBS that 
‘(a)ny future limitation on US systems principally designed for theatre missions should 
be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theatre systems’. On the other 
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hand, the Americans made it clear that German attitudes were an important factor in 
their deliberations.
31
 They were as yet still undecided about the grey area but were 
seeking a policy decision and would take Germany’s final conclusion into 
consideration.  
Fortunately for the British, they learned in the Anglo-French bilateral talks held on 5 
July that French officials took a similar stance to their own. They too saw danger in 
approaching arms limitation talks by focusing solely on the limitation of Soviet 
medium-range nuclear forces separately from overall strategic balance because this 
would ultimately lead to a decoupling of the Alliance’s nuclear forces. Likewise, the 
French shared the British view that the SS-20 missile and the Backfire bomber did not 
fundamentally change the strategic military balance in Europe. They also had a same 
concern about how their own nuclear deterrent would be affected by arms control 
talks.
32
 It can be assumed that this accordance of view with the French gave the British 
government confidence in their original line on the grey area and its potentially 
damaging relationship with their own nuclear deterrent. 
During the summer of 1978, American, British, French and German officials were 
involved in intense contact to determine each others’ thoughts on the grey area. Among 
them the British had formulated their view earlier than other allies. They were very 
cautious about the inclusion of the grey area into the forthcoming SALT III negotiations 
for three reasons. First, they were not convinced that this tactic would curb the Soviets’ 
ambitious arms build-up in theatre nuclear forces. Second, they were deeply concerned 
about the risks to Britain’s own nuclear deterrent. Lastly, they thought that inclusion 
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would cast doubt on America’s commitment to European defence and this suspicion 
would shatter Alliance unity. In bilateral negotiations the British always used the first 
and third arguments to justify their judgement. However, the second was critical to their 
approach. That is why the Callaghan government stressed the disadvantages of the 
inclusion of grey area in the future SALT III discussions and tried to influence their 
allies policies as they reached their formation.  
 
 
2. The Road to Guadeloupe  
 
While bilateral discussions were taking place among the officials of the four principal 
NATO member states, the Carter administration continued its inter-agency study on the 
grey area problem throughout the summer. At first even the British were not fully 
informed about it.
33
 But at the beginning of August Gelb told Robinson at the British 
Embassy in Washington that the inter-agency study would be completed soon and the 
Americans wanted to have further bilateral meetings with Britain, France and West 
Germany. Robinson repeated Britain’s view that German concerns were ‘essentially 
psychological and political’ and might be ‘small compared with the problems which 
would arise in the same area if negotiations on Grey Area were conducted to a 
conclusion’. Gelb agreed with this, pointing out that in Washington ‘no-one at the 
highest level wanted to displease the Germans, or to stand up to them’. Gelb’s comment 
implied that the administration did not necessarily wish to tackle the grey area issue 
from a political point of view, but members ‘at the highest level’ knew that they had to 
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do so because West Germany wanted a solution. Robinson observed from Gelb’s 
comments that the reluctance to displease the Germans ‘centred on Carter himself’.
34
  
West Germany’s presence seemed to be increasing in the minds of decision makers 
in the Carter administration. From Brussels, Killick warned that if discussions on the 
grey area went slowly, Washington might listen more to the German voice. He wrote to 
Moberly of his growing concern that ‘the Germans are expressing their national views 
to the Americans while being less than open with us about what they are’. He drew 
attention to the possibility that West Germany envisaged the deployment of ‘some kind 
of counter-balancing force to SS-20/Backfire’ even if only as a ‘bargaining chip’.
35
 
Killick’s anxiety was not necessarily shared in London at this point,
36
 but it was true 
that the Bonn government’s activism doubtlessly put the West Germans centre stage in 
intra-Alliance discussions on European security. At this time, American officials told 
members of the British Embassy that the SALT II negotiations would be concluded by 
the end of the year.
37
 If so, even if the attitudes of the FRG and the US were not 
completely clear, intra-Alliance considerations on SALT III would commence before 
long and inevitably the grey area would be a subject for discussion. 
By September 1978, while the Americans were still cautious about taking a lead on 
grey area talks, the Germans formulated their own views. In bilateral talks on 14 
September, Friedrich Ruth, Assistant Under Secretary of State at the Auswärtiges Amt, 
told British officials about Bonn’s decision. It suggested that first, the SALT III 
negotiations should be expanded to US and Soviet theatre weapon systems from 
inter-continental down to those with a range of 1,000km. But negotiations should deal 
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only with US and Soviet systems; third country systems would be excluded. Secondly, 
the Alliance should have more intensive consultation on SALT. Finally, and importantly, 
Ruth added that the TNF modernisation alone could not be a card with which to bargain, 
saying that ‘the time has come to give up the compartmentation of SALT’.
38
 This meant 
the combination of TNF modernisation and arms control negotiations, or more precisely 
a unity of two approaches. Naturally this was not a choice which Britain envisaged. For 
them, TNF modernisation and arms control negotiations should not be mixed up in light 
of military considerations. In London, German thinking seemed to be too much affected 
by political and psychological concerns. For this reason, the British officials were still 
highly sceptical about German reasoning.
39
 Interestingly enough, one result was that 
Whitehall officials felt that Britain’s position and that of France were closer still.
40
 
In Washington, the inter-agency study based on PRM-38 was now completed. The 
report proposed several options to the administration, but its recommendation was the 
‘Integrated Force Deployment and Arms Control’ option, which assumed TNF 
modernisation including the LRTNF and US-Soviet arms control negotiations in 
parallel.
41
 The paper stressed that ‘(i)f the Alliance decides ultimately to make 
long-range TNF deployments, then they would have to be accompanied by a strong 
arms control effort, and that both these tracks would be guided by an integrated 
strategy’.
42
 Quite importantly, the main reason of this choice was the administration’s 
concern about the FRG’s attitude. The study indicated that the SS-20s themselves were 
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not militarily a serious threat. Rather, political handling of German concerns arising 
from the SS-20s was far more significant. It stated that the SS-20 problem catalysed and 
symbolised Germany’s long-standing anxieties, held since Carter’s inauguration, about 
the US commitment to nuclear defence. With this understanding, the report judged that 
‘(t)he political-military character of the problem rules out pure-arms control and 
pure-deployment approaches. If we decide to do one, we must do both.’
43
 For this 
reason, it argued that pure arms control would be unable to constrain Soviet TNF 
deployment and that the Alliance’s TNF deployment alone was ‘politically unacceptable 
for the Germans’ and would make East-West relations unstable. Brzezinski later recalled 
that he was ‘personally never persuaded that we needed TNF for military reasons’, but 
he was ‘persuaded reluctantly that we needed it to obtain European support for SALT’.
44
 
This decision was apparently motivated by political reasons to tame German 
apprehensions, relieve the anxieties of other European allies, and to gain support for US 
policy towards European security. 
By the end of September, the White House accepted the report’s recommendations.
45
 
This was an important change in US policy. As mentioned above, the upper reaches of 
the Carter administration had not made clear their attitude towards the HLG’s 
recommendation that the deployment of LRTNF was necessary. As a reflection of this 
point, US officials retained an open-minded stance and some key figures were even 
sympathetic with Britain’s position. Nevertheless, what is important here is that the 
decision to accept an ‘integrated strategy’ was based on political rather than military 




 Brzezinski, ‘East-West Relations: Strategic Crossroads’, Trialogue, no.30/1 (Summer/Fall 1982), p.21, 
quoted from Garthoff, Détente, p.945.  
45





 The main purpose here was to relieve European allies’ worries caused 
by the increasing threat posed by Soviet medium-range systems. Particularly important 
was to ease West Germany anxieties and suspicions about the Carter administration’s 
attitude towards European security. The administration could not be convinced of the 
allies’ full backing for SALT II unless they alleviated their apprehensions about the 
future of European security after the conclusion of SALT II. Moreover, the Carter 
administration feared that West Germany’s concerns would extend to the other 
European allies and render the Alliance, and also East-West relations, unstable. It is 
notable that there was a view in the administration that West Germany saw ‘a need for 
arms control as at least a “cover”, if not a complement NATO deployment’.
47
 In other 
words, the administration assumed that while the Chancellor wanted TNF 
modernisation at heart, he was forced to place emphasis on arms control because of the 
anti-TNF mood in his country. However, the Americans underestimated Schmidt’s 
strong hopes for stability in Europe; as this chapter will reveal, this issue became a 
source of dispute between Carter and Schmidt in Guadeloupe in January 1979.    
Formally, the Americans kept saying they were open-minded about Alliance 
consultations. But the Carter administration began to approach Britain and West 
Germany based on its new policy. On 5 October, the second UK-US bilateral meeting 
took place in Washington. The long discussion revolved around the ‘integrated strategy’. 
There was general consensus on the necessity of TNF modernisation, but views clashed 
on its relation to arms control. Moberly restated the British view saying that ‘arms 
control could not solve everything by itself, nor at present could we see a favourable 
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outcome from an arms control negotiation’.
48
 UK and US officials differed on the 
question of when arms control negotiations should start. While the Americans argued 
that they should be done in parallel with TNF modernisation, the British thought that 
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At this point, the White House also began to take the initiative on top-level Alliance 
consultations. On 21 September, Brzezinski told Jay that he was planning to visit Britain, 
France and West Germany at the beginning of October and wished to see Callaghan in 
private to talk about problems on East-West relations.
49
 As Callaghan would be at the 
Labour Party Conference in Blackpool during Brzezinski’s planned arrival in London, 
the American agreed to fly to Blackpool to see the prime minister on 4 October. The 
purpose and significance of Brzezinski’s visit became clear in the meeting. He told 
Callaghan that Carter was determined not to repeat the disputes over the Multilateral 
Force (MLF) in the sixties ‘in which the US had prepared a complex and sophisticated 
response to a perceived strategic problem only to have it rejected by the Europeans’. 
Nor did he want to repeat the ERW fiasco ‘which had suffered from totally inadequate 
Alliance consultation and even more from bad public relations work’. For this reason, 
Brzezinski continued, Carter wished to initiate serious discussions on the grey area at 
the ‘highest political level’ on three aspects: the nature of the problem, the response 
which it required, and the relationship between this response and arms control policy.
50
  
Brzezinski’s continued his analysis by describing the origin of the problem in 
European fears about the decoupling of the US nuclear deterrent and the perception of 
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the ‘European strategic balance’. Resolution would come in an exchange of views at the 
highest political level ‘which would give proper emphasis to the political as well as to 
the strategic dimension of the problem’. With this assumption, Brzezinski implied 
possible responses such as the deployment of GLCMs in Europe and the upgrading of 
the Alliance’s IRBM/MRBM – the Pershing missile – by extending its range. He then 
referred to the implications of TNF modernisation for arms control negotiations. He told 
Callaghan that in SALT III the Americans would have to discuss tactical nuclear 
weapons with the Russians. The question was whether this issue should be raised before 
or after the deployment of these new nuclear weapon systems. He added that ‘(t)his 
would be an important political issue’. 
Brzezinski repeated this importance of an informal quadripartite meeting to Jay on 
26 October. He added that preparations should be carried out within ‘White House 
channels’ under the direct supervision of the heads of governments concerned. Yet he 
stressed that although Carter thought that such a meeting would be very useful, he did 
not want to be regarded as a protagonist of it and preferred that the Europeans to take a 
lead.
51
 Carter remained cautious about appearing as the leader of a quadripartite summit 
meeting which dealt with nuclear issues and arms control problems. This secrecy could 
be understood in the context of SALT II negotiations. If Carter invited the major 
European leaders to discuss European security when the SALT II negotiations reached 
their final stages, it would doubtlessly provoke the Soviets and risk delay in the talks 
once again.  
In London, ahead of the imminent UK–FRG summit where these topics would 
inevitably arise, No.10 asked officials for advice on how to handle Brzezinski’s 
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 Consequently, on 10 October, arms control experts in the Cabinet Office, 
the FCO and the MOD met.
53
 They generally supported the prospect of a quadripartite 
meeting, but did not like the idea of an ‘integrated strategy’. This position was 
predictable given officials’ attitudes over the past six months since GEN63’s conclusion 
was approved by the restricted ministerial meeting on 3 April. It was pointed out in the 
meeting that the Americans ‘saw TNF modernisation as a possible response to the 
political problems and were moving towards an integrated strategy for dealing with 
strategic requirements and arms control policies’. Officials nevertheless added that ‘we 
should avoid a situation in which political problems of perception overshadowed the 
real strategic problems’. For this reason, they argued that Callaghan should try to 
persuade Schmidt in the forthcoming bilateral meeting that political issues were 
‘secondary problems’. In addition, it was hoped that France would be involved in 
studies on the grey area as the French position mirrored that of the British. France could 
be a ‘useful ally’ to press Britain’s line on the US and West Germany as well as to resist 
any proposal for the inclusion of the national independent nuclear deterrent into SALT 
III. Thus the British needed to think about how to secure Giscard’s participation as 
France had been reluctant to participate in NATO multinational discussions. With these 
thoughts in mind, the meeting concluded that Callaghan should remind Schmidt that no 
decisions should be taken on grey area issues at least until TNF modernisation was 
completed. Moreover, the prime minister needed to confer with the Chancellor about 
how to involve the French president in quadripartite discussions.
54
 
When Callaghan met Schmidt in Bonn on 19 October, the greater part of their 
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conversation focussed on the grey area debate. It was an important occasion to reveal 
what Schmidt himself thought about the ‘Eurostrategic’ balance. Schmidt talked at 
length about his understanding of the problem. He was not at all happy with current 
SALT II negotiations; strategic thinking in Britain and France tended to be prejudiced 
because of their nuclear deterrents; Nixon and Kissinger had made a ‘strategic error’ by 
launching SALT and excluding medium-range weapons which were ‘strategic’ across a 
‘vast area of Europe’. What was worse for the Germans was that the Carter 
administration ‘compounded the Nixon/Kissinger error by excluding from the 
negotiations bombers of less than inter-continental range’. Schmidt’s criticism 
continued. Since Germany did not possess nuclear weapons, its strategic thinking was 
different from that of Britain and France as well as the US. Moreover, West Germany 
was more vulnerable to nuclear threat. But the US administration did not recognise this 
fact sufficiently. The Americans were thinking of increasing the range of Pershing 
missiles but such a move offered ‘no solution to the problem’. What Schmidt wanted 




Nevertheless, in contrast with his previous statements, the Chancellor did not seem 
to hold a firm view on solutions to these problems. When Callaghan asked why he 
wanted to include the grey area in SALT III, he stressed that he was not sure if he 
wished to press for it even if he was convinced that this should be discussed by the 
Western countries. Schmidt added that ‘the question to tackle was that of what 
bargaining chips the West could set against the Soviet grey area systems’. He admitted 
that it could be an option for the West to produce and deploy grey area weapons and 
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then offer to stop in return for a reduction in equivalent weapons on the Soviet side, but 




In response, Callaghan simply repeated Britain’s view that it was in the same 
situation in terms of the threat of theatre nuclear weapons, but that Soviet superiority in 
grey area systems was too enormous to make them a bargaining chip in arms control 
negotiation.
57
 In the end, Callaghan was unable to persuade Schmidt to change his 
position on grey area problems. But Schmidt’s eloquence at least gave the British a clue 
as to what exactly he thought about the issues, which would help Britain’s final policy 
decision. In addition, the meeting revealed that both Callaghan and Schmidt were in 
favour of a four-power summit meeting. They agreed that for the subsequent summit 
meeting the officials of both countries should jointly define the range of grey area 
systems and assess the balance between East and West.
58
 British policymakers regarded 
this German attitude as a sign of ‘the relative flexibility and open-mindness’ compared 
with Schmidt’s lecture at the IISS the previous year. From Bonn, Bullard told Moberly 
that ‘the effort that you and others have put into explaining the problems of any 
negotiations has clearly had a powerful effect’.
59
 
Meantime, regardless of Britain’s scepticism, the Americans reached their own view. 
In a meeting in Brussels on 18 October, the US Secretary of Defense Brown pointed out 
to Mulley that the US no longer had the advantage in strategic weapons, and this new 
situation caused ‘military and psychological problems’. Thus, he continued, the Alliance 
should have ‘firm plans […] for deploying medium-range nuclear weapons’ before the 
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arms control negotiation began. On this point UK and US positions were more or less 
same. But Mulley opposed the start of arms control negotiations triggered by a 
psychological rationale, and confessed that the British felt that ‘American thinking was 
moving towards the German position’. Brown parried by stressing that what was 
important was the ability of the Alliance ‘to demonstrate its political will by [a] step by 
step process of escalation up to an exchange of central nuclear systems. To maintain this 
step by step approach, we should have credible long range systems in Europe’.
60
 
Clearly, the Carter administration was no longer opposed to TNF modernisation. 
Furthermore, on the following day, the West German Defence Minister Hans Apel 
told Mulley that if ‘the West had nothing with which to negotiate, it was necessary to 
create new European-based capabilities’. He then added that ‘(i)t was essential for 
Britain, the United States and Germany to consider the political aspects of this matter 
before specific decisions were taken’.
61
 Although Schmidt showed some flexibility in 
his thinking on the grey area, the Germans still clearly preferred the termination of 
‘compartmentation’. On the other hand, in the second UK-French bilateral meeting on 3 
November, French officials repeated their earlier concerns. But they made it clear once 
again that they were not going to be involved in NATO’s TNF modernisation even if 
they acknowledged the HLG’s conclusion.
62
 In this situation, President Giscard’s 
attendance at the quadripartite summit was essential to strengthen Callaghan’s position 
in the discussion, even if the French were not going to be involved in the intra-Alliance 
talks.  
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These meetings showed that the four countries were at least in agreement about the 
necessity of TNF modernisation. But in terms of its link with arms control, or the 
inclusion of grey area systems in SALT III negotiations, while the US and West 
Germany wanted the ‘integrated strategy’, Britain was still reluctant, if not opposed, to 
it. Apart from this concern, the British already knew that the French view was closer to 
theirs but it was not clear whether Giscard would accept Carter’s proposal. Brzezinski 
told Jay that Francois-Poncet, Secretary General of the Elysee, thought that if a French 
island was chosen as the venue for the meeting, the situation might be eased.
63
 
Ultimately, the choice of Guadeloupe was regarded as an important factor to lure 
Giscard to the summit meeting. 
In the Callaghan government, Owen was stimulated by the American proposal and 
started arguing for a re-evaluation of the April 3rd approach to arms control negotiations. 
The foreign secretary envisaged using the development of cruise missiles and other 
medium-range systems as negotiating leverage to limit equivalent Soviet systems.
64
 
This was close to the strategy which the US and the FRG were arguing. Bearing these 
considerations in mind, Callaghan held a restricted ministerial meeting at the Prime 
Minister’s Office on 17 November for the first time since April. He said that it was now 
necessary to study this problem in the context of the relations between the US and 
Europe as well as between NATO and the Soviet Union. Importantly, Callaghan added 
that TNF modernisation and the arms control negotiations were ‘two sides of the same 
coin’. Nevertheless, it was argued that as long as the current military balance was 
maintained in Europe, based on the linkage between strategic and tactical nuclear 
weapons and conventional forces, there was little likelihood of aggression. This 
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assumption apparently rested on the consideration in the British government that the 
deployment of SS-20s and Backfire bombers did not make any major qualitative change 
to the Soviet military threat.
65
 Regardless of this estimation, Britain’s nuclear deterrent, 
and that of France, remained highly significant in East-West politics: 
    
The uncertainty the aggressor had to face was increased by the possibility that the United 
Kingdom or France might use their nuclear forces. This gave added strength to the 
Alliance’s deterrent strategy. Leading Americans had in the past been divided about the 
value of the United Kingdom’s and French nuclear forces […] But an independent United 
Kingdom nuclear force had definite advantages both for us and for the Alliance as a whole. 





For this reason, it was argued that the inclusion of grey area systems would be 
dangerous as it would bring ‘decoupling’ through a separate discussion on the 
‘Eurostrategic’ balance. In principle, that discussion troubled the British as it was likely 
to affect adversely their country’s independent nuclear deterrent. It was pointed out that 
although the Americans were floating the idea that once the Alliance decided on the 
TNF requirement they should require the limitation of Soviet theatre nuclear forces, it 
was ‘questionable whether a bargain could be struck on this basis’. Nevertheless, 
probably because of Owen’s request in the same meeting, the development of cruise 
missiles was discussed. As mentioned before, cruise missiles were important for the 
British as they were regarded, particularly by the Foreign Secretary, as an option for the 
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next generation nuclear deterrent after the Polaris force. In this context, there were 
increasing suspicions about the Carter administration’s handling of SALT II 
negotiations. It was pointed out that it was a ‘gross error’ of the Americans that they had 
decided to include cruise missiles in the SALT II Protocol without sufficient 
intra-Alliance consultations. The record of meeting reveals clear dissatisfaction among 
the ministers about the credibility of the US administration and its skill to negotiate a 
crucial issue of European security:     
 
(T)his decision and other developments in the course of the SALT II negotiations had cast 
doubt on the extent to which we could rely on being consulted adequately in advance by 
the Americans on matters which affected Alliance interests. For this reason we should not 
support the idea of grey area systems being discussed between the United States and the 




Given political and practical reasons, it was suggested that deployment of GLCMs in 
Britain was not probable, but there was a ‘strong case’ for SLCMs as a possible option 
for the post-Polaris nuclear deterrent.
68
 A final decision on these matters was not 
reached by ministers in their meeting; that was postponed because Callaghan wanted to 
know of the results of the study by officials on the future of Britain’s nuclear deterrent. 
While the US and West Germany revised their views, the British were still cautious 
about departing from their earlier conclusion. This fact indicates that priority for key 
British ministers was the future of Britain’s nuclear deterrent rather than the problems 
thrown up by TNF modernisation and grey area systems. As will be seen later in this 







chapter, the replacement of the Polaris force became the central issue of discussion in 
the government on Britain’s defence policy. 
As the British postponed a final decision on their view of the form of SALT III, the 
Americans continued with their initiatives. The Alliance discussed the issue for the first 
time in the NAC on 20 November. The French decided not to take since they did not 
wish to be involved in the discussion on TNF modernisation. W. Tapley Bennet, the US 
Permanent Representative, reiterated that the Alliance should be prepared for TNF 
issues ‘which were likely to arise in SALT III’ and proposed further discussions early 
the following year. Pauls, the German Permanent Representative, said favourably that 
dual consultations would add ‘a new dimension to the SALT consultations’. His 
Auswärtiges Amt colleague, Ruth, then proposed the establishment of ‘an analytical 
study of the overall East/West nuclear balance comprising all significant systems and 
which would illustrate the essential linkage between the various elements’. This would, 
he continued, complement the TNF modernisation and be consistent with ‘the spirit of 
Harmel Report’, the 1967 seminal NATO document. Furthermore, he added that this 
would show the public that the Alliance approached defence improvement and arms 
control ‘in an integrated manner’.
69
  
The British remained cautious. Speaking for the Callaghan government, Moberly 
repeated its doubt that inclusion of the grey area in SALT III held any advantages. 
Likewise he was sceptical about whether the Alliance could reach a firm position on 
possible arms control options before having a clearer idea on TNF modernisation in the 
light of the HLG. However, Moberly’s view was in the minority in the permanent 
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representatives’ discussions. Except for the Dutch delegate, all other allies supported the 
‘integrated strategy’ which Bennet had suggested. Paul C. H. Holmer, Minister at the 
UKREP, wrote to London that the discussion was ‘an important first step’.
70
 
Intra-Alliance discussions had started to move forwards and, due its indecision, Britain 
was being left behind.    
Although the French made it clear that they were not going to involve themselves in 
Alliance cooperation in the LRTNF or arms control negotiations, it was still critical for 
the British to persuade Giscard in the November annual Anglo-French meeting to accept 
Carter’s idea of summit meeting. On 24 November Callaghan arrived in Paris and 
observed that regardless of what French officials had been saying, Giscard himself had 
not made up his mind on grey area systems or the future deployment of cruise missiles 
in Europe. Callaghan thought that Britain was ‘considerably in advance’ of the French 
on these matters.
71
 Apart from the grey area problem, Giscard accepted Carter’s idea of 
a quadripartite summit and confirmed that he was willing to host it in Martinique. From 
the beginning, a venue in a French territory in the Caribbean Sea was assumed, but in 
the end it was changed from Martinique to Guadeloupe, as the latter was less accessible 
to prevent press speculation more effectively.
72
  
Now the attitudes of the US, West Germany and France were almost clear. Most of 
the allies had showed their support for the Carter administration’s integrated approach. 
Britain’s contrary approach had not, however, gained significant followers. How did the 
Labour government and Callaghan himself respond to this situation?  
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3. The Guadeloupe Summit and the End of the Callaghan Government 
 
On 4 January, the four leaders gathered on the French island of Guadeloupe. The details 
of the quadripartite meetings have to some extent already been revealed by the memoirs 
of the participants.
73
 Readman has pointed out that German documents on the meetings 
were reliable and detailed in comparison with these sources.
74
 Yet, the records in 
British documents are generally consistent with these German materials and depict the 
Guadeloupe discussion vividly. This final section of the chapter reconstructs the 
meeting by referring to British and German primary sources.  
There were three meetings on 5 and 6 January and the main topics of discussion 
were politico-military problems (economic issues were excluded from the agenda as 
they would be discussed in the Tokyo economic summit later in the year). Needless to 
say, SALT and the grey area were the core subjects of debate. On SALT II, there was 
consensus among European leaders to offer Carter their support towards its ratification. 
Carter told Callaghan, Giscard and Schmidt that after resolving the outstanding SALT 
issues, a final US-Soviet summit meeting would take place at the end of February. 
Consequently, time was extremely short. After hearing this, Callaghan said that 
Brezhnev’s successor should come to power ‘against a reassuring rather than a 
threatening international background’. For this reason Callaghan argued that Giscard, 
Schmidt and himself should support the ratification of SALT II ‘whatever private 
reservations they might have’. Schmidt accepted this proposal, despite his doubts, and 
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Giscard followed him. Cater was delighted saying that it was ‘worth his while to come 
to Guadeloupe solely to hear’ what Callaghan had said.
75
 
Nevertheless, this accord did not last long. Callaghan wrote in his memoirs that ‘(i)f 
President Carter had hoped that the three European leaders would arrive in Guadeloupe 
with a clear position and a united voice he was soon disillusioned’.
76
 At the second 
session held in the afternoon on 5 January, stark divergence emerged on SALT III and 
the grey area. Here was when Carter put the American proposal: the US would deploy 
LRTNF (Pershing II and GLCMs) to Europe to gain the necessary leverage to negotiate 
on the SS-20 with the Soviets. But, he added, if the Europeans wanted negotiations on 
the SS-20 they should accept deployments on their territory.
77
 This attitude clearly 
derived from a lesson Carter had learnt during the ERW fiasco. Back then, he had failed 
to get prior confirmation on his proposals from European allies. This time, it would be 
different. 
Callaghan immediately provided his support. This was, in fact, a significant change 
of the British policy which had been in place since spring 1978. The prime minister said 
that Britain had been reluctant to see the inclusion of grey area systems in arms control 
negotiations, but since the SS-20s were capable of destroying London and other 
European cities, they were ‘as much strategic as [those missiles] targeted on the US’. 
Giscard remained reserved but argued that early agreement on the grey area would bring 
a decoupling and unbalancing effect. Thus, he was against Carter’s idea unless the 
Alliance developed something which could be a negotiating card on the SS-20s. 
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However, he added that it was a matter for NATO members rather than France which 
had its own capability to develop GLCMs. In addition, he made it clear that in any case 
French nuclear forces were not included in SALT III. Giscard’s declaration was entirely 
predictable given France’s long-standing nuclear defence policy. However, as long as 
Giscard kept this line he could not commit to the discussion on NATO’s 
countermeasures against the SS-20s. As Callaghan and Giscard had showed their hands, 
all rested on Schmidt’s response and thus there was a real hardball discussion between 
him and Carter. The Chancellor was rather pessimistic. While he emphasised the 
importance of parity, he criticised US administrations since Nixon for their acceptance 
of the exclusion of SS-20s in SALT II; he pointed out that with the predominance of the 
Soviet SS-20s Germany was most likely to be the only battlefield under NATO’s current 
flexible response strategy. Based upon this dismal prospect, Schmidt made it clear that 
West Germany would support the deployment of the LRTNF on German soil only if at 
least one more NATO country did the same.
78
  
With such divergence among his European allies, Carter confessed that he was 
‘disturbed’. His confusion was increased when Giscard suddenly proposed the exclusion 
of grey area systems from SALT III. Carter then told his fellow leaders that although the 
Europeans had crucial interests in SALT III, he had not got ‘any clear message from the 
meeting as to what [they] wanted’. Since he was to meet Brezhnev at the end of 
February he needed an immediate conclusion. That was vital not only to the success of 
the SALT negotiation, but also more importantly to his image as the leader of the 
Alliance. The memory of the ERW fiasco cast a long shadow over the president’s 
outlook. Carter told Callaghan, Giscard and Schmidt that he was unwilling to spend the 





US budget on Pershing II ‘in the hope that someone would agree to its deployment’.
79
 
Consequently, he wanted confirmation from the European leaders of their actual 
commitment to this new weapon system. As the previous chapter explained, Carter had 
decided to defer development of ERW because he thought there was no wholehearted 
support for it in Europe.
80
 At Guadeloupe, the firmness of his attitude reflected his 
determination that he was not going to repeat the same experience again. The onus now 
rested on European shoulders. 
At this point Callaghan suggested a compromise. He proposed that the grey area 
question should be approached in the following way; when Carter and Brezhnev met at 
the end of February, Carter should inform Brezhnev of his concern about the increasing 
number of SS-20 missiles. His aim should be to raise this question in an entirely 
non-committal way to suggest negotiations on the modernised FBS in Europe and the 
SS-20s while leaving the option open of their inclusion within the SALT III framework. 
If Brezhnev responded favourably, the Alliance would consider this problem further, 
including the deployment of GLCMs as a bargaining card.
81
  
The first day of the Guadeloupe talks ended up at this point. What Carter proposed 
on the next day was largely based on the British prime minister’s idea. He told the three 
European leaders that he would make it clear that ‘any discussion of US forward base 
systems would have to be on the basis of their probabl[e] modernisation, rather than the 
status quo, and he would take care not to jeopardise any European interests or agree at 
this stage to the inclusion of any European-owned weapons in the negotiation’. The 
president’s formula had thus carefully included what the European leaders had 
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Carter wrote in his diary that the discussion was inconclusive.
83
 Callaghan also 
recalled in his memoirs that the four leaders did not reach an agreement on grey area 
problems.
84
 However, as Readman and Nuti have pointed out, the meeting marked a 
significant political step which shaped the embryo of NATO’s dual track decision which 
was taken in December of the same year.
85
 The four leaders did not reach consensus, 
but at least they agreed to proceed with the deployment of LRTNF and the negotiation 
of grey area systems in parallel. As such, the Guadeloupe summit was important in that 
it also exposed Britain’s stance on the grey area. Callaghan gave Carter his consistent 
support from the beginning of the summit. When Carter faced opposition from Schmidt 
and Giscard, Callaghan mediated between them, particularly between Carter and 
Schmidt, and brought that sharp dispute to a conclusion. In this process, Callaghan’s 
attitude towards Schmidt’s reluctance on the deployment of LRTNF on the German soil 
was noticeable. Considering the difference of understanding between Carter and 
Schmidt on stability in Europe, this difference in opinion was rather inevitable. As the 
PRM-38 study had indicated, the Carter administration thought that Germany’s wish for 
arms control was just a ‘cover’ for its interest in TNF modernisation. As a consequence, 
from Carter’s perspective, Schmidt should accept his new offer wholeheartedly to ease 
political and psychological worries in Germany. While for Schmidt, the security of his 
country was as important as the TNF modernisation. He explained the reason for his 
approach in his memoirs: the only bargaining chip for the Alliance was to declare the 
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possible deployment of intermediate range missiles. The Soviet Union would, in the 
meantime, deploy a propaganda campaign with West Germany as its most likely 
principal target. Therefore, he thought that other allies should be ready to deploy the 
new American missiles on their soil in case Germany could not accept them.
86
 It was 
important that West Germany and the SPD, Schmidt’s own party, were already severely 
divided on nuclear issues over this period.
87
 In this sense, nuclear deployment burden 
sharing would assist Schmidt by alleviating criticism from opponents in Germany. Thus, 
to secure stability in European security and in his country, there was no room for 
compromise. The German Chancellor’s stance was thus inflexible and necessarily so 
from his point of view. To Callaghan, however, it made Schmidt’s position ‘the most 
illogical’ in the discussions on SALT III and the grey area.
88
 Clearly he did not share 
Schmidt’s concern and instead shared Carter’s view. This fact explains why Callaghan 
gave Carter the support required to achieve progress at Guadeloupe on the SALT II 
agreement and the ‘integrated strategy’. His intervention in favour of the United States, 
and as an arbiter between it and Germany, pulled the Guadeloupe summit back from the 
brink of breakdown. 
However, it is striking that Callaghan’s initial thoughts on the grey area and arms 
control were not the same as those of the Carter administration, particularly on its 
proposals for an ‘integrated strategy’. Nevertheless, Callaghan followed Carter’s line in 
the Guadeloupe meetings. Considering Britain’s previous policy approach, this was a 
significant change. Since April, the British government’s line was simply defined as 
‘TNF modernisation first, arms control second’. There was no opposition to arms 
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control itself but there was towards running it in parallel with TNF modernisation. 
Callaghan’s memoirs offer the following explanation for his change of mind: 
 
[The exclusion of grey area] remained our official position, but new systems had been 
developed by the Soviets and the SS20 could devastate London as readily as Bonn, 
Hamburg or Paris. I was personally beginning to modify my thinking and was ready to 
have the Cabinet Defence Committee examine a proposition that the whole range of 
weapons on the Western side, including both strategic and Grey Areas, should be brought 




Accordingly, during the Guadeloupe discussions, Callaghan came to the conclusion that 
the grey area was a strategic problem. However, his recollections did not explain why 
he changed his mind at this point, or why the advantages of grey area inclusion 
exceeded the disadvantages. In the records of two restricted ministerial meetings, which 
took place immediately before the Guadeloupe summit, there was no sign that the four 
ministers discussed modification of their decision.
90
 It nevertheless seems that 
Callaghan and Owen had agreed on this modification before the prime minister left for 
Guadeloupe and that this important change was theirs.
91
 
There are several possible reasons for these developments. The first is that by this 
time British ministers had begun to think that the military problem caused by inclusion 
could be overcome. Immediately before the first briefing for the four ministers held on 
21 December, as the result of the Vance-Gromyko talks in Vienna, the Carter 
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administration assured the British that SALT II would not include the no-circumvention 
provision of the US nuclear technology and they would refuse any interpretation by the 
Soviets that the UK deterrent would be included in the forthcoming SALT III.
92
 
Furthermore, given the NATO Council discussion on 20 November, it was likely that 
the deployment of the LRTNF to Europe would be approved by the Alliance. However, 
at that point, the Alliance had yet to have a clear view on TNF modernisation, which 
should be the basis of the arms control negotiation. Thus, according to the logic which 
they had repeatedly explained to the major allies, the balance of advantage would still 
lay in the continuing exclusion of grey area systems from SALT III negotiations. 
Secondly, the British were alive to the political risk of isolation in intra-Alliance 
talks. As described above, the US and West Germany had reached a similar conclusion 
on the inclusion of the grey area into arms control negotiations.
93
 In addition, at the 
NATO Council on 20 November, most of the allies supported the ‘integrated strategy’. 
As a consequence, if Britain remained opposed to what was now a majority view, it 
would be isolated and left behind. To maintain its influence in Alliance consultation, it 
was necessary at least to accept in principle the logic of the ‘integrated strategy’. This 
possible explanation for why Owen’s idea was finally accepted by his fellow ministers 
is likely, but it does not account fully for why the change in Britain’s position occurred 
at the point that it did. 
Thirdly, then, in the absence of definitive evidence, it must be assumed that the 
factor which weighed heavy on Callaghan’s mind as he considered what to do at 
Guadeloupe was the future of Britain’s nuclear deterrent. As was seen in Chapter Three, 
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Owen recalled that the main issue in British defence policy at this time was the 
replacement of the Polaris force. In comparison, the SS-20 issue was not ‘something 
about which British Ministers felt passionately’.
94
 In fact no decision on the successor 
system to the Polaris force was needed in the lifetime of the present Parliament, but it 
remained the main agenda item in ministerial meetings towards the end of 1977 and into 
1978. During this period, the officials group, set up as the result of the decision in the 
restricted ministerial meeting on 1 December 1977, had produces studies on this 
important problem. In the middle of December, just immediately before the first 
meeting, a major part of the report reached Callaghan with six months delay. It pointed 
out the advantages of the maintenance of Britain’s nuclear deterrent. The dominant 
point was that while the British deterrent was smaller than those of the superpowers, 
because of its independent capability the Soviet Union could not rule out the possibility 
of nuclear retaliation by the UK after a pre-emptive nuclear strike ‘This is sufficient for 
deterrence’, the report argued. In addition, it stated that in a future era when the US 
nuclear umbrella over Europe was less credible, it would be all the more important to 
show that not all deterrence was in the hands of the US president. Thus the British and 
French nuclear deterrents could be the ‘nucleus of an alternative European deterrent’ 
and would consequently deter ‘the risk that Germany might seek to develop an 
independent nuclear weapons capability’. Additionally, maintenance of deterrence 
capability would give Britain political impact, as the report said:  
 
Our possession of nuclear weapons gives us a standing in world affairs which we would not 
otherwise have. It gives the United Kingdom a special place in the Alliance as the only 
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NWS [Nuclear Weapon State] besides the United States which contributes nuclear forces to 
the military organisation. Through our close association and shared experience and interests 
with the United States in this vital area, we have access to and the opportunity to influence 
American thinking on defence and arms control policy, and this association also helps to 
forge links on a wider range of international topics. […] The abandonment of our nuclear 




The officials’ report continued to say that this status was particularly meaningful in 
relation to France and West Germany since Britain had ‘lagged behind them in other 
indicators of prestige’. Abandonment of a British deterrent would leave France alone as 
the nuclear state in Europe and consequently ‘reduce [UK] influence over the evolution 
of defence relations within Europe and between European members of the Alliance and 
the United States’.
96
 Reflecting this judgement, in the first ministerial meeting on 21 
December 1978 there was a general agreement on the maintenance of this status as a 
‘stabilising factor’ in Europe in relation to France and West Germany.
97
  
However, the problem for Callaghan was how the maintenance of the deterrent 
could be achieved. It was not his government’s choice to do everything on its own under 
the severe budgetary limitation. There were three options: collaboration with the US, or 
with France, or the adoption of cruise missiles. These prospects were discussed in the 
second ministerial meeting held on 2 January 1979, just prior to Guadeloupe, and the 
main focus of discussion was the support of the US for the acquisition of their Trident 
C4 SLBM. It was argued that Guadeloupe was the ‘ideal opportunity’ for Callaghan to 
                                                 
95
 TNA/PREM16/1977, Factors Relating to Further Consideration of the Future of the United Kingdom 








raise the issue with Carter and that there would be a possible interconnection between 
Britain’s support on SALT and the Carter’s attitude as follows: 
    
He [Carter] needed expressions of support from his European allies […]. President Carter 
might well conclude that Britain was his best friend and staunchest ally on this issue. 
Although we had some criticism of the way in which the Americans had handled 
consultations with their allies during SALT II, we had been generally constant in our 
support for the negotiations and the importance of retaining this support would not be lost 
on the President. We were likely to get a better opportunity of sounding out whether, and in 





With this assumption in mind, ministers agreed that Callaghan should raise with Carter 
the UK’s nuclear deterrent issue ‘privately and without commitment’ at Guadeloupe, 
and if the president responded favourably, the prime minister should work it out with 
him. Callaghan himself favoured the Trident option; the alternate – the cruise missile 
option which Owen had pushed as a ‘cheaper minimum deterrent’ – was dismissed in 
the end.
99
 Thus, immediately before the Guadeloupe summit, although the final 
decision was to be taken by the end of 1979, the Trident C4 SLBM became the most 
feasible option for Britain’s post-Polaris nuclear deterrent. Importantly, its supply was 
dependent on Carter’s goodwill. Thus while the British were not happy with Carter’s 
policy towards European security, and had reservation about his ‘integrated strategy’, 
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they needed to offer the US president assistance if they wanted a favourable reply from 
the US government on its continued assistance with Britain’s nuclear deterrent and with 
Trident in particular. Callaghan’s support at Guadeloupe could offer exactly what Carter 
wanted to contain criticisms in Europe as well as in the US against his SALT II policy. 
That support, in British eyes, was to be a quid-pro-quo for Carter’s cooperative attitude 
towards the American offer of Trident. In the private meeting with Carter at Guadeloupe 
on 5 January, Carter showed his apparent willingness to offer the British the MIRVed 
Trident C4. He was more sympathetic towards the problems in Britain’s nuclear 
deterrent than the four ministers had thought in the restricted ministerial meetings 
before Guadeloupe.
100
 No doubt the deal was assisted by Callaghan’s, and Britain’s, 
consistent support for Carter and also by the prime minister’s long-standing Atlanticist 
convictions. 
Callaghan gave his report on the Guadeloupe summit to Cabinet on 11 January. He 
said that it was necessary to include the Alliance’s grey area systems in arms control 
negotiations to secure the limitations on Soviet medium-range nuclear systems. He 
repeated his criticisms of Schmidt, saying that he ‘had been at his most illogical’ in the 
discussion, but argued that it was necessary to help the FRG feel secure.
101
 In the 
Cabinet where ministers from the left wing of the party were present, this emphasis on 
Schmidt’s ‘illogical’ attitude and the need to assist Germany was intended to justify 
Callaghan’s conclusion.
102
 His statement in the House of Commons on 16 January 
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reaffirmed the importance of accounting for West Germany’s anxieties which would: 
    
[I]nfluence our consideration of the way in which we negotiate in the next round of arms 
limitations, because the fact that the Soviet Union has this large advantage in what are 
called ‘grey areas’, as distinct from the artificial and nominal strategic situation, must be of 




In-depth discussion took place on 19 January in a restricted ministerial meeting.
104
 
Naturally, the new position was favoured by Owen, but Healey and Mulley were still 
against it.
105
 They had recognised in the previous meeting of 2 January that Britain’s 
support for SALT II could be a quid-pro-quo for Carter’s goodwill on an American offer 
of Trident, but the price of British support for the ‘integrated strategy’ was considered 
too high. On 19
th
, Callaghan explained his own change of mind. Given uncertainty 
about US attitudes towards future arms control, he admitted that there might be ‘logic’ 
in the case ‘for bringing the British nuclear forces into SALT III if Soviet medium range 
systems were to be brought in’. He added that Carter would say that he would be 
prepared to include US FBS systems only and that British and French nuclear forces 
would not be involved. In addition, it was argued that an early decision was not 
necessary since it would take at least six months until Congress ratified, while NATO 
discussions were still underway in the HLG. With these arguments, Healey and Mulley 
were silenced. The main reason was that they both knew how critical it was for 
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Callaghan to be able to gain a favourable response from Carter on a future offer of 
Trident. Britain’s participation was also regarded as beneficial in light of its influence 
on decision-making and inner-party politics. On the latter it was pointed out that ‘our 




But very careful handling of the issue was necessary. The British did not wish to be 
regarded as representing alone the Europeans in grey area negotiations; if the Fernch 
were detached, then German participation was crucial to divert criticisms that would 
inevitably arise. In addition, there was another consideration: 
 
If the French and Germans both stayed out, there would be a risk that our participation 
alongside the United States would be seen as implying an Anglo-Saxon line-up against the 
Europeans. This would have the effect of reinforcing the tendency towards closer 
Franco-German co-operation, which was already a worrying trend. The danger would be 





For this reason, the Callaghan government had to discern more precisely Schmidt’s 
thinking before taking action. Such diplomatic sensitivity indicates that given the 
‘political imperative’, particularly of the Germans, Britain was ‘keen to take part in the 
search for an effective arms control deal, […] for containing the SS20s and Backfire’.
108
 
After the Guadeloupe meeting, it was, once again, the UK, US and West Germany 
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who led intra-Alliance consultations. France soon declared that it would not participate 
in the possible arms control negotiations on grey areas.
109
 Among the three leading 
NATO powers, the West Germans were most active as the Americans entered a new 
phase of volatility. Aaron told Hunt in London as early as 8 February that Carter was 
now thinking of concentrating on SALT II at the forthcoming summit meeting with 
Brezhnev and for this reason, on that occasion, he would not discuss SALT III. 
Furthermore, to the surprise of British officials, Aaron told them that the Americans 
would prefer Alliance consensus on TNF modernisation by the end of 1979 after which 
consultation on grey area systems would follow. In response, the British officials 
restated the position that TNF modernisation and arms control were ‘two sides of the 
same coin’.
110
 Nevertheless, the Carter administration’s priority was now not to 
endanger the SALT II agreement or to provoke the Russians by demanding that these 
two issues be dealt with as one. 
West German officials immediately proposed to Aaron that the Alliance should 
seriously consider doing ‘something on arms control measures in parallel’ with TNF 
modernisation or establish a special group in the Alliance to study the arms control 
aspect of grey areas.
111
 In the Anglo-German bilateral meeting of 23 February, Ruth 
explained in detail the idea of a special working group in NATO on grey area systems 
and arms control. The Germans preferred a new body rather than the existing NATO 
political committee; they argued that institutional innovation would have the 
‘presentational advantage’ of indicating to both the public and the Soviets the intent of 
the Alliance on arms control. Given the significant anti-nuclear lobby in the FRG, the 
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politics of this proposal were particularly acute.
112
 Thinking of the sense of urgency – 
completing the work by the end of the years as the Americans wanted – British officials 
believed the German idea to be ‘a satisfactory way of giving the necessary impetus to 
this work’. They were concerned that without US leadership it would be difficult to 
produce effective results.
113
 Nevertheless, as Callaghan stressed in Cabinet on 16 
January, it was important for the British not to isolate the Germans. In the end, during a 
restricted ministerial meeting on 5 March, the four ministers agreed to support the 
German’s proposal for a special working group.
114
 In other words, the British had 
accepted German leadership. Throughout the winter and spring, it was West Germany 
which led the discussion and Britain followed the Germans, rather than the Americans. 
Their close collaboration continued amid consideration of the details of the special 




This Anglo-German cooperation had its effect on the US position. At first, the 
Americans were rather reluctant to take a lead. The priority for Washington was the 
successful conclusion of SALT II and Aaron told Hunt that the discussions on a future 
SALT III needed to be quite separate from the SALT II ratification debate. Moreover, in 
regard to the Anglo-German proposal for a new working group, he added that a member 
of the NATO International Staff, rather than an American official, was more preferable 
as a chair. Also, he said that the US would not head the discussion on the deployment of 
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the LRTNF in Belgium and the Netherlands, the two countries which the FRG wished to 
home LRTNF alongside West Germany itself.
116
  
However, the American attitude changed after hearing the views of Britain and West 
Germany in February.
117
 By this time the Carter administration had belatedly realised 
that US leadership was necessary to maintain Alliance integrity or face criticism and 
weakness. As the Americans assumed that West Germany would doubt the reliability of 
the US and NATO further, they accepted in the end that the Special Group should be 
chaired by an American to indicate leadership.
118
 Once the Americans had changed 
their stance, discussions followed smoothly. On 29 March in Washington, the American, 
British and German officials agreed to propose to their allies the establishment of the 
‘Special Group on Arms Control and Related Matters’ (SG) based on a draft by the 
British and the Germans.
119
 Now it was obvious that the Americans were clearly 
backing the Germans, Owen argued that Britain should follow their lead.
120
 Although 
the French declared again that they did not have any intention of participating, a 
consensus was forged that the SG should be established as soon as possible. 
Consequently, the idea of the SG was approved in the NATO Council on 6 April and the 
first meetings took place on 19 and 20 April.
121
  
After Guadeloupe, close Anglo-German cooperation was the main driving force in 
the establishment of the new SG in the Alliance. As British policymakers worked with 
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their German opposite numbers, there were growing concerns in London about the 
FRG’s role in European international relations. Callaghan was disturbed by Schmidt’s 
attitude. As mentioned above, in Cabinet on 11 January he expressed rather clearly his 
dissatisfaction with what he described as Schmidt’s ‘illogical’ attitude. He repeated this 
impression to Jay in March and later mentioned it in his memoirs.
122
 In his note on the 
Guadeloupe summit, he put it bluntly: ‘Schmidt illogical, Giscard detached. We agree 
Carter would probe Brezhnev’, adding that with ‘Germany’s emergence as a world 
power – the economic giant becomes politically adult’.
123
 In Callaghan’s estimation, 
while the Federal Republic had started to play a major role in politico-military relations 
in Europe, the illogicality, as he saw it, of Schmidt’s position suggested that the 
Chancellor neither understood the significance, or the responsibility, of his country’s 
new status. In this sense, Callaghan found himself drawn yet further to Carter. 
The emergence of Germany as a major political power in European international 
affairs was now clear to the British policymakers. Before Callaghan’s visit to Bonn in 
October 1978, Wright argued in his despatch on German foreign policy that Willy 
Brandt’s description of the FRG – as ‘an economic giant but a political dwarf’ – was no 
longer apt; under Schmidt, with all of its economic strength, Germany had entered the 
world stage. Wright remarked on the Federal Republic’s active international roles, 
adding that its improved relationship with the Soviet Union and France indicated that 
while maintaining its deep commitment to NATO and the EC, West Germany was ‘no 
longer content to maintain a low profile in either but is making a specifically German 
contribution to both’. But his conclusion was positive; while it would take some time 
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for European allies to get used to an engaged German foreign policy, West Germany 




Wright’s optimistic evaluation did not gain consensus in Whitehall; a strengthened 
Franco-German entente was regarded as a threat to Britain’s leading status in Europe. 
To the British, Germany had been a more loyal ally than France, but now the Germans 
seemed to be paying greater attention to the Franco-German entente than to the Alliance 
solidarity. Evidence for this view was close Franco-German cooperation in the 
European Monetary System (EMS). Julian L. Bullard, Minister of the British Embassy 
in Bonn, pointed out that there were plenty of prior consultations between the Germans 
and the French, and political cooperation between these two countries was always 
several steps ahead of Anglo-German consultations. Those facts indicated, he argued, 
that Britain would be overtaken.
125
 Any hopes for an Anglo-French-German strategic 
triangle had to be questioned by the endurance of the Franco-German axis. 
Ambassador Wright was less anxious. In his annual review on West Germany in 
1978, he commented that the leadership shown by the Federal Republic and its foreign 
policy was the product of the absence of leadership by others; Germany itself did not 
have any intention to seek domination in international affairs. From his point of view, 
active German commitment to deepened Franco-German relations and improved 
German-Soviet relations were the result of the concerns about Carter’s foreign policy. 
He concluded that: 
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Their action will be based upon an almost neurotic search for stability and predictability in 
an unstable and unpredictable world and upon the knowledge that memories of the past will 
come back to strike them if they adopt too high a profile in the process. Germans as much 
as anyone else seek to promote their interests, it is a measure of their absence of 
self-assertion since the war that active German policy-making strikes some observers as 




Wright’s colleagues in London did not necessarily share his assessment. Owen was 
particularly concerned about the FRG’s foreign policy, warning of the risks associated 
with close Franco-German relations and airing his criticisms.
127
 He instructed his 
officials at the end of November 1978 to review recent developments in FRG foreign 
policy, especially towards West German relations with France, the US and the USSR.
128
 
At the end of the following February in the DOP, ministers discussed West German 
foreign policy based on the review produced by the FCO officials. Owen pointed out 
that closeness of West Germany’s bilateral relations with France was not in the interest 
of Britain or other European allies.
129
 He argued that Britain should try to direct 
Germany’s political and economic strength within the framework of the Alliance and 
the European Community while trying to persuade the Bonn government to alter its 
policies.  
The DOP discussion is notable for two points. First, ministers argued that in order to 
deter the Franco-German dominance of Europe Britain had to develop a stronger 
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economy in order to redress the balance of power. Secondly, and more importantly, it 
was pointed out that West Germany’s economic power was not commensurate with its 
political responsibilities. The Federal Republic’s attitude towards the grey area 
discussions was an example of its reluctance to take a lead or shoulder its political 
responsibilities. The ‘strongest card’ that the British had to apply pressure on the 
Germans was the UK defence relationship with the FRG. The intra-Alliance discussion 
on grey area systems gave policymakers in London an opportunity to influence the 
changing role of West Germany. It is important that it was Helmut Schmidt rather than 
Jimmy Carter who created the new circumstances. Carter set up the background to 
induce him to do so as the result of his faulty policy towards European security.  
Unfortunately for the Labour government, there was not sufficient time to grasp this 
important change in the tides or reflect on the FCO’s review in the development of its 
policy. Immediately on return from Guadeloupe, Callaghan and his government faced 
widespread protest. Healey recalled that ‘(p)ictures of him in tropical sun did not 
improve the temper of ordinary men and women suffering from trade union action in the 
British winter’.
130
 Callaghan’s regret at this political predicament, which diverted his 
focus from critical matters of European security, was apparent in his memoirs.
131
 As he 
had no option but to focus his government’s attention entirely on the management of 
domestic disorder, there was little time to consider Britain’s place in the Alliance, its 
contribution to European security, or its role in transatlantic relations. From 3 May 1979, 
Callaghan and his ministers would no longer have to worry about their own roles in 
managing Britain’s course through the changing Cold War of the late 1970s. On that day, 
the British people voted for a new Conservative government. 
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The intra-Alliance discussions on grey area systems and arms control in Cold War 
Europe revealed the changing balance of power in the Alliance at the end of the 1970s. 
It was West Germany, or, more precisely, Helmut Schmidt himself, who led the 
consultation, not Jimmy Carter. As a result of the ERW dispute, the Carter 
administration began to pay more attention to intra-Alliance diplomacy on European 
security and the discussions on grey area systems clearly indicated this change. While 
listening to European allies’ voices, the Carter administration intended to take a lead on 
this complicated issue. The American priority was to alleviate the concerns of European 
allies on the grey area in order to obtain their support for the SALT II agreement before 
the launch of the SALT III negotiations. In this sense, the Guadeloupe summit was a 
product of the ERW fiasco. It would not have occurred without the mishandling of the 
ERW dispute and in this context, the decisions agreed at the summit were a 
consequence of Carter’s efforts to compensate for previous failed diplomacy in Europe.  
However, what is more significant in the period after April 1978 is that the Carter 
administration paid most of its attention to Schmidt’s attitude, and the position of West 
Germany, and consequently Carter and his administration were forced to take the 
initiative. Initially, the US government did not regard the deployment of the SS-20s and 
the Backfire bombers as critical military threats. Therefore the ‘integrated strategy’ was 
not based on military considerations; it was established for a political reason, namely to 
alleviate West Germany’s concerns before they spread throughout western European.  
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Another point which should be mentioned here is that regardless of Carter’s efforts 
to lead the Alliance, his administration was not consistent on how to handle either the 
grey area issue or TNF modernisation. The discussions in the HLG showed that the 
administration did not at first have a coherent view on TNF modernisation. True, they 
adopted the ‘integrated strategy’ in September 1978, but even after that their policy was 
ambivalent, particularly after the Guadeloupe summit. To some extent, Washington’s 
wavering attitude was caused by the Soviet response to the SALT II negotiations but the 
result was an inability to present clear leadership in the Alliance to deal with the grey 
area issue. This lack of consistency in US policy obliged West Germany to play a major 
role in the policy making process. 
Given the complexity of this evolving situation, what kind of role did the British 
play? The previous chapter explained that Britain’s actions were critical as a mediate in 
the Alliance over the ERW dispute. The British worked pari passu with the Americans 
to calm relations and British diplomacy was highly appreciated by the Carter 
administration. However, when it comes to the period from summer 1978 to spring 1979, 
Britain’s role was upstaged as the central political dynamic in the Alliance moved to 
that between the US and West Germany. In his description of Callaghan’s role as an 
‘international honest broker’, the former Labour leader’s official biographer stated that 
‘(t)he conference at Guadeloupe marked the climax of Callaghan’s involvement in 
foreign affairs as Prime Minister’.
132
 True, his role at Guadeloupe was important. He 
mediated between the heads of government and facilitated the agreement on the future 
handling of the grey area and TNF modernisation. Callaghan’s interventions were 
tactically significant, but not strategically decisive. It was Carter and Schmidt who 
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determined the direction of Alliance consultation on grey area systems and their place in 
arms control negotiations. Fundamentally, while these were at base military problems, 
for the Americans and the West Germans they were also Cold War political issues, for 
different reasons. The British had argued that the grey area was a military issue and to 
the extent that the West Germans shared this view, close Anglo-German cooperation 
was enabled in the HLG on TNF modernisation and on the establishment of the SG after 
Guadeloupe. But for West Germany the grey area was also a critical political problem. 
Even if the Federal Republic became the most powerful economic power in Europe, it 
was still highly vulnerable, politically, as a country facing the gigantic direct military 
threat of a Soviet attack. The deployment of SS-20s was thus not so much a simple 
military issue but a grave political problem. Nevertheless, the FRG was not, and could 
not by treaty, be a nuclear country. Callaghan did not fully understand this sensitivity. 
The more powerful West Germany became, the more clearly this sensitive imbalance 
between its economic power and politico/military ability emerged. Unfortunately, 
Callaghan’s criticism of Schmidt’s refusal to allow deployment of LRTNF in West 
Germany indicated his lack of understanding of the FRG’s predicament. For himself and 
Carter, West Germany was a country which should share a political and military burden 
corresponding with its economic power. At the same time, this changing German 
attitude was an open question in London and after Guadeloupe, British officials began a 
significant review of West Germany’s future as an influential player in European 
politics. However, as the Labour Party lost the 1979 General Election, their review was 
incomplete and there was no consensus in Whitehall about how to deal with the rising 
power of Germany.   
The increase of German influence necessarily affected the state of Anglo-American 
299 
 
relations. There is no evidence that the key ministers doubted Britain’s ties with the 
Carter administration. In fact, the agreement between Callaghan and Carter on the 
renewal of Britain’s nuclear deterrent with the American Trident C4 SLBM was 
symbolic, proving the existence of the nuclear ‘special relationship’. It was to a large 
extent accomplished by the good personal relationship between the two men at the top. 
Yet, this fact blurred the reality of Britain declining influence in European defence 
policy making. The Americans still trusted the Callaghan government as a mediator in 
transatlantic relations, particularly between themselves and the Germans. The British 
and the Americans shared the understanding that the SS-20s and the Backfire bombers 
were not a military threat and thus did not seriously change the nuclear balance in 
Europe. Despite the largely shared outlook between the Americans and the British, the 
strength of their relationship on Cold War Europe began to wane as the Carter 
administration recognised the centrality of the Federal Republic to the resolution of its 
policies and thus concentrated its diplomacy on Bonn, and less so on London. 
As these changes in the transatlantic constellation occurred, the Callaghan 
government’s response was delayed by its own considerations on Britain’s nuclear 
deterrent. As this chapter has revealed, the primary concern among key ministers was 
the replacement of Polaris. Consequently, officials and ministers were unable to react 
promptly to the development of discussions on the grey area. By the time the four 
ministers decided their stance immediately before Callaghan went to Guadeloupe, the 
major framework for the future of European defence had already been constructed by 
the Americans and the Germans. Callaghan’s own trade-off, between Britain’s support 
for Carter’s line at Guadeloupe and the American offer of Trident, gave both heads of 
government meaningful results. While Callaghan gained Carter’s confirmation on the 
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Trident, Carter received a crucial help from Callaghan which brought conclusion to the 
Guadeloupe summit meeting, even if it was not exactly the one which Carter wanted. 
Nevertheless, Britain’s presence in the Alliance had been diminished by its vacillation, 
even despite good relations between Callaghan and Carter. Nuclear power status and the 
‘special relationship’ had prevented policymakers from entirely recognising the 
changing political balance in the ever more complex transatlantic relationship. 
Since the inauguration of Carter’s administration, inconsistency had been the 
abiding feature of US policy towards European security. This fact enabled the Callaghan 
government to play its self-defined role as the mediator of transatlantic relations. Yet 
there was a price to pay in playing this part; as it included conveying Carter’s indistinct 
policies to European allies, it rendered Britain vulnerable politically. Once the Carter 
administration started paying more attention to West Germany and its position in the 
Alliance, Britain’s role as mediator, clearly displayed during the ERW dispute, was 
easily superseded. When allied leaders moved beyond ERW to debate and resolve at the 
highest levels the problems of grey area systems, TNF modernisation and SALT III, the 
altered constellation was stark. In crucial matters of European security in the changing 
Cold War world of the late 1970s, the British were faced, through their own diplomacy, 








While the 1970s was an era in which Britain formally began to pay more political and 
economic attention to Europe, its political-military commitment to European security 
seemed to be eclipsed as Britain’s decline took hold. Historians have described Britain’s 
important contribution to European détente during this period which reached its climax 
with the Helsinki Accord at the CSCE in July–August 1975, but they have also 
suggested that defence matters, with the exception of nuclear deterrence, were neglected 
under the Labour governments.
1
Moreover, they have explained how Britain’s 
commitment to European defence was marginalised during the decade as a result of 
defence expenditure cuts under the Labour governments.
2
 This thesis has shed a new 
light on this largely overlooked, but important period in Britain’s diplomatic history by 
focusing on the policymaking process in terms of European security and its relationship 
with developments in Cold War in Europe in the late 1970s. It set out to address two 
main questions concerning the Callaghan government’s policy towards European 
security: first, what kind of policy the Callaghan government envisaged for European 
security; and, secondly, what kind of role Britain played in transatlantic relations. This 
conclusion concentrates on these two research questions and offers interpretations and 
answers. 
There are three main findings. First, the Callaghan government’s foreign policy was 
the combination of the pursuit of a leading role in Europe and an intensified 
Anglo-American relationship underpinned by Britain’s strengthened European position. 
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In terms of European security, this meant the maintenance of Britain’s influence in the 
American defence policy-making process through its major military contribution to 
NATO forces. Nevertheless, this vision was forced to change by the ongoing economic 
crisis in 1976. Secondly, given reduced defence resources, British policymakers sought 
to sustain their commitment to European security by pursuing further unity and playing 
the role of a ‘mediator’ in transatlantic relations to enhance the solidarity of the Alliance. 
In this strategy, the British complied with the Carter administration’s desire to find a 
reliable ally in Europe. The personal relationship between the British Prime Minister 
and the new US President substantially contributed to the development of enhanced 
bilateral cooperation. This Anglo-American special relationship significantly assisted 
the maintenance of Alliance unity, particularly in the aftermath of the ERW dispute. 
Thirdly, despite Britain’s response to its economic trails, and its collaboration with the 
US, Callaghan’s preference for the status quo, and his lack of strategy towards the 
future of European security other than the maintenance of the stability of the Alliance 
under American leadership, hampered Britain’s attempts to retain influence in European 
security. Whilst Britain’s presence waned in the Alliance, West Germany gained status 
in the defence policy making process of NATO by arguing for a new response to the 
changing East-West military balance and the decline of détente.  
The first point this thesis seeks to elucidate is the vision which the Callaghan 
government had for European security in the context of transatlantic relations. By the 
end of the first half of the 1970s, the final phase of the long transitional period of British 
foreign policy from Empire to Europe had been completed. The referendum on the EC 
membership in June 1975 confirmed Britain’s place in Europe. With the ‘yes’ vote, the 
long dispute over Britain’s place in Europe was at least formally, if not in reality, settled. 
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In addition, as a result of two Statements on the Defence Estimates for 1975 and 1976 
which argued that Britain’s limited resources should be concentrated on defence and 
détente in the European theatre, Britain’s defence contribution was to be dedicated 
solely to European security.
3
 Britain’s substantial military commitment outside Europe 
would cease. Thus by the time when Callaghan became Prime Minister in April 1976 
after his predecessor Harold Wilson’s resignation, Europe was regarded more than ever 
before as the principal field for British foreign policy. As Foreign Secretary in the 
Wilson government, and then Prime Minister, Callaghan was central to the formulation 
of this policy. In an era of international instability, the unity of NATO was ever-more 
important. Thus, Britain’s priority was to play a major role in European security in 
cooperation with the US to solidify the Alliance. Under the Callaghan government, 
Britain’s policy towards European security was two-fold; to continue its military 
contribution to NATO and thus maintain its leading position in the Alliance, and to 
retain the US commitment to European defence. In turn, this policy was expected to 
sustain the special relationship with the US which in itself would underpin Britain’s 
major presence in the Alliance. Callaghan was the key figure in making British defence 
policy from the beginning of his government and his influence was increased by 
Crosland’s death and Owen’s appointment as his successor. With the Prime Minister in 
control, Atlanticism dominated British thinking as Owen, Healey, and Mulley shared his 
commitment to Anglo-American relations. 
Nevertheless, Britain’s policy plan was very quickly and very seriously interrupted 
by dire economic circumstances and the resulting IMF crisis of autumn 1976. Among 
the many casualties was the defence budget, and cuts inevitably affected not only 
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Britain’s military strength but also its political status in the Alliance. What was worse 
for the Callaghan government was that the IMF crisis occurred just as the Soviet 
military build-up in conventional forces heightened public concern and strengthened 
doubts about détente. Clearly 1976 was a watershed in defence and détente in Europe as 
the earlier euphoria about East-West reconciliation turn towards fear of a new 
confrontation. In this critical moment for European security, and as the Alliance 
considered increasing defence expenditure to maintain the military balance in Europe, 
Britain was forced to make consecutive reductions in defence spending. NATO’s DPC 
meeting of December 1976 warned of increased Warsaw Pact conventional forces and 
called for an Alliance response.
4
 Britain’s cuts at this very point naturally provoked 
harsh criticisms from its allies. Facing these responses, the British were more seriously 
concerned about the decline of their presence in the Alliance and realised that it was 
necessary to find a way to recoup their influence.  
This decline in Britain’s presence highlighted the increase of West Germany’s 
strength in the Alliance and over Britain, as became apparent over the Anglo-German 
offset problem. Compared with the massive aggregate of the defence budget cutbacks, 
the amount of payment that could be secured from the Germans was relatively small, 
but Britain desperately needed that money to sustain its contribution to European 
defence. In this sense, the IMF crisis made British policymakers feel keenly the rise of 
West Germany, not only in its economic influence but also in its military strength in the 
Alliance. The British were concerned that a good US-FRG relationship at that time 
would encroach upon Britain’s relations with the US because of its declining economic 
and military presence, but unless the British received Germany’s financial support, their 
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status would potentially suffer yet further degradation. This ironic situation symbolised 
the changing power balance in European international relations. 
At the same time, the offset negotiations revealed changing German attitudes 
towards the political setting in Europe. For the Germans, particularly for Chancellor 
Schmidt himself, the offset negotiation was not a simple financial or military question 
but a more fundamental issue concerning West Germany’s position in the Alliance. For 
him, paying offset costs to the Americans and the British evoked West Germany’s past 
and its subordinate status in Europe since 1945.
5
 Thus, Schmidt and Genscher wanted 
West Germany to gain more equal status with Europe’s leading powers politically. Yet 
as the British ambassador to West Germany Sir Oliver Wright pointed out, German 
leaders were still cautious about their nation playing a more active political and military 
role.
6
 Britain could still find a way to take the lead. 
By the end of 1976, as Britain faced the dual challenges of reduced standing in the 
Alliance and the rise of German influence in Atlantic and European affairs, officials 
concentrated on the pursuit of an alternative way to contribute to the Alliance which 
could offer counterbalance to the contraction in the UK’s physical military contributions 
to European security.
7
 Naturally, acceptance of declining influence and the 
abandonment of Britain’s major role in the Alliance was not their choice. Diplomatic 
ideas and initiatives – offering ideas for the stability of the Alliance – were the answers 
that British policymakers found for Britain’s future role in the Alliance. 
The second conclusion of this thesis is that the Callaghan government attempted to 
counterbalance its reduced resource contribution to the Alliance by playing a more 
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active role as a mediator in transatlantic relations. The advent of the new American 
administration gave the Callaghan government an opportunity to pursue this alternative 
role when the US government proclaimed that it would consult closely with European 
allies on European security soon after Carter’s inauguration in January 1977.
8
  
What was fortunate for the Callaghan government was that the Carter administration 
wanted Anglo-American cooperation. The Americans needed a good relationship with 
Britain to convince those sceptical Europeans that the administration was paying 
attention to intra-Alliance consultation. For the US administration, cooperation with 
Britain was a good starting point to reassure other allies about the President’s earlier 
promise.
9
 In turn, Callaghan’s Atlanticist convictions, his belief in American leadership 
and in good transatlantic relations, had not changed throughout his premiership and 
were no doubt strengthened by personal relations with Carter.
10
 Morgan pointed out 
that because of Carter’s reserved personality and technocratic outlook Callaghan never 
felt the same closeness with Carter as he did with Ford.
11
 Callaghan later recalled that 
Carter had a ‘manifest dislike of horse-trading, and was not ready enough to use tactical 
skill to overcome the vested interests and powerful Washington lobbies which 
challenged him’. But he liked this ‘gentle and good man’.
12
 Personal ties were 
established in their first meeting in Washington in March 1977. Callaghan’s initial 
impression of the new President was immediately positive: he was a ‘man with a 
well-stocked mind and disciplined approach. He had given considerable thought to his 
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intended initiatives and had a clear idea of what he wished to achieve’.
13
 Moreover, 
Callaghan felt a strong affinity with the new President because of their common 
background, Baptist faith, non-university education and, according to Peter Jay, their 
shared initials.
14
 For Carter, too, Callaghan was the closest European leader.
15
 
Brzezinski was ‘amazed how quickly Callaghan succeeded in establishing himself as 
Carter’s favourite, writing him friendly little notes, calling, talking like a genial old 
uncle, and lecturing Carter in a pleasant manner on the intricacies of inter-allied 
politics’.
16
 With this closeness, and perhaps because of his inexperience in foreign 
affairs, Carter was influenced by the well-experienced British Prime Minister, and 
Callaghan was happy to counsel the US president.
17
 Thus, both countries had their own 
reasons for the revival of Anglo-American special relationship. It is also important that 
the four key ministers in the Labour Cabinet – Callaghan himself, Owen, Healey and 
Mulley – shared a belief in the value of Anglo-American relations. In addition to these 
factors, Jay’s appointment to the ambassador to the US eased communication between 
President and Prime Minister.
18
 
If the administration developed its foreign policy under close consultation with the 
allies as planned, the allies would at least understand Carter’s intentions more precisely. 
However, what followed was not a broad understanding, but widespread confusion in 
the Alliance over the new administration’s intentions. This confusion was largely 
created by Carter’s radical foreign policy and his administration’s lack of consultation 
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with the allies about it.
19
 However, at this point policymakers in London still believed 
that they could shift the Carter administration’s foreign policy through consultation with 
the Americans. Officials were not as optimistic as the Prime Minister, but they too 
believed in their capacity to shift the American policy in the right direction.
20
  
While the leaders of the US and the UK established a close partnership, anxieties 
grew among other Alliance leaders as early as spring 1977 after the setback in the SALT 
II negotiations and the possible increase in Soviet armed forces. Tensions developed 
between France, West Germany and the US. The quadripartite summit meeting in May 
1977 in London revealed divisions over the future of European security. Giscard and 
Schmidt did not share Callaghan’s affinity with Carter, and expressed their deep 
concerns about the future of East-West relations given Carter’s policy. Contrary to their 
scepticism, Callaghan maintained his support for Carter.
21
 Moreover, in the European 
Council in June, while European leaders criticised the US president again, Callaghan 
remained steadfast.
22
 However, on European security, British and American policies 
were not entirely aligned as the British had reservations about the Carter 
administration’s policy. One example was Britain’s reluctance to accept the requirement 
for a 3% increase of defence spending at the NATO ministerial meeting in London. 
However, Britain’s cooperative attitude with the Americans was an indispensable factor 
which made the NATO ministerial meeting successful. In fact, Carter’s initiative for the 
LTDP demonstrated the President’s leadership in European defence, but its preparation 
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could not be performed successfully without London’s help. The British informed 
Washington repeatedly of European disquiet about a radical proposal, and Washington 
appreciated their advice.
23
 Dumbrell has pointed out that during this period Britain was 
the ‘explainer of America’s ways to Europe and of Europe’s ways to America’.
24
 But 
judging from the Callaghan government’s actions it is fair to say that the former had far 
more weight than the latter in Callaghan’s mind as a committed Atlanticist. Britain’s 
role was to enhance understanding of American foreign policy which had been confused 
by Carter’s diplomatic inexperience. 
The Carter administration’s poor performance in East-West relations, arms control, 
and intra-Alliance consultation enhanced Britain’s chances of increasing its status as a 
mediator and consequently strengthened the bilateral relationship. The ERW dispute 
was the case in which Anglo-American cooperation clearly played the most crucial role 
in overcoming the turmoil caused by the administration’s policy towards European 
security. The heart of the problem was Carter’s lack of full initiative for intra-Alliance 
consultation to gain an Alliance agreement for its deployment to Europe. With slow 
progress in SALT II, Carter’s earlier success in the NATO summit in London faded 
away and his reaffirmation of US commitment to European defence sounded futile. In a 
sense, Schmidt’s Alistair Buchan Lecture at the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies (IISS) in October 1977 was a result of Alliance uncertainties. Schmidt argued 
that the Alliance should react promptly to counter the Soviet nuclear military build-up – 
the so-called grey area – and particularly to the Soviet’s newly developed SS-20 
medium-range nuclear missiles.  
Originally the Americans remained reluctant to discuss the countermeasures to the 
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new Soviet medium-range nuclear weapon systems so as not to provoke Soviet 
opposition to an early SALT II agreement.
25
 However, Schmidt’s IISS speech on the 
‘Eurostrategic’ imbalance pushed the Carter administration to think about a trade-off 
between ERW and the SS-20s.
26
 For the Carter administration, which was facing harsh 
criticism of its détente policy, the ERW–SS-20 trade-off was an attractive alternative 
which could solve the grey area problem without causing contradictions with Carter’s 
earlier promises on arms control as it was not a part of SALT II negotiations. In London, 
officials were clearly in favour of the ERW although it is still not certain whether 
Callaghan wanted it, yet he did support the idea, if not wholeheartedly.
27
 For the British, 
the ERW–SS-20 deal could be useful as it ended the inertia in European security and did 
not affect their own considerations for nuclear deterrence. Once the Americans made 
their line clear in January 1978, the British government began to work with the 
Americans on a NATO statement for the ERW–SS-20 trade-off based on the US 
proposal.
28
 Britain’s own proposal for the arms control deal set within a wider context 
was a hybrid of the US and the German ideas and became a basis for the NATO 
statement which was to be issued after the intra-Alliance discussion in March. 
Carter’s 7 April announcement brought intra-Alliance consultations on ERW to a 
sudden end and complicated attempts by allied governments to quieten public criticisms 
of the President’s plans. As Garthoff pointed out, the significance of ERW was its 
political impact on the allies’ confidence in American leadership.
29
 This decisively 
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exacerbated tensions within US–West German bilateral relations. But here again, Britain 
played a crucial role to calm the waters in the aftermath of Carter’s sudden decision. 
Callaghan was unhappy with the way Carter’s had handled this issue, but he still trusted 
Carter, whereas some Whitehall officials began to doubt the President’s ability to lead 
the Alliance.
30
 Callaghan’s statements to the Cabinet on 6 and 13 April indicate his 
conviction perfectly; Carter was ‘man of principle who was however the first to admit 
that he lacked experience’, and ‘(i)t was important we should not make President 
Carter’s position more difficult as the Germans had done, and so far the President 
accepted that we were genuinely trying to be helpful’.
31
 Furthermore, Callaghan’s 
determination to tell his European colleagues about Carter’s intention on his behalf was 
clearly shown in his reply to Carter’s personal letter.
32
 In addition, his words in his 
meeting with Schmidt immediately after Carter’s decision in April 1978 indicate that he 
kept his promise.
33
 However, the highpoint of Anglo-American cooperation was the 
meeting at the White House at the end of March. While Carter was away in Latin 
America, Vice President Mondale discussed how to settle the problem with Callaghan 
and Jay. In this top-level consultation the discussion was led by Callaghan, which was 
particularly important as arrangements were made on how to persuade Schmidt.
34
 
Consequently, close Anglo-American cooperation saved the Alliance from further 
confusion.    
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Callaghan’s diplomacy grew from the consensus in London that dissonance in the 
Alliance over American policy should be minimised and unity should be protected. The 
British played an important role again later in spring 1978 to calm the Americans down. 
Given the mishandling of the ERW issue, the White House was anxious to recover its 
damaged reputation for leadership with ambitious plans for the forthcoming Washington 
NATO ministerial meeting more than the approval of the LTDP.
35
 With their knowledge 
of anything but consensus among European allies and the Americans in the Alliance, the 
British counselled the Carter administration to rethink their approach to the summit. 
The ERW fiasco marked a change in the Carter administration’s attitude towards 
European defence. It needed to show more forcefully its determination to commit to, 
and to take initiative, on it. Carter’s statements on East-West relations in the NATO 
summit in Washington at the end of May and the Naval Academy in Annapolis at the 
beginning of June showed his new more confrontational stance towards the Soviet 
military strength and greater American commitment to European defence.
36
 Yet as the 
result of the failure of the ERW deal, the grey area problem remained unresolved, and 
while the conclusion of the SALT II talks was expected in the foreseeable future, the 
grey area became the centre of the intra-Alliance discussion. Given this threat, the 
Germans and the British argued for the early TNF modernisation. Pushed by these 
factors, the Americans finally started intra-Alliance consultations on the grey area in 
May and Carter issued Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM)-38 in June which 
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directed US ministries to review TNF modernisation and arms control.
37
 
In September, the administration accepted officials’ recommendations in response to 
PRM-38, the so-called ‘integrated strategy’: TNF modernisation including the LRTNF 
and parallel US-Soviet arms control negotiations on TNF. It is clear that Carter’s move 
was prompted by Schmidt’s active commitment to resolving the grey area problem. The 
main motive was not the military threat of the SS-20s; instead, the defusing of German 
political and psychological anxieties arising from the SS-20s was far more significant.
38
 
Originally the Americans and the British shared the interpretation that the deployment 
of SS-20s and the Backfire bomber would not make a major qualitative shift in the 
Soviet military threat, but would just cause a quantitative change. But the Americans 
decided to change their line as they wished to avoid further conflict with the Germans 
over this issue and the spill-over of the conflict to the other European allies. Political 
necessity surpassed military consideration.  
The Guadeloupe summit was an important step to gain approval for the ‘integrated 
strategy’. In fact it paved the way to the deployment of the Pershing II and cruise 
missiles if the Soviet Union refused to limit the deployment of the SS-20s in arms 
control negotiations. Callaghan’s role as mediator was decisive in securing agreement 
between the four heads of government to Carter’s policies. Callaghan originally thought 
differently. Britain’s policy had been for the exclusion of the grey area from arms 
control negotiations as they believed that it would not yield the result which the 
Alliance wished, and, also, it would affect the future of Britain’s nuclear deterrent. But 
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he modified his thought and yet again supported Carter and mediated between Carter, 
Giscard and Schmidt. Callaghan’s support and mediation was decisive and no doubt 
impressed Carter, yet, the summit largely confirmed Schmidt’s line. Nevertheless, 
Callaghan’s mediation contributed to the approval of Carter’s handling of SALT II and 
to the agreement on the combination of future arms control and the TNF modernisation 
which became the prototype of the ‘double track’ decision 11 months later, December 
1979.
39
 At the same time, the summit meeting was significant in terms of the future of 
Britain’s nuclear deterrent. Historians have suggested that as a result of generally good 
personal ties and highly close discussions between Callaghan and Carter, it was agreed 
that the US would supply Trident C4 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) 
for the post-Polaris nuclear deterrent.
40
 But this was not only just the result of that 
personal relationship, rather this symbolised the special relationship which was 
underwritten by Britain’s role in transatlantic relations.  
However, Britain’s mediation did not mean that Britain played a major part in 
developing European security in the Callaghan years. This observation is central to the 
third conclusion of this thesis: British foreign policy played a significant tactical role for 
the stability of the Alliance during the Callaghan government. Nevertheless, since 
British policy concentrated more on tactics than strategy, Britain’s function did not 
extend to resolving, or contributing to the resolution of, fundamental issues of 
transatlantic relations when the Cold War was changing its nature at the end of the 
1970s. 
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True, the British did enhance the stability of the Alliance, which was greatly 
disturbed by the Carter administration’s attitude towards European security, and the 
Americans did fully appreciate their help. Nevertheless, beyond mediation, it is hard to 
see what the Callaghan government did and thus it is not clear how the British managed 
the development of the Cold War in Europe in the second half of the 1970s. It meant 
that Britain did not actively commit to intra-Alliance discussions. At official level 
Britain led the discussion in the HLG on the TNF modernisation since October 1977 
and then in the Special Group (SG) on the TNF and grey area issues after the 
Guadeloupe summit meeting. But at the political level, while Callaghan energetically 
worked hard for the unity of the Alliance, he did not make a visible British contribution 
to the considerations on the Alliance’s response to the changing nature of the Cold War 
caused by the Soviet military expansion in conventional and nuclear fields. Thus it can 
be assumed that for him, Alliance stability itself was the objective and thus the status 
quo in transatlantic relations under American leadership was what he aimed for. 
Throughout his premiership, Callaghan thought that with the existing defence posture 
the Alliance could react to the Soviet military challenge. For this purpose, in the 
convinced Atlantist’s eyes, the priority should be put on the maintenance of good 
transatlantic relations. The continuation of specialness of Anglo-American relations, and 
the active ties that it sustained between London and Washington, underpinned the 
American commitment to European defence and thus the stability of the Alliance as 
well as Britain’s status in the Alliance.    
Morgan wrote that Callaghan regarded himself as a 'consensus leader'. It is not fully 
clear to what extent his preferences in his foreign policy management were formed by 
this principle, but these were certainly reflected in his attitude in summit meetings. In 
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international summitry during this period Callaghan was no longer in the leading 
position; it was Carter in every sense. As this thesis has pointed out, Callaghan took 
American leadership for granted as a convinced Atlanticist. Thus it is possible to 
suggest that under Carter’s leadership, the British Prime Minister intended to establish 
conditions which enabled consensus among allied leaders. On the other hand, Morgan 
also wrote that Callaghan thought a political leader should ‘take a broad global view’ of 
his role and the ‘reciprocal relationship between leader and led’, and ‘seize the initiative 
and provide an active and engaged sense of direction from both the strategic and moral 
point of view’.
41
 It is debatable as to whether Carter followed this approach sufficiently, 
but judging from Callaghan’s comments on Carter in the government and at 
international meetings with other European leaders, he certainly believed that Carter had 
the capability to be a leader of the Alliance, although scepticism grew among the other 
leaders. Good personal relations enabled him to believe in this conviction and it is 
important to note that even real problems, such as the ERW dispute, did not alter his 
view. 
With this consideration, Britain’s role as mediator worked effectively when the 
Alliance was in cacophony amid Carter’s initial lack of leadership and his 
administration’s lack of consultations. While it was a good tactic to pull the Alliance 
together, it was not a broad strategy which rewired NATO’s defence policy or thought 
anew about arms control negotiations. This lack of strategy becomes more evident in a 
comparison with Heath. It is easy to find Heath's initiative in Britain's policy towards 
European security as he had such a solid vision of building a more integrated Europe, if 
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not fully independent from the US.
42
 Nevertheless, in Callaghan's case, such an 
overriding strategy is not so clear other than the maintenance of good transatlantic 
relations. Thus, Callaghan had nothing in terms of strategic vision equivalent to Heath’s 
own. Kissinger recalled that Callaghan admitted that he did not have a geopolitical and 
strategic mind but he well understood the basic courses for British foreign policy.
43
 But 
when Soviet military expansion was changing the nature of the East-West military 
balance under the Cold War in Europe, a wider strategy for European security was more 
necessary than ever before.  
In terms of strategic considerations in European security, it was possible for the 
Callaghan government to commit to taking advantage of its close ties with the Carter 
administration. Callaghan, as well as other policymakers in London, did give advice to 
the members of the Carter administration, but Callaghan did not choose to point out the 
problems with Giscard, Schmidt or other European leaders, but tried to modify it from 
inside. In the end, this diplomacy did not cause a fundamental change of the US policy 
towards European defence. The real strategic framework of European security was 
designed by West Germany, or Schmidt’s concern about the US administration’s attitude 
towards European security. While Callaghan paid most of his attention to the 
maintenance of the Alliance, Schmidt had vocally warned of the crisis of  European 
security caused by the Soviet-military build-up and argued for a new response to the 
changing East-West military balance and the decline of détente. This presented a clear 
contrast with Callaghan’s preference for the status quo. It is significant that, facing the 
decline of their credibility as leaders of the Alliance in the aftermath of the ERW dispute, 
the Americans clearly shifted to follow the Germans’ tail, not because of military 
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necessity, but due to a political requirement to compromise with them. The Carter 
administration needed Britain as a buffer between the Germans and themselves to avoid 
any further clashes. But when they began to set up a new strategy for European security 
in response to the changing circumstances of the Cold War, Britain’s place was 
relatively diminished. It was Callaghan’s achievement that the four heads of 
government reached an agreement at Guadeloupe on the future of TNF modernisation 
and grey area. But it also meant that Britain had to accept the broad strategy set by the 
Americans and the Germans. 
West Germany was no longer the subordinate, defeated country. Under Schmidt its 
influence was increasing in European international affairs, but, given the still existing 
memory of the past, Schmidt was still cautious about playing a more substantial role in 
political and military spheres. However, to a large extent because of doubts about 
American foreign policy, it was West Germany and Schmidt who shaped Alliance 
defence strategy in the latter half of the 1970s. Schmidt clearly recalled that ‘Europeans 
were markedly more sceptical. The European governments had no need of a new 
beginning in Washington. Instead, they had high hopes for a confirmation of America’s 
overall strategy and its consistency in pursuing it’.
44
 But what Europeans had to deal 
with was the new administration’s changeable foreign policy. Lack of transatlantic 
consultation generated by Washington accelerated the confusion in the Alliance and 
increased doubts about the credibility of American leadership. The way Washington 
handled Alliance discussions on ERW only served to solidify distrust. This unstable 
situation gave room to Schmidt to propose an alternative strategy, although he was still 
cautious about doing so. Consequently, Carter’s lack of leadership brought Schmidt and 
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West Germany to the centre stage of European international relations. On the other hand, 
for the British government, Carter’s new foreign policy was a change in style and not in 
substance. They were supportive in principle as long as there was no threat to Britain’s 
position in the Alliance. Although FCO officials began to shift from their earlier view, 
Callaghan maintained it firmly and Britain’s mediator role continued. The confusions 
and conflicts in the Alliance offered Britain opportunities to play an important role as a 
mediator to protect those conflicts from escalation. But Callaghan’s lack of strategy 
other than the maintenance of Alliance stability and his preference for the status quo in 
European security limited Britain’s influence, ultimately, as its economic woes reduced 
its standing as an international player.  
The final judgement offered by this thesis is that the British pursuit of the role of 
mediator in transatlantic relations was an inevitable choice given economic weakness 
and reduced defence spending in the latter half of seventies. It complied with Britain’s 
consistent intent to contribute to European security, now based less on hardware and 
more on diplomacy, and matched with what the Carter administration wanted from its 
primary ally. In turn, the Callaghan government’s policy towards European security thus 
enhanced the Anglo-American special relationship and so contributed to the 
stabilisation of the Atlantic Alliance. This achievement was no mean feat when the 
Alliance was in cacophony. Nevertheless, the fluctuations in the Carter administration’s 
foreign policy, set against the backdrop of changing international relations, ensured that 
Callaghan had to support the Americans at a most difficult moment in Cold War Europe. 
Inconsistency from Washington gave the West Germans opportunity to pursue their own 
strategic ideas for European security. Britain’s continuing role as a mediator was 
tactically effective and protected the Alliance when the tensions in East-West relations 
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markedly increased. Nevertheless, Britain’s attachment to the special relationship and 
Callaghan’s lack of strategy and preference for the status quo weakened the UK’s 
diplomatic status. Consequently, by the end of the Callaghan government, the long-held 
British anxiety that West Germany would supplant the United Kingdom as Europe’s 
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